CVE-2026-80612 (GCVE-0-2026-80612)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5
Published
2026-08-28 06:48
Modified
2026-08-29 06:21
Severity ?
VLAI Severity ?
EPSS score ?
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: lwtunnel: Drop skb metadata before LWT encapsulation
skb metadata is meant for passing information between XDP and TC. It lives
in the skb headroom, immediately before skb->data. LWT programs cannot
access the __sk_buff->data_meta pseudo-pointer to metadata.
However, LWT encapsulation prepends outer headers, moving skb->data back
over the headroom where the metadata sits. On an RX-originated (forwarded)
packet that still carries XDP metadata this goes wrong in two different
ways, depending on the encap type:
1. Non-BPF LWT encaps (mpls, seg6, ioam6 ...) call skb_push()/skb_pull()
and silently overwrite the metadata that sits in the headroom.
2) BPF LWT xmit calls bpf_skb_change_head(), which uses skb_data_move().
That helper expects metadata immediately before skb->data. But since
the IP output path runs LWT xmit before neighbour output has built
the outgoing L2 header, for forwarded packets skb->data points at the
L3 header while skb_mac_header() still points at the old L2 header.
skb_data_move() sees metadata ending at skb_mac_header(), not before
skb->data, warns and clears metadata:
WARNING: CPU: 21 PID: 454557 at include/linux/skbuff.h:4609 skb_data_move+0x47/0x90
CPU: 21 UID: 0 PID: 454557 Comm: napi/iconduit-g Tainted: G O 6.18.21 #1
RIP: 0010:skb_data_move+0x47/0x90
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
bpf_skb_change_head+0xe6/0x1a0
bpf_prog_...+0x213/0x2e3
run_lwt_bpf.isra.0+0x1d3/0x360
bpf_xmit+0x46/0xe0
lwtunnel_xmit+0xa1/0xf0
ip_finish_output2+0x1e7/0x5e0
ip_output+0x63/0x100
__netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x85/0xa0
process_backlog+0x9c/0x150
__napi_poll+0x2b/0x190
net_rx_action+0x40b/0x7f0
handle_softirqs+0xd2/0x270
do_softirq+0x3f/0x60
</IRQ>
That is what happens, as for how to fix it - a received packet that
carries metadata can reach an encap through any of the three LWT
redirect modes:
LWTUNNEL_STATE_INPUT_REDIRECT
ip6_rcv_finish
dst_input
lwtunnel_input
LWTUNNEL_STATE_OUTPUT_REDIRECT
ip6_rcv_finish
dst_input
ip6_forward
ip6_forward_finish
dst_output
lwtunnel_output
LWTUNNEL_STATE_XMIT_REDIRECT
ip6_rcv_finish
dst_input
ip6_forward
ip6_forward_finish
dst_output
ip6_output
ip6_finish_output
ip6_finish_output2
lwtunnel_xmit
Every encap funnels through the three LWT dispatch helpers, so drop the
metadata there, right before handing the skb to the encap op. This
single chokepoint covers all encap types and all three redirect modes:
- lwtunnel_input(): seg6, rpl, ila, seg6_local
- lwtunnel_output(): ioam6
- lwtunnel_xmit(): mpls, LWT BPF xmit
Alternatively, we could clear the metadata right after TC ingress hook.
That would require a compromise, however. Metadata would become
inaccessible from TC egress (in setups where it actually reaches the
hook it tact, that is without any L2 tunnels on path).
References
Impacted products
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"net/core/lwtunnel.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "19eec11f3ab5dd29ba58f5f209c24e946c95ef12",
"status": "affected",
"version": "8989d328dfe7c7a3b9f4b9f0ef60006d277f81cc",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "c00320b0e355c4bf0ae4743a53b4180fea237546",
"status": "affected",
"version": "8989d328dfe7c7a3b9f4b9f0ef60006d277f81cc",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"net/core/lwtunnel.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.19"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.19",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.1.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.1.5",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"cpeApplicability": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "7.1.5",
"versionStartIncluding": "6.19",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "7.2",
"versionStartIncluding": "6.19",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
]
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet: lwtunnel: Drop skb metadata before LWT encapsulation\n\nskb metadata is meant for passing information between XDP and TC. It lives\nin the skb headroom, immediately before skb-\u003edata. LWT programs cannot\naccess the __sk_buff-\u003edata_meta pseudo-pointer to metadata.\n\nHowever, LWT encapsulation prepends outer headers, moving skb-\u003edata back\nover the headroom where the metadata sits. On an RX-originated (forwarded)\npacket that still carries XDP metadata this goes wrong in two different\nways, depending on the encap type:\n\n1. Non-BPF LWT encaps (mpls, seg6, ioam6 ...) call skb_push()/skb_pull()\n and silently overwrite the metadata that sits in the headroom.\n\n2) BPF LWT xmit calls bpf_skb_change_head(), which uses skb_data_move().\n That helper expects metadata immediately before skb-\u003edata. But since\n the IP output path runs LWT xmit before neighbour output has built\n the outgoing L2 header, for forwarded packets skb-\u003edata points at the\n L3 header while skb_mac_header() still points at the old L2 header.\n skb_data_move() sees metadata ending at skb_mac_header(), not before\n skb-\u003edata, warns and clears metadata:\n\n WARNING: CPU: 21 PID: 454557 at include/linux/skbuff.h:4609 skb_data_move+0x47/0x90\n CPU: 21 UID: 0 PID: 454557 Comm: napi/iconduit-g Tainted: G O 6.18.21 #1\n RIP: 0010:skb_data_move+0x47/0x90\n Call Trace:\n \u003cIRQ\u003e\n bpf_skb_change_head+0xe6/0x1a0\n bpf_prog_...+0x213/0x2e3\n run_lwt_bpf.isra.0+0x1d3/0x360\n bpf_xmit+0x46/0xe0\n lwtunnel_xmit+0xa1/0xf0\n ip_finish_output2+0x1e7/0x5e0\n ip_output+0x63/0x100\n __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x85/0xa0\n process_backlog+0x9c/0x150\n __napi_poll+0x2b/0x190\n net_rx_action+0x40b/0x7f0\n handle_softirqs+0xd2/0x270\n do_softirq+0x3f/0x60\n \u003c/IRQ\u003e\n\nThat is what happens, as for how to fix it - a received packet that\ncarries metadata can reach an encap through any of the three LWT\nredirect modes:\n\n LWTUNNEL_STATE_INPUT_REDIRECT\n ip6_rcv_finish\n dst_input\n lwtunnel_input\n\n LWTUNNEL_STATE_OUTPUT_REDIRECT\n ip6_rcv_finish\n dst_input\n ip6_forward\n ip6_forward_finish\n dst_output\n lwtunnel_output\n\n LWTUNNEL_STATE_XMIT_REDIRECT\n ip6_rcv_finish\n dst_input\n ip6_forward\n ip6_forward_finish\n dst_output\n ip6_output\n ip6_finish_output\n ip6_finish_output2\n lwtunnel_xmit\n\nEvery encap funnels through the three LWT dispatch helpers, so drop the\nmetadata there, right before handing the skb to the encap op. This\nsingle chokepoint covers all encap types and all three redirect modes:\n\n - lwtunnel_input(): seg6, rpl, ila, seg6_local\n - lwtunnel_output(): ioam6\n - lwtunnel_xmit(): mpls, LWT BPF xmit\n\nAlternatively, we could clear the metadata right after TC ingress hook.\nThat would require a compromise, however. Metadata would become\ninaccessible from TC egress (in setups where it actually reaches the\nhook it tact, that is without any L2 tunnels on path)."
}
],
"metrics": [
{
"cvssV3_1": {
"baseScore": 9.8,
"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"scenarios": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "AV:N - The bug fires on the network RX datapath in softirq when remotely sourced packets are received, forwarded, and LWT-encapsulated (ip6_rcv_finish to ip6_forward to lwtunnel_xmit as shown in the fix commit stack trace).\nAC:L - Once a forwarding host has XDP/TC metadata plus LWT encap routes, an attacker can repeatedly send matching traffic and deterministically hit the metadata/encap collision each time without races or victim-timed actions.\nPR:N - The attacker only needs to send IP packets to a forwarding system; LWT routes, XDP/TC metadata programs, and forwarding are administrator deployment choices, not privileges the attacker must hold on the victim.\nUI:N - No end-user interaction is required beyond delivering attacker-controlled network packets to an affected router or edge node.\nS:U - Impact is confined to kernel network packet processing on the same host and does not cross VM, hypervisor, or sandbox security boundaries.\nC:H - Non-BPF LWT encap silently overwrites metadata while meta_len can remain set, and BPF LWT xmit mishandles metadata via skb_data_move, enabling corrupted metadata reads by later BPF/TC code and potential information disclosure.\nI:H - LWT encapsulation performs headroom skb_push/bpf_skb_change_head over the metadata region without clearing meta_len, corrupting skb memory state in ways that can misdirect subsequent kernel/BPF packet-buffer writes.\nA:H - The BPF LWT path triggers skb_data_move WARN_ON_ONCE in softirq and non-BPF encap corrupts forwarding skbs, enabling warn-driven failure modes and repeated disruption of packet forwarding on internet-facing edge routers."
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-08-29T06:21:20.430Z",
"orgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"shortName": "Linux"
},
"references": [
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/19eec11f3ab5dd29ba58f5f209c24e946c95ef12"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c00320b0e355c4bf0ae4743a53b4180fea237546"
}
],
"title": "net: lwtunnel: Drop skb metadata before LWT encapsulation",
"x_generator": {
"engine": "bippy-1.2.0"
}
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"assignerShortName": "Linux",
"cveId": "CVE-2026-80612",
"datePublished": "2026-08-28T06:48:34.527Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-08-26T14:34:25.773Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-08-29T06:21:20.430Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or seen somewhere by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability is confirmed from an analyst perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: This vulnerability was exploited and seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Patched: This vulnerability was successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not exploited: This vulnerability was not exploited or seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expresses doubt about the veracity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: This vulnerability was not successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
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