CVE-2026-80218 (GCVE-0-2026-80218)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5
Published
2026-09-17 13:09
Modified
2026-09-17 18:28
Severity ?
VLAI Severity ?
EPSS score ?
CWE
- CWE-287 - Improper Authentication
Summary
Improper Authentication vulnerability in team-alembic AshAuthentication allows an attacker holding a sign-in token for one authenticated resource to be signed in as a user of a different resource.
AshAuthentication.Strategy.Password.SignInWithTokenPreparation.extract_primary_keys_from_subject/2 parses the JWT sub claim (for example user?id=1) with URI.parse/1 and keeps only its query string, discarding the path segment that names the subject the token was issued for. Nothing else restores that binding: AshAuthentication.Jwt.verify/3 checks the signature, exp, nbf, jti and the library-version claims, the purpose check only requires sign_in, and the remaining comparison is over primary-key field names, which are identical across resources. The WebAuthn sign-in and remember-me preparations carry copies of the same helper and drop the path in the same way. The magic link sign-in path pins the subject name against the resource and is not affected.
This issue affects ash_authentication: from 3.10.5 before 4.15.0 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.14.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| team-alembic | ash_authentication |
Version: 3.10.5 ≤ Version: 5.0.0-rc.0 ≤ cpe:2.3:a:team-alembic:ash_authentication:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* |
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|
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The magic link sign-in path pins the subject name against the resource and is not affected.\u003c/p\u003e\\n\u003cp\u003eThis issue affects ash_authentication: from 3.10.5 before 4.15.0 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.14.\u003c/p\u003e\", \"base64\": false}, {\"type\": \"text/markdown\", \"value\": \"Improper Authentication vulnerability in team-alembic AshAuthentication allows an attacker holding a sign-in token for one authenticated resource to be signed in as a user of a different resource.\\n\\n`AshAuthentication.Strategy.Password.SignInWithTokenPreparation.extract_primary_keys_from_subject/2` parses the JWT `sub` claim (for example `user?id=1`) with `URI.parse/1` and keeps only its query string, discarding the path segment that names the subject the token was issued for. Nothing else restores that binding: `AshAuthentication.Jwt.verify/3` checks the signature, `exp`, `nbf`, `jti` and the library-version claims, the purpose check only requires `sign_in`, and the remaining comparison is over primary-key field names, which are identical across resources. The WebAuthn sign-in and remember-me preparations carry copies of the same helper and drop the path in the same way. The magic link sign-in path pins the subject name against the resource and is not affected.\\n\\nThis issue affects ash_authentication: from 3.10.5 before 4.15.0 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.14.\", \"base64\": false}]}], \"problemTypes\": [{\"descriptions\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"type\": \"CWE\", \"cweId\": \"CWE-287\", \"description\": \"CWE-287 Improper Authentication\"}]}], \"cpeApplicability\": [{\"nodes\": [{\"negate\": false, \"cpeMatch\": [{\"criteria\": \"cpe:2.3:a:team-alembic:ash_authentication:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*\", \"vulnerable\": true, \"versionEndExcluding\": \"4.15.0\", \"versionStartIncluding\": \"3.10.5\"}, {\"criteria\": \"cpe:2.3:a:team-alembic:ash_authentication:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*\", \"vulnerable\": true, \"versionEndExcluding\": \"5.0.0-rc.14\", \"versionStartIncluding\": \"5.0.0-rc.0\"}], \"operator\": \"OR\"}], \"operator\": \"AND\"}], \"providerMetadata\": {\"orgId\": \"6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db\", \"shortName\": \"EEF\", \"dateUpdated\": \"2026-09-17T13:09:25.585Z\"}}}",
"cveMetadata": "{\"cveId\": \"CVE-2026-80218\", \"state\": \"PUBLISHED\", \"dateUpdated\": \"2026-09-17T18:28:47.571Z\", \"dateReserved\": \"2026-09-11T18:30:01.333Z\", \"assignerOrgId\": \"6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db\", \"datePublished\": \"2026-09-17T13:09:25.585Z\", \"assignerShortName\": \"EEF\"}",
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2"
}
}
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or seen somewhere by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability is confirmed from an analyst perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: This vulnerability was exploited and seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Patched: This vulnerability was successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not exploited: This vulnerability was not exploited or seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expresses doubt about the veracity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: This vulnerability was not successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
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