CVE-2026-79979 (GCVE-0-2026-79979)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5
Published
2026-10-23 19:56
Modified
2026-10-23 19:56
Severity ?
VLAI Severity ?
EPSS score ?
CWE
- CWE-416 - use-after-free
Summary
The arm64 MMU backend invalidates a single virtual address from the TLB with invalidate_tlb_page() in arch/arm64/core/mmu.c, which issued TLBI VAE1{IS} with an operand of virt >> 12. That operand encodes the ASID in bits [63:48], so the invalidation only ever matched ASID 0 (the kernel page tables) and global entries. Memory domains, however, are allocated ASIDs starting at 1 in arch_mem_domain_init(), and every domain-private leaf created by private_map() is mapped with MT_NG, i.e. non-global. A domain's cached translation therefore survived the invalidation.
All callers of invalidate_tlb_page() are demand-paging paths. When the eviction algorithm reclaims a frame, page_frame_prepare_locked() in kernel/mmu.c calls arch_mem_page_out(), which marks the kernel leaf invalid, propagates the invalid descriptor into every domain via sync_domains(), and then flushes only ASID 0. do_page_fault() immediately reuses the very same page frame for the incoming mapping through arch_mem_page_in(). A user thread that had already touched the evicted page — a k_mem_partition added with arch_mem_domain_partition_add(), or its own stack mapped by map_thread_stack() — retains a valid EL0 read/write translation to that physical frame under its own ASID.
Unprivileged code running in a user thread can drive memory pressure to force eviction and then keep accessing the stale address, obtaining read and write access to whatever the kernel subsequently placed in that frame: supervisor data, another memory domain's partition, or another thread's stack. This defeats the isolation that CONFIG_USERSPACE is meant to enforce, allowing information disclosure and memory corruption up to full compromise of the system.
The fix switches the implementation to TLBI VAAE1{IS}, which matches every ASID and both global and non-global entries, so no domain-tagged translation survives a page out, dirty-bit update or access-flag clear. Exploitation requires an arm64 build with both CONFIG_USERSPACE and CONFIG_DEMAND_PAGING enabled, an active backing store, and at least one demand-paged page that is also privately mapped into a user memory domain. The same commit additionally stops globalize_table() from stripping EL0 permission and non-global attributes off domain-private leaves during paging synchronization, which previously caused user threads to lose access to their own partitions and stacks.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| zephyrproject | zephyr |
Version: 4.3.0 ≤ |
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"collectionURL": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr",
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"packageName": "zephyr",
"product": "zephyr",
"programFiles": [
"arch/arm64/core/mmu.c"
],
"programRoutines": [
{
"name": "arch_mem_page_out"
},
{
"name": "invalidate_tlb_page"
}
],
"vendor": "zephyrproject",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "4.5.0",
"status": "affected",
"version": "4.3.0",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "The arm64 MMU backend invalidates a single virtual address from the TLB with invalidate_tlb_page() in arch/arm64/core/mmu.c, which issued TLBI VAE1{IS} with an operand of virt \u003e\u003e 12. That operand encodes the ASID in bits [63:48], so the invalidation only ever matched ASID 0 (the kernel page tables) and global entries. Memory domains, however, are allocated ASIDs starting at 1 in arch_mem_domain_init(), and every domain-private leaf created by private_map() is mapped with MT_NG, i.e. non-global. A domain\u0027s cached translation therefore survived the invalidation.\n\nAll callers of invalidate_tlb_page() are demand-paging paths. When the eviction algorithm reclaims a frame, page_frame_prepare_locked() in kernel/mmu.c calls arch_mem_page_out(), which marks the kernel leaf invalid, propagates the invalid descriptor into every domain via sync_domains(), and then flushes only ASID 0. do_page_fault() immediately reuses the very same page frame for the incoming mapping through arch_mem_page_in(). A user thread that had already touched the evicted page \u2014 a k_mem_partition added with arch_mem_domain_partition_add(), or its own stack mapped by map_thread_stack() \u2014 retains a valid EL0 read/write translation to that physical frame under its own ASID.\n\nUnprivileged code running in a user thread can drive memory pressure to force eviction and then keep accessing the stale address, obtaining read and write access to whatever the kernel subsequently placed in that frame: supervisor data, another memory domain\u0027s partition, or another thread\u0027s stack. This defeats the isolation that CONFIG_USERSPACE is meant to enforce, allowing information disclosure and memory corruption up to full compromise of the system.\n\nThe fix switches the implementation to TLBI VAAE1{IS}, which matches every ASID and both global and non-global entries, so no domain-tagged translation survives a page out, dirty-bit update or access-flag clear. Exploitation requires an arm64 build with both CONFIG_USERSPACE and CONFIG_DEMAND_PAGING enabled, an active backing store, and at least one demand-paged page that is also privately mapped into a user memory domain. The same commit additionally stops globalize_table() from stripping EL0 permission and non-global attributes off domain-private leaves during paging synchronization, which previously caused user threads to lose access to their own partitions and stacks."
}
],
"metrics": [
{
"cvssV3_1": {
"baseScore": 7.8,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"format": "CVSS"
}
],
"problemTypes": [
{
"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-416",
"description": "use-after-free",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-10-23T19:56:16.111Z",
"orgId": "e2e69745-5e70-4e92-8431-deb5529a81ad",
"shortName": "zephyr"
},
"references": [
{
"name": "Fix commit",
"tags": [
"patch"
],
"url": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/d732e9f808f16911d06769b3f756246f3528669f"
},
{
"name": "GHSA-6pqm-hfxf-48qv",
"url": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-6pqm-hfxf-48qv"
}
],
"title": "Stale TLB entries after demand-paging page-out let arm64 user threads access reused physical frames",
"x_generator": {
"engine": "cvelib 1.8.0"
}
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "e2e69745-5e70-4e92-8431-deb5529a81ad",
"assignerShortName": "zephyr",
"cveId": "CVE-2026-79979",
"datePublished": "2026-10-23T19:56:16.111Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-08-25T16:06:32.777Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-10-23T19:56:16.111Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or seen somewhere by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability is confirmed from an analyst perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: This vulnerability was exploited and seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Patched: This vulnerability was successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not exploited: This vulnerability was not exploited or seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expresses doubt about the veracity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: This vulnerability was not successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
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