CVE-2026-78038 (GCVE-0-2026-78038)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5
Published
2026-08-30 11:50
Modified
2026-08-30 11:50
Severity ?
VLAI Severity ?
EPSS score ?
CWE
- CWE-915 - Improperly Controlled Modification of Dynamically-Determined Object Attributes
Summary
Improperly Controlled Modification of Dynamically-Determined Object Attributes vulnerability in ash-project ash_oban allows a user whose input reaches the :args option of AshOban.build_trigger/3 to retarget an update or destroy trigger at another record, including across tenants.
build_trigger/3 builds the trusted job arguments with atom keys (:primary_key, :tenant, :action_arguments) and merges the caller's :args underneath so the trusted values win on collision. Because Oban job arguments round-trip through JSON, the caller's keys arrive as strings, so Map.merge sees no collision and both keys survive. When the job is persisted the JSON object is de-duplicated keeping the last (string) key, and the worker reads the caller's value. The documentation describes :args as unable to affect the action, so an application that forwards user input into it for uniqueness scoping is exposed to authorization bypass and tenant isolation breaks.
This issue affects ash_oban: from 0.2.5 before 0.8.14.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ash-project | ash_oban |
Version: 0.2.5 ≤ cpe:2.3:a:ash-project:ash_oban:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* |
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{
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"collectionURL": "https://repo.hex.pm",
"cpes": [
"cpe:2.3:a:ash-project:ash_oban:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
],
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"modules": [
"\u0027Elixir.AshOban\u0027"
],
"packageName": "ash_oban",
"packageURL": "pkg:hex/ash_oban",
"product": "ash_oban",
"programFiles": [
"lib/ash_oban.ex"
],
"programRoutines": [
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.AshOban\u0027:build_trigger/3"
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],
"packageName": "ash-project/ash_oban",
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"product": "ash_oban",
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"vendor": "ash-project",
"versions": [
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"status": "affected",
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"versionType": "git"
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"cpeApplicability": [
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"credits": [
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"type": "finder",
"value": "Peter Ullrich"
},
{
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"type": "reporter",
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{
"lang": "en",
"type": "remediation developer",
"value": "Zach Daniel / Ash Project"
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{
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"type": "coordinator",
"value": "Jonatan M\u00e4nnchen / EEF"
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"value": "\u003cp\u003eImproperly Controlled Modification of Dynamically-Determined Object Attributes vulnerability in ash-project ash_oban allows a user whose input reaches the \u003ccode\u003e:args\u003c/code\u003e option of \u003ccode\u003eAshOban.build_trigger/3\u003c/code\u003e to retarget an update or destroy trigger at another record, including across tenants.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ccode\u003ebuild_trigger/3\u003c/code\u003e builds the trusted job arguments with atom keys (\u003ccode\u003e:primary_key\u003c/code\u003e, \u003ccode\u003e:tenant\u003c/code\u003e, \u003ccode\u003e:action_arguments\u003c/code\u003e) and merges the caller\u0027s \u003ccode\u003e:args\u003c/code\u003e underneath so the trusted values win on collision. Because Oban job arguments round-trip through JSON, the caller\u0027s keys arrive as strings, so \u003ccode\u003eMap.merge\u003c/code\u003e sees no collision and both keys survive. When the job is persisted the JSON object is de-duplicated keeping the last (string) key, and the worker reads the caller\u0027s value. The documentation describes \u003ccode\u003e:args\u003c/code\u003e as unable to affect the action, so an application that forwards user input into it for uniqueness scoping is exposed to authorization bypass and tenant isolation breaks.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThis issue affects ash_oban: from 0.2.5 before 0.8.14.\u003c/p\u003e"
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"value": "Improperly Controlled Modification of Dynamically-Determined Object Attributes vulnerability in ash-project ash_oban allows a user whose input reaches the `:args` option of `AshOban.build_trigger/3` to retarget an update or destroy trigger at another record, including across tenants.\n\n`build_trigger/3` builds the trusted job arguments with atom keys (`:primary_key`, `:tenant`, `:action_arguments`) and merges the caller\u0027s `:args` underneath so the trusted values win on collision. Because Oban job arguments round-trip through JSON, the caller\u0027s keys arrive as strings, so `Map.merge` sees no collision and both keys survive. When the job is persisted the JSON object is de-duplicated keeping the last (string) key, and the worker reads the caller\u0027s value. The documentation describes `:args` as unable to affect the action, so an application that forwards user input into it for uniqueness scoping is exposed to authorization bypass and tenant isolation breaks.\n\nThis issue affects ash_oban: from 0.2.5 before 0.8.14."
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"impacts": [
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"vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"version": "4.0",
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"description": "CWE-915 Improperly Controlled Modification of Dynamically-Determined Object Attributes",
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"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-08-30T11:50:21.136Z",
"orgId": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"shortName": "EEF"
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"references": [
{
"tags": [
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"url": "https://github.com/ash-project/ash_oban/security/advisories/GHSA-gj9p-x393-rf9h"
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"tags": [
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"url": "https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-78038.html"
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"tags": [
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"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-78038"
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"url": "https://github.com/ash-project/ash_oban/commit/da2d81e1e8e1dcc3e6ec8587cdb4f273575ffca3"
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"source": {
"discovery": "EXTERNAL"
},
"title": "Job argument injection via :args overrides primary_key and tenant in AshOban"
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"datePublished": "2026-08-30T11:50:21.136Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-08-28T19:30:02.318Z",
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"state": "PUBLISHED"
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or seen somewhere by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability is confirmed from an analyst perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: This vulnerability was exploited and seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Patched: This vulnerability was successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not exploited: This vulnerability was not exploited or seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expresses doubt about the veracity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: This vulnerability was not successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
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