CVE-2026-77776 (GCVE-0-2026-77776)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5
Published
2026-08-21 11:22
Modified
2026-08-21 21:44
Severity ?
9.1 (Critical) - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
9.3 (Critical) - CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
CWE
  • CWE-639 - Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key
Summary
Headroom's LLM proxy derives the memory owner from the x-headroom-user-id request header. The header is read directly at several points in headroom/proxy/handlers/openai.py, including the chat completion and websocket paths, and nothing binds the value to the caller. A client can therefore name another user's identifier and read or write that user's stored LLM memory. The fix introduces a single resolve_memory_identity seam in headroom/proxy/identity.py that honors the header only for loopback or allowlisted callers and otherwise binds the identity to the proxy-token fingerprint or the operating system user. The pip console script binds 127.0.0.1 by default, but the reference docker-compose.yml ships --host 0.0.0.0 with published ports and no required HEADROOM_PROXY_TOKEN, which the server itself warns about at startup, so a deployment following the shipped compose exposes the affected data-plane routes to the network without authentication.
References
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
Headroom Labs Headroom Version: 0   ≤
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