CVE-2026-74836 (GCVE-0-2026-74836)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5
Published
2026-08-20 21:11
Modified
2026-08-21 19:55
Severity ?
VLAI Severity ?
EPSS score ?
CWE
- CWE-770 - Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling
Summary
Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in mtrudel bandit allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to pin an unbounded number of HTTP/2 stream processes indefinitely via connection-level flow control. When a stream's response body outruns the HTTP/2 connection-level send window (default 65,535 bytes, shared across all streams on the connection), Bandit.HTTP2.Connection queues the remaining bytes and a reply closure in pending_sends and the stream process blocks forever inside a synchronous call to the connection process. Nothing bounds that wait and nothing purges the queue: a client RST_STREAM for the blocked stream is delivered to its mailbox but never read while it is stuck inside the call, so cancelling frees nothing, and periodic PING frames keep the transport-level read timeout from ever firing. The equivalent block on the stream-level send window is already bounded at 15 seconds; the connection-level path had no such bound.
Each stalled stream pins its process, Plug state, and any resource the Plug holds across the blocked write, such as a pooled upstream connection in a reverse-proxy Plug. The attacker chooses any endpoint whose response exceeds the connection window (common for most non-trivial payloads), grants a generous stream-level window so only the connection window limits it, and keeps the connection alive with periodic PINGs; the primitive is repeatable across streams and connections at the cost of one idle socket each.
This issue affects bandit: from 0.3.4 before 1.12.5.
References
| URL | Tags | |
|---|---|---|
Impacted products
{
"containers": {
"adp": [
{
"metrics": [
{
"other": {
"content": {
"id": "CVE-2026-74836",
"options": [
{
"Exploitation": "poc"
},
{
"Automatable": "yes"
},
{
"Technical Impact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-08-21T19:54:42.335290Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
},
"type": "ssvc"
}
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-08-21T19:55:01.929Z",
"orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"shortName": "CISA-ADP"
},
"references": [
{
"tags": [
"exploit"
],
"url": "https://github.com/mtrudel/bandit/security/advisories/GHSA-xj8g-532w-jv94"
}
],
"title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
}
],
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"collectionURL": "https://repo.hex.pm",
"cpes": [
"cpe:2.3:a:mtrudel:bandit:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
],
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"modules": [
"\u0027Elixir.Bandit.HTTP2.Connection\u0027",
"\u0027Elixir.Bandit.HTTP2.Stream\u0027"
],
"packageName": "bandit",
"packageURL": "pkg:hex/bandit",
"product": "bandit",
"programFiles": [
"lib/bandit/http2/connection.ex",
"lib/bandit/http2/stream.ex"
],
"programRoutines": [
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.Bandit.HTTP2.Connection\u0027:finish_data/5"
},
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.Bandit.HTTP2.Connection\u0027:handle_frame/3"
},
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.Bandit.HTTP2.Stream\u0027:send_data/3"
}
],
"repo": "https://github.com/mtrudel/bandit",
"vendor": "mtrudel",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "1.12.5",
"status": "affected",
"version": "0.3.4",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
},
{
"collectionURL": "https://github.com",
"cpes": [
"cpe:2.3:a:mtrudel:bandit:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
],
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"modules": [
"\u0027Elixir.Bandit.HTTP2.Connection\u0027",
"\u0027Elixir.Bandit.HTTP2.Stream\u0027"
],
"packageName": "mtrudel/bandit",
"packageURL": "pkg:github/mtrudel/bandit",
"product": "bandit",
"programFiles": [
"lib/bandit/http2/connection.ex",
"lib/bandit/http2/stream.ex"
],
"programRoutines": [
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.Bandit.HTTP2.Connection\u0027:finish_data/5"
},
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.Bandit.HTTP2.Connection\u0027:handle_frame/3"
},
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.Bandit.HTTP2.Stream\u0027:send_data/3"
}
],
"repo": "https://github.com/mtrudel/bandit",
"vendor": "mtrudel",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "f6914aad14bb1365dd6f306aa592cfb0819bed3e",
"status": "affected",
"version": "6feadb31189d18b7dcda6c663112cd3bbaf63a46",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
}
],
"cpeApplicability": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:mtrudel:bandit:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "1.12.5",
"versionStartIncluding": "0.3.4",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
],
"operator": "AND"
}
],
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "reporter",
"value": "Giovanni Visciano / Hewlett Packard Enterprise - Athonet"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "remediation developer",
"value": "Mat Trudel"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "coordinator",
"value": "Jonatan M\u00e4nnchen / EEF"
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"supportingMedia": [
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/html",
"value": "\u003cp\u003eAllocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in mtrudel bandit allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to pin an unbounded number of HTTP/2 stream processes indefinitely via connection-level flow control. When a stream\u0027s response body outruns the HTTP/2 connection-level send window (default 65,535 bytes, shared across all streams on the connection), \u003ccode\u003eBandit.HTTP2.Connection\u003c/code\u003e queues the remaining bytes and a reply closure in \u003ccode\u003epending_sends\u003c/code\u003e and the stream process blocks forever inside a synchronous call to the connection process. Nothing bounds that wait and nothing purges the queue: a client \u003ccode\u003eRST_STREAM\u003c/code\u003e for the blocked stream is delivered to its mailbox but never read while it is stuck inside the call, so cancelling frees nothing, and periodic PING frames keep the transport-level read timeout from ever firing. The equivalent block on the stream-level send window is already bounded at 15 seconds; the connection-level path had no such bound.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eEach stalled stream pins its process, Plug state, and any resource the Plug holds across the blocked write, such as a pooled upstream connection in a reverse-proxy Plug. The attacker chooses any endpoint whose response exceeds the connection window (common for most non-trivial payloads), grants a generous stream-level window so only the connection window limits it, and keeps the connection alive with periodic PINGs; the primitive is repeatable across streams and connections at the cost of one idle socket each.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThis issue affects bandit: from 0.3.4 before 1.12.5.\u003c/p\u003e"
},
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/markdown",
"value": "Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in mtrudel bandit allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to pin an unbounded number of HTTP/2 stream processes indefinitely via connection-level flow control. When a stream\u0027s response body outruns the HTTP/2 connection-level send window (default 65,535 bytes, shared across all streams on the connection), `Bandit.HTTP2.Connection` queues the remaining bytes and a reply closure in `pending_sends` and the stream process blocks forever inside a synchronous call to the connection process. Nothing bounds that wait and nothing purges the queue: a client `RST_STREAM` for the blocked stream is delivered to its mailbox but never read while it is stuck inside the call, so cancelling frees nothing, and periodic PING frames keep the transport-level read timeout from ever firing. The equivalent block on the stream-level send window is already bounded at 15 seconds; the connection-level path had no such bound.\n\nEach stalled stream pins its process, Plug state, and any resource the Plug holds across the blocked write, such as a pooled upstream connection in a reverse-proxy Plug. The attacker chooses any endpoint whose response exceeds the connection window (common for most non-trivial payloads), grants a generous stream-level window so only the connection window limits it, and keeps the connection alive with periodic PINGs; the primitive is repeatable across streams and connections at the cost of one idle socket each.\n\nThis issue affects bandit: from 0.3.4 before 1.12.5."
}
],
"value": "Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in mtrudel bandit allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to pin an unbounded number of HTTP/2 stream processes indefinitely via connection-level flow control. When a stream\u0027s response body outruns the HTTP/2 connection-level send window (default 65,535 bytes, shared across all streams on the connection), Bandit.HTTP2.Connection queues the remaining bytes and a reply closure in pending_sends and the stream process blocks forever inside a synchronous call to the connection process. Nothing bounds that wait and nothing purges the queue: a client RST_STREAM for the blocked stream is delivered to its mailbox but never read while it is stuck inside the call, so cancelling frees nothing, and periodic PING frames keep the transport-level read timeout from ever firing. The equivalent block on the stream-level send window is already bounded at 15 seconds; the connection-level path had no such bound.\n\nEach stalled stream pins its process, Plug state, and any resource the Plug holds across the blocked write, such as a pooled upstream connection in a reverse-proxy Plug. The attacker chooses any endpoint whose response exceeds the connection window (common for most non-trivial payloads), grants a generous stream-level window so only the connection window limits it, and keeps the connection alive with periodic PINGs; the primitive is repeatable across streams and connections at the cost of one idle socket each.\n\nThis issue affects bandit: from 0.3.4 before 1.12.5."
}
],
"impacts": [
{
"capecId": "CAPEC-130",
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CAPEC-130 Excessive Allocation"
}
]
}
],
"metrics": [
{
"cvssV4_0": {
"Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackRequirements": "NONE",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"baseScore": 8.7,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
"subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"version": "4.0",
"vulnAvailabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"vulnConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
},
"format": "CVSS",
"scenarios": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "GENERAL"
}
]
}
],
"problemTypes": [
{
"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-770",
"description": "CWE-770 Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-08-20T21:11:18.999Z",
"orgId": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"shortName": "EEF"
},
"references": [
{
"tags": [
"vendor-advisory",
"related"
],
"url": "https://github.com/mtrudel/bandit/security/advisories/GHSA-xj8g-532w-jv94"
},
{
"tags": [
"related"
],
"url": "https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-74836.html"
},
{
"tags": [
"related"
],
"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-74836"
},
{
"tags": [
"patch"
],
"url": "https://github.com/mtrudel/bandit/commit/f6914aad14bb1365dd6f306aa592cfb0819bed3e"
}
],
"source": {
"discovery": "EXTERNAL"
},
"title": "HTTP/2 connection-window starvation pins Plug processes indefinitely in Bandit"
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"assignerShortName": "EEF",
"cveId": "CVE-2026-74836",
"datePublished": "2026-08-20T21:11:18.999Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-08-20T14:30:02.109Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-08-21T19:55:01.929Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2",
"vulnerability-lookup:meta": {
"vulnrichment": {
"containers": "{\"adp\": [{\"title\": \"CISA ADP Vulnrichment\", \"metrics\": [{\"other\": {\"type\": \"ssvc\", \"content\": {\"id\": \"CVE-2026-74836\", \"role\": \"CISA Coordinator\", \"options\": [{\"Exploitation\": \"poc\"}, {\"Automatable\": \"yes\"}, {\"Technical Impact\": \"partial\"}], \"version\": \"2.0.3\", \"timestamp\": \"2026-08-21T19:54:42.335290Z\"}}}], \"references\": [{\"url\": \"https://github.com/mtrudel/bandit/security/advisories/GHSA-xj8g-532w-jv94\", \"tags\": [\"exploit\"]}], \"providerMetadata\": {\"orgId\": \"134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0\", \"shortName\": \"CISA-ADP\", \"dateUpdated\": \"2026-08-21T19:54:55.488Z\"}}], \"cna\": {\"title\": \"HTTP/2 connection-window starvation pins Plug processes indefinitely in Bandit\", \"source\": {\"discovery\": \"EXTERNAL\"}, \"credits\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"type\": \"reporter\", \"value\": \"Giovanni Visciano / Hewlett Packard Enterprise - Athonet\"}, {\"lang\": \"en\", \"type\": \"remediation developer\", \"value\": \"Mat Trudel\"}, {\"lang\": \"en\", \"type\": \"coordinator\", \"value\": \"Jonatan M\\u00e4nnchen / EEF\"}], \"impacts\": [{\"capecId\": \"CAPEC-130\", \"descriptions\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"value\": \"CAPEC-130 Excessive Allocation\"}]}], \"metrics\": [{\"format\": \"CVSS\", \"cvssV4_0\": {\"Safety\": \"NOT_DEFINED\", \"version\": \"4.0\", \"Recovery\": \"NOT_DEFINED\", \"baseScore\": 8.7, \"Automatable\": \"NOT_DEFINED\", \"attackVector\": \"NETWORK\", \"baseSeverity\": \"HIGH\", \"valueDensity\": \"NOT_DEFINED\", \"vectorString\": \"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N\", \"providerUrgency\": \"NOT_DEFINED\", \"userInteraction\": \"NONE\", \"attackComplexity\": \"LOW\", \"attackRequirements\": \"NONE\", \"privilegesRequired\": \"NONE\", \"subIntegrityImpact\": \"NONE\", \"vulnIntegrityImpact\": \"NONE\", \"subAvailabilityImpact\": \"NONE\", \"vulnAvailabilityImpact\": \"HIGH\", \"subConfidentialityImpact\": \"NONE\", \"vulnConfidentialityImpact\": \"NONE\", \"vulnerabilityResponseEffort\": \"NOT_DEFINED\"}, \"scenarios\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"value\": \"GENERAL\"}]}], \"affected\": [{\"cpes\": [\"cpe:2.3:a:mtrudel:bandit:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*\"], \"repo\": \"https://github.com/mtrudel/bandit\", \"vendor\": \"mtrudel\", \"modules\": [\"\u0027Elixir.Bandit.HTTP2.Connection\u0027\", \"\u0027Elixir.Bandit.HTTP2.Stream\u0027\"], \"product\": \"bandit\", \"versions\": [{\"status\": \"affected\", \"version\": \"0.3.4\", \"lessThan\": \"1.12.5\", \"versionType\": \"semver\"}], \"packageURL\": \"pkg:hex/bandit\", \"packageName\": \"bandit\", \"programFiles\": [\"lib/bandit/http2/connection.ex\", \"lib/bandit/http2/stream.ex\"], \"collectionURL\": \"https://repo.hex.pm\", \"defaultStatus\": \"unaffected\", \"programRoutines\": [{\"name\": \"\u0027Elixir.Bandit.HTTP2.Connection\u0027:finish_data/5\"}, {\"name\": \"\u0027Elixir.Bandit.HTTP2.Connection\u0027:handle_frame/3\"}, {\"name\": \"\u0027Elixir.Bandit.HTTP2.Stream\u0027:send_data/3\"}]}, {\"cpes\": [\"cpe:2.3:a:mtrudel:bandit:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*\"], \"repo\": \"https://github.com/mtrudel/bandit\", \"vendor\": \"mtrudel\", \"modules\": [\"\u0027Elixir.Bandit.HTTP2.Connection\u0027\", \"\u0027Elixir.Bandit.HTTP2.Stream\u0027\"], \"product\": \"bandit\", \"versions\": [{\"status\": \"affected\", \"version\": \"6feadb31189d18b7dcda6c663112cd3bbaf63a46\", \"lessThan\": \"f6914aad14bb1365dd6f306aa592cfb0819bed3e\", \"versionType\": \"git\"}], \"packageURL\": \"pkg:github/mtrudel/bandit\", \"packageName\": \"mtrudel/bandit\", \"programFiles\": [\"lib/bandit/http2/connection.ex\", \"lib/bandit/http2/stream.ex\"], \"collectionURL\": \"https://github.com\", \"defaultStatus\": \"unaffected\", \"programRoutines\": [{\"name\": \"\u0027Elixir.Bandit.HTTP2.Connection\u0027:finish_data/5\"}, {\"name\": \"\u0027Elixir.Bandit.HTTP2.Connection\u0027:handle_frame/3\"}, {\"name\": \"\u0027Elixir.Bandit.HTTP2.Stream\u0027:send_data/3\"}]}], \"references\": [{\"url\": \"https://github.com/mtrudel/bandit/security/advisories/GHSA-xj8g-532w-jv94\", \"tags\": [\"vendor-advisory\", \"related\"]}, {\"url\": \"https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-74836.html\", \"tags\": [\"related\"]}, {\"url\": \"https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-74836\", \"tags\": [\"related\"]}, {\"url\": \"https://github.com/mtrudel/bandit/commit/f6914aad14bb1365dd6f306aa592cfb0819bed3e\", \"tags\": [\"patch\"]}], \"descriptions\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"value\": \"Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in mtrudel bandit allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to pin an unbounded number of HTTP/2 stream processes indefinitely via connection-level flow control. When a stream\u0027s response body outruns the HTTP/2 connection-level send window (default 65,535 bytes, shared across all streams on the connection), Bandit.HTTP2.Connection queues the remaining bytes and a reply closure in pending_sends and the stream process blocks forever inside a synchronous call to the connection process. Nothing bounds that wait and nothing purges the queue: a client RST_STREAM for the blocked stream is delivered to its mailbox but never read while it is stuck inside the call, so cancelling frees nothing, and periodic PING frames keep the transport-level read timeout from ever firing. The equivalent block on the stream-level send window is already bounded at 15 seconds; the connection-level path had no such bound.\\n\\nEach stalled stream pins its process, Plug state, and any resource the Plug holds across the blocked write, such as a pooled upstream connection in a reverse-proxy Plug. The attacker chooses any endpoint whose response exceeds the connection window (common for most non-trivial payloads), grants a generous stream-level window so only the connection window limits it, and keeps the connection alive with periodic PINGs; the primitive is repeatable across streams and connections at the cost of one idle socket each.\\n\\nThis issue affects bandit: from 0.3.4 before 1.12.5.\", \"supportingMedia\": [{\"type\": \"text/html\", \"value\": \"\u003cp\u003eAllocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in mtrudel bandit allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to pin an unbounded number of HTTP/2 stream processes indefinitely via connection-level flow control. When a stream\u0027s response body outruns the HTTP/2 connection-level send window (default 65,535 bytes, shared across all streams on the connection), \u003ccode\u003eBandit.HTTP2.Connection\u003c/code\u003e queues the remaining bytes and a reply closure in \u003ccode\u003epending_sends\u003c/code\u003e and the stream process blocks forever inside a synchronous call to the connection process. Nothing bounds that wait and nothing purges the queue: a client \u003ccode\u003eRST_STREAM\u003c/code\u003e for the blocked stream is delivered to its mailbox but never read while it is stuck inside the call, so cancelling frees nothing, and periodic PING frames keep the transport-level read timeout from ever firing. The equivalent block on the stream-level send window is already bounded at 15 seconds; the connection-level path had no such bound.\u003c/p\u003e\\n\u003cp\u003eEach stalled stream pins its process, Plug state, and any resource the Plug holds across the blocked write, such as a pooled upstream connection in a reverse-proxy Plug. The attacker chooses any endpoint whose response exceeds the connection window (common for most non-trivial payloads), grants a generous stream-level window so only the connection window limits it, and keeps the connection alive with periodic PINGs; the primitive is repeatable across streams and connections at the cost of one idle socket each.\u003c/p\u003e\\n\u003cp\u003eThis issue affects bandit: from 0.3.4 before 1.12.5.\u003c/p\u003e\", \"base64\": false}, {\"type\": \"text/markdown\", \"value\": \"Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in mtrudel bandit allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to pin an unbounded number of HTTP/2 stream processes indefinitely via connection-level flow control. When a stream\u0027s response body outruns the HTTP/2 connection-level send window (default 65,535 bytes, shared across all streams on the connection), `Bandit.HTTP2.Connection` queues the remaining bytes and a reply closure in `pending_sends` and the stream process blocks forever inside a synchronous call to the connection process. Nothing bounds that wait and nothing purges the queue: a client `RST_STREAM` for the blocked stream is delivered to its mailbox but never read while it is stuck inside the call, so cancelling frees nothing, and periodic PING frames keep the transport-level read timeout from ever firing. The equivalent block on the stream-level send window is already bounded at 15 seconds; the connection-level path had no such bound.\\n\\nEach stalled stream pins its process, Plug state, and any resource the Plug holds across the blocked write, such as a pooled upstream connection in a reverse-proxy Plug. The attacker chooses any endpoint whose response exceeds the connection window (common for most non-trivial payloads), grants a generous stream-level window so only the connection window limits it, and keeps the connection alive with periodic PINGs; the primitive is repeatable across streams and connections at the cost of one idle socket each.\\n\\nThis issue affects bandit: from 0.3.4 before 1.12.5.\", \"base64\": false}]}], \"problemTypes\": [{\"descriptions\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"type\": \"CWE\", \"cweId\": \"CWE-770\", \"description\": \"CWE-770 Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling\"}]}], \"cpeApplicability\": [{\"nodes\": [{\"negate\": false, \"cpeMatch\": [{\"criteria\": \"cpe:2.3:a:mtrudel:bandit:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*\", \"vulnerable\": true, \"versionEndExcluding\": \"1.12.5\", \"versionStartIncluding\": \"0.3.4\"}], \"operator\": \"OR\"}], \"operator\": \"AND\"}], \"providerMetadata\": {\"orgId\": \"6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db\", \"shortName\": \"EEF\", \"dateUpdated\": \"2026-08-20T21:11:18.999Z\"}}}",
"cveMetadata": "{\"cveId\": \"CVE-2026-74836\", \"state\": \"PUBLISHED\", \"dateUpdated\": \"2026-08-21T19:55:01.929Z\", \"dateReserved\": \"2026-08-20T14:30:02.109Z\", \"assignerOrgId\": \"6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db\", \"datePublished\": \"2026-08-20T21:11:18.999Z\", \"assignerShortName\": \"EEF\"}",
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2"
}
}
}
Loading…
Loading…
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or seen somewhere by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability is confirmed from an analyst perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: This vulnerability was exploited and seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Patched: This vulnerability was successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not exploited: This vulnerability was not exploited or seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expresses doubt about the veracity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: This vulnerability was not successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
Loading…
Loading…