CVE-2026-74727 (GCVE-0-2026-74727)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5
Published
2026-08-22 15:33
Modified
2026-08-25 05:42
Severity ?
VLAI Severity ?
EPSS score ?
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ovpn: skip rehash for peers already removed from by_id
ovpn_nl_peer_set_doit() resolves the target peer via
ovpn_peer_get_by_id() before taking ovpn->lock. In the window between
the lookup (which only takes a refcount) and the subsequent
spin_lock_bh(&ovpn->lock), a concurrent OVPN_CMD_PEER_DEL, keepalive
expiry, or socket teardown can take ovpn->lock first, run
ovpn_peer_remove() to unhash the peer from all four tables (by_id,
by_vpn_addr4/6, by_transp_addr) and release the lock. set_doit then
acquires ovpn->lock and calls ovpn_peer_hash_vpn_ip(), which
re-inserts the now-removed peer back into the rehashing tables.
The same race affects the float path: ovpn_peer_endpoints_update()
holds only a refcount and acquires ovpn->lock very late (after async
AEAD decrypt and a netlink notification), then rehashes the peer
in the by_transp_addr table.
The resurrected peer becomes reachable again from the RX lookup
(ovpn_peer_get_by_transp_addr) and the TX VPN-IP lookup, even though
userspace believes it is gone. Once the data-path refcount drops the
peer is freed via call_rcu while the hash entries embedded in it
remain linked, opening a UAF window.
Bail out of the rehash when hash_entry_id is unhashed, mirroring
the sentinel already used by ovpn_peer_remove() to detect the
already-removed state. The check is safe under ovpn->lock, which
serializes every mutation of hash_entry_id, and is a no-op for the
add path because ovpn_peer_add_mp() inserts hash_entry_id before
calling ovpn_peer_hash_vpn_ip().
References
Impacted products
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/net/ovpn/peer.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "d20c181088984b6eaa8d7fe7cb5ab3510988df59",
"status": "affected",
"version": "1d36a36f6d5347360ef9681a05f6166683bafd1d",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "66745480298775f188b2f5ad266643e85a90f73b",
"status": "affected",
"version": "1d36a36f6d5347360ef9681a05f6166683bafd1d",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "33ec10567fe14456063daf549fdf1a4f53448e4c",
"status": "affected",
"version": "1d36a36f6d5347360ef9681a05f6166683bafd1d",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/net/ovpn/peer.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.16"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.16",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.45",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.1.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.1.9",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"cpeApplicability": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "6.18.45",
"versionStartIncluding": "6.16",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "7.1.9",
"versionStartIncluding": "6.16",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "7.2",
"versionStartIncluding": "6.16",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
]
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\novpn: skip rehash for peers already removed from by_id\n\novpn_nl_peer_set_doit() resolves the target peer via\novpn_peer_get_by_id() before taking ovpn-\u003elock. In the window between\nthe lookup (which only takes a refcount) and the subsequent\nspin_lock_bh(\u0026ovpn-\u003elock), a concurrent OVPN_CMD_PEER_DEL, keepalive\nexpiry, or socket teardown can take ovpn-\u003elock first, run\novpn_peer_remove() to unhash the peer from all four tables (by_id,\nby_vpn_addr4/6, by_transp_addr) and release the lock. set_doit then\nacquires ovpn-\u003elock and calls ovpn_peer_hash_vpn_ip(), which\nre-inserts the now-removed peer back into the rehashing tables.\n\nThe same race affects the float path: ovpn_peer_endpoints_update()\nholds only a refcount and acquires ovpn-\u003elock very late (after async\nAEAD decrypt and a netlink notification), then rehashes the peer\nin the by_transp_addr table.\n\nThe resurrected peer becomes reachable again from the RX lookup\n(ovpn_peer_get_by_transp_addr) and the TX VPN-IP lookup, even though\nuserspace believes it is gone. Once the data-path refcount drops the\npeer is freed via call_rcu while the hash entries embedded in it\nremain linked, opening a UAF window.\n\nBail out of the rehash when hash_entry_id is unhashed, mirroring\nthe sentinel already used by ovpn_peer_remove() to detect the\nalready-removed state. The check is safe under ovpn-\u003elock, which\nserializes every mutation of hash_entry_id, and is a no-op for the\nadd path because ovpn_peer_add_mp() inserts hash_entry_id before\ncalling ovpn_peer_hash_vpn_ip()."
}
],
"metrics": [
{
"cvssV3_1": {
"baseScore": 9.8,
"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"scenarios": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "AV:N - The float-path UAF is reached from ovpn_udp_encap_recv()/ovpn_tcp_rcv() through ovpn_recv(), async AEAD decrypt, and ovpn_peer_endpoints_update(); a remote peer sends authenticated DATA_V2 packets over UDP/TCP to an internet-facing MP-mode OpenVPN gateway.\nAC:L - The remote peer controls float timing (new transport source), packet rate, and concurrent removal via TCP disconnect, UDP socket teardown, or keepalive expiry; netlink PEER_SET vs PEER_DEL races are likewise attacker-synchronized with no luck-dependent layout.\nPR:N - On an internet-facing MP-mode gateway, exploitation needs no Linux credentials on the victim\u2014only an established kernel-installed peer with valid AEAD keys (or namespace CAP_NET_ADMIN for netlink races), matching a remote VPN client rather than host root.\nUI:N - The rehash race is triggered by normal peer traffic and automatic keepalive/socket teardown; no administrator or end-user action on the victim host is required beyond routine VPN server operation.\nS:U - The UAF corrupts ovpn peer hash tables inside the kernel VPN driver; impact remains within the host kernel security domain without crossing VM, container, or IOMMU boundaries.\nC:H - Freed ovpn_peer objects remain linked in by_transp_addr/by_vpn_addr hash tables, so RX/TX lookups dereference recycled kmalloc-1k structures and enable arbitrary kernel-memory reads via attacker-controlled heap reuse.\nI:H - Resurrected hash entries steer traffic to freed peers and subsequent RCU/kref teardown on stale objects provide typical slab-UAF write primitives (refcount, socket, crypto pointer updates) suitable for kernel code execution.\nA:H - Use-after-free on hot datapath peer lookups reliably causes kernel oops/panic or slab corruption on VPN gateways, and remote peers can repeat the race to sustain denial of service."
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-08-25T05:42:08.380Z",
"orgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"shortName": "Linux"
},
"references": [
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d20c181088984b6eaa8d7fe7cb5ab3510988df59"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/66745480298775f188b2f5ad266643e85a90f73b"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/33ec10567fe14456063daf549fdf1a4f53448e4c"
}
],
"title": "ovpn: skip rehash for peers already removed from by_id",
"x_generator": {
"engine": "bippy-1.2.0"
}
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"assignerShortName": "Linux",
"cveId": "CVE-2026-74727",
"datePublished": "2026-08-22T15:33:17.773Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-08-15T05:44:03.929Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-08-25T05:42:08.380Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or seen somewhere by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability is confirmed from an analyst perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: This vulnerability was exploited and seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Patched: This vulnerability was successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not exploited: This vulnerability was not exploited or seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expresses doubt about the veracity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: This vulnerability was not successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
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