CVE-2026-74496 (GCVE-0-2026-74496)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5
Published
2026-08-15 12:27
Modified
2026-08-17 05:47
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fou: Fix use-after-free in fou_create() fou_create() publishes struct fou through sk_user_data before adding the new FOU port to the per-netns list. If fou_add_to_port_list() fails, the error path frees fou while it is still reachable through sk_user_data. A concurrent receive can then dereference the freed object in fou_from_sock(). This ordering issue was previously noted in the linked discussion. The failure is reachable when local port 0 is requested. Each socket binds to a different ephemeral port, but fou_cfg_cmp() compares the requested port 0 and reports -EALREADY once an entry already exists. Release the tunnel socket before freeing fou so sk_user_data is cleared first, and defer reclamation with kfree_rcu() to protect concurrent RCU readers. This matches the lifetime handling in fou_release().
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
Linux Linux Version: 23461551c00628c3f3fe9cf837bf53cf8f212b63
Version: 23461551c00628c3f3fe9cf837bf53cf8f212b63
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{
  "containers": {
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "net/ipv4/fou_core.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
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              "lessThan": "a28d8903bfe76089ea4bbdbff9976965f9ef8107",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "23461551c00628c3f3fe9cf837bf53cf8f212b63",
              "versionType": "git"
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              "status": "affected",
              "version": "23461551c00628c3f3fe9cf837bf53cf8f212b63",
              "versionType": "git"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "defaultStatus": "affected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "net/ipv4/fou_core.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "3.18"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "3.18",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "7.1.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.1.8",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.2",
              "versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "cpeApplicability": [
        {
          "nodes": [
            {
              "cpeMatch": [
                {
                  "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                  "versionEndExcluding": "7.1.8",
                  "versionStartIncluding": "3.18",
                  "vulnerable": true
                },
                {
                  "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                  "versionEndExcluding": "7.2",
                  "versionStartIncluding": "3.18",
                  "vulnerable": true
                }
              ],
              "negate": false,
              "operator": "OR"
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          ]
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nfou: Fix use-after-free in fou_create()\n\nfou_create() publishes struct fou through sk_user_data before adding the\nnew FOU port to the per-netns list.  If fou_add_to_port_list() fails,\nthe error path frees fou while it is still reachable through\nsk_user_data.  A concurrent receive can then dereference the freed\nobject in fou_from_sock().\n\nThis ordering issue was previously noted in the linked discussion.\n\nThe failure is reachable when local port 0 is requested.  Each socket\nbinds to a different ephemeral port, but fou_cfg_cmp() compares the\nrequested port 0 and reports -EALREADY once an entry already exists.\n\nRelease the tunnel socket before freeing fou so sk_user_data is cleared\nfirst, and defer reclamation with kfree_rcu() to protect concurrent RCU\nreaders.  This matches the lifetime handling in fou_release()."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV3_1": {
            "baseScore": 7.8,
            "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
            "version": "3.1"
          },
          "scenarios": [
            {
              "lang": "en",
              "value": "AV:L - The UAF is opened only via local FOU_CMD_ADD genetlink into fou_create(); remote UDP can race the dangling sk_user_data read in fou_udp_recv/gue_udp_recv but cannot alone reach the erroneous teardown path.\nAC:L - An attacker with CAP_NET_ADMIN controls both sides: issue a second FOU_CMD_ADD with port 0 to force -EALREADY on fou_add_to_port_list while concurrently sending UDP/GRO traffic to the just-bound ephemeral socket during the kfree window.\nPR:L - FOU_CMD_ADD is gated by GENL_ADMIN_PERM (CAP_NET_ADMIN); the fou genl family is netnsok, so a user with CAP_NET_ADMIN inside unshare -Urn can configure FOU and trigger the failing add path without init-namespace root.\nUI:N - Exploitation is fully programmatic via concurrent netlink FOU_CMD_ADD requests and attacker-controlled UDP packets; no victim mount, file open, or other interactive action is required.\nS:U - Impact is kernel heap corruption and privilege escalation within the same security authority; this is not a VM escape, IOMMU bypass, or other cross-boundary scope change.\nC:H - Concurrent readers call fou_from_sock() and dereference freed struct fou fields (family, protocol, flags); reclaimed slab contents give attacker-controlled reads and kernel pointer disclosure primitives typical of UAF.\nI:H - Freed struct fou is attacker-reclaimable kmalloc memory; fou_gro_receive indexes inet_offloads[fou-\u003eprotocol] from the dangling pointer, enabling heap grooming for arbitrary writes and control-flow hijack.\nA:H - Use-after-free in UDP receive/GRO softirq reliably causes KASAN violations and, on production kernels, invalid pointer dereferences or panics when accessing the freed fou object during packet processing."
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-08-17T05:47:51.722Z",
        "orgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
        "shortName": "Linux"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a28d8903bfe76089ea4bbdbff9976965f9ef8107"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b14361aca6350ff7907b0e9903c7b94dc7d5d4a0"
        }
      ],
      "title": "fou: Fix use-after-free in fou_create()",
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    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
    "assignerShortName": "Linux",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-74496",
    "datePublished": "2026-08-15T12:27:23.854Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-08-15T05:44:03.906Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-08-17T05:47:51.722Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}


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