CVE-2026-74434 (GCVE-0-2026-74434)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5
Published
2026-08-15 05:59
Modified
2026-08-17 05:47
Severity ?
VLAI Severity ?
EPSS score ?
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
rxrpc: Don't move a peeked OOB message onto the pending queue
rxrpc_recvmsg_oob() takes a received oob message off recvmsg_oobq and,
if a response is needed, moves it onto the pending_oobq tree. However,
only the unlink from recvmsg_oobq is guarded by MSG_PEEK; the move onto
pending_oobq always runs.
As a result, reading a challenge with MSG_PEEK leaves the skb on
recvmsg_oobq while also adding it to pending_oobq. Since struct
sk_buff's rbnode shares storage with its next and prev pointers,
rb_insert_color() overwrites the list linkage, and the skb, which holds
a single reference, becomes reachable from both queues at once.
When the socket is closed both queues are drained in turn. While
draining recvmsg_oobq, __skb_unlink() follows the next and prev
pointers that rbnode has overwritten and writes to a bad address. Also,
as the skb holds a single reference but is freed from each queue, both
the skb and the connection reference it holds are released twice. This
leads to memory corruption and to a use-after-free caused by the
connection refcount underflow.
MSG_PEEK does not consume the message from the queue, so only unlink it
from recvmsg_oobq and then move it onto pending_oobq or free it when
the message is actually consumed.
References
Impacted products
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"net/rxrpc/recvmsg.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "9ada3931beb37068fcb725b34b0398457009f343",
"status": "affected",
"version": "5800b1cf3fd8ccab752a101865be1e76dac33142",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
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"status": "affected",
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"versionType": "git"
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{
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"status": "affected",
"version": "5800b1cf3fd8ccab752a101865be1e76dac33142",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"net/rxrpc/recvmsg.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.16"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.16",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.40",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.1.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.1.5",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"cpeApplicability": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "6.18.40",
"versionStartIncluding": "6.16",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
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"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
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"versionStartIncluding": "6.16",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
]
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nrxrpc: Don\u0027t move a peeked OOB message onto the pending queue\n\nrxrpc_recvmsg_oob() takes a received oob message off recvmsg_oobq and,\nif a response is needed, moves it onto the pending_oobq tree. However,\nonly the unlink from recvmsg_oobq is guarded by MSG_PEEK; the move onto\npending_oobq always runs.\n\nAs a result, reading a challenge with MSG_PEEK leaves the skb on\nrecvmsg_oobq while also adding it to pending_oobq. Since struct\nsk_buff\u0027s rbnode shares storage with its next and prev pointers,\nrb_insert_color() overwrites the list linkage, and the skb, which holds\na single reference, becomes reachable from both queues at once.\n\nWhen the socket is closed both queues are drained in turn. While\ndraining recvmsg_oobq, __skb_unlink() follows the next and prev\npointers that rbnode has overwritten and writes to a bad address. Also,\nas the skb holds a single reference but is freed from each queue, both\nthe skb and the connection reference it holds are released twice. This\nleads to memory corruption and to a use-after-free caused by the\nconnection refcount underflow.\n\nMSG_PEEK does not consume the message from the queue, so only unlink it\nfrom recvmsg_oobq and then move it onto pending_oobq or free it when\nthe message is actually consumed."
}
],
"metrics": [
{
"cvssV3_1": {
"baseScore": 9.8,
"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"scenarios": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "AV:N - A remote RxRPC/AFS peer can deliver CHALLENGE packets over UDP to a victim AF_RXRPC client socket; those packets are queued for recvmsg() handling, so the vulnerable rxrpc_recvmsg_oob() path is reached from network-driven authentication traffic rather than purely local-only APIs.\nAC:L - An attacker who controls both ends of the connection (or a malicious remote server and a userspace client) can reliably queue a CHALLENGE, call recvmsg(MSG_PEEK) with RXRPC_MANAGE_RESPONSE enabled, then close the socket to trigger duplicate queueing and deterministic double-free/UAF during OOB queue purge.\nPR:N - Exploitation requires no privileges on the victim host beyond what any unauthenticated remote RxRPC/AFS server already has to send protocol packets during connection security negotiation; no CAP_NET_ADMIN, root, or namespace-admin capability is needed on the target system.\nUI:N - No victim user interaction is required beyond normal automated RxRPC/AFS client operation that receives and processes authentication challenges from a server; the attacker does not need the victim to perform a separate manual action beyond routine client-server communication.\nS:U - The corrupted component is kernel RxRPC socket state and the impact is kernel memory corruption and privilege escalation within the same kernel security authority, not a cross-boundary escape such as a VM or sandbox breakout.\nC:H - The bug leaves one sk_buff referenced from both recvmsg_oobq and pending_oobq, causing double free and rxrpc_connection refcount underflow; this is a use-after-free/memory-corruption primitive that can expose or read freed kernel heap contents.\nI:H - rb_insert_color() overwrites sk_buff list linkage shared with rbnode, and socket teardown calls __skb_unlink() on corrupted pointers leading to out-of-bounds writes, enabling control of freed objects and potential arbitrary kernel code execution.\nA:H - Closing the socket drains both OOB queues and reliably triggers invalid pointer writes, skb double-free, and connection refcount underflow, producing kernel oops/panic and complete loss of system availability even without full exploitation."
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-08-17T05:47:08.797Z",
"orgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"shortName": "Linux"
},
"references": [
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9ada3931beb37068fcb725b34b0398457009f343"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5f470cc883416fea6d3bce18ef96bf91dd49ffc3"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5801cff7d5d7b4e9d877dfb627b23eb63167f02c"
}
],
"title": "rxrpc: Don\u0027t move a peeked OOB message onto the pending queue",
"x_generator": {
"engine": "bippy-1.2.0"
}
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"assignerShortName": "Linux",
"cveId": "CVE-2026-74434",
"datePublished": "2026-08-15T05:59:33.438Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-08-15T05:44:03.896Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-08-17T05:47:08.797Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or seen somewhere by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability is confirmed from an analyst perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: This vulnerability was exploited and seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Patched: This vulnerability was successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not exploited: This vulnerability was not exploited or seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expresses doubt about the veracity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: This vulnerability was not successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
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