CVE-2026-72139 (GCVE-0-2026-72139)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5
Published
2026-08-15 05:53
Modified
2026-08-17 05:40
Severity ?
VLAI Severity ?
EPSS score ?
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tcp: defer md5sig_info kfree past RCU grace period in tcp_connect
The md5+ao reconciliation in tcp_connect() (net/ipv4/tcp_output.c)
has two symmetric branches:
if (needs_md5) {
tcp_ao_destroy_sock(sk, false);
} else if (needs_ao) {
tcp_clear_md5_list(sk);
kfree(rcu_replace_pointer(tp->md5sig_info, NULL, ...));
}
Both branches free a per-socket auth-info object while the socket is
in TCP_SYN_SENT and is already on the inet ehash (inserted by
inet_hash_connect() in tcp_v4_connect()). Both branches are reachable
by softirq RX-path readers that load the corresponding info pointer
via implicit RCU before bh_lock_sock_nested() is taken.
The needs_md5 branch is fixed in the prior patch by re-introducing
the call_rcu() free in tcp_ao_destroy_sock(): the equivalent per-key
loop runs inside tcp_ao_info_free_rcu(), the RCU callback, so by the
time it frees each tcp_ao_key all softirq readers that captured the
container have already completed rcu_read_unlock().
The needs_ao branch is not symmetric in the same way. The container
free can be deferred via kfree_rcu(md5sig, rcu) -- struct
tcp_md5sig_info already has the required rcu member
(include/net/tcp.h:1999-2002), and the rest of the tree already does
this in the tcp_md5sig_info_add() rollback paths
(net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1410, 1436). But the per-key teardown is done
by tcp_clear_md5_list() in process context BEFORE the container's
RCU grace period: it walks &md5sig->head and frees each
tcp_md5sig_key with bare hlist_del + kfree. A concurrent softirq
reader in __tcp_md5_do_lookup() / __tcp_md5_do_lookup_exact()
(tcp_ipv4.c:1253, 1298) walks the same list via
hlist_for_each_entry_rcu() and races with that bare kfree on the
keys themselves -- a per-key slab use-after-free of the same class
as the TCP-AO bug, on the same race window.
Fix this in two halves:
1. Convert the bare kfree() in tcp_connect() to kfree_rcu() so the
md5sig_info container joins the rest of the md5sig lifecycle.
The local-variable lift is mechanical and required because
kfree_rcu() is a macro that expects an lvalue.
2. Make tcp_clear_md5_list() RCU-safe by replacing hlist_del +
kfree(key) with hlist_del_rcu + kfree_rcu(key, rcu). struct
tcp_md5sig_key already carries the rcu member
(include/net/tcp.h:1995) and tcp_md5_do_del()
(net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1456) already uses kfree_rcu, so this
restores the lifecycle invariant the rest of the file follows
rather than introducing a one-off.
The other caller of tcp_clear_md5_list() is tcp_md5_destruct_sock()
(net/ipv4/tcp.c:412), which runs from the sock destructor when the
socket is already unhashed and unreachable; the extra grace period
there is unnecessary but harmless. Making the helper unconditionally
RCU-safe is the cleaner contract.
The needs_ao branch is not reachable by the userns reproducer used
to demonstrate the AO-side splat (the repro installs both keys but
ends up in the needs_md5 branch because the connect peer matches
the MD5 key, not the AO key); however the symmetric race exists
and a maintainer touching this code should not have to think about
which branch escapes RCU and which one does not.
[also credits to Qihang, who found that this races with tcp-diag]
References
Impacted products
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c",
"net/ipv4/tcp_output.c"
],
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"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
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"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c",
"net/ipv4/tcp_output.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
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"status": "affected",
"version": "6.18"
},
{
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"version": "0",
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{
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"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.40",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.1.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.1.5",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"cpeApplicability": [
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"nodes": [
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"cpeMatch": [
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"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "6.18.40",
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"negate": false,
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],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ntcp: defer md5sig_info kfree past RCU grace period in tcp_connect\n\nThe md5+ao reconciliation in tcp_connect() (net/ipv4/tcp_output.c)\nhas two symmetric branches:\n\n\tif (needs_md5) {\n\t\ttcp_ao_destroy_sock(sk, false);\n\t} else if (needs_ao) {\n\t\ttcp_clear_md5_list(sk);\n\t\tkfree(rcu_replace_pointer(tp-\u003emd5sig_info, NULL, ...));\n\t}\n\nBoth branches free a per-socket auth-info object while the socket is\nin TCP_SYN_SENT and is already on the inet ehash (inserted by\ninet_hash_connect() in tcp_v4_connect()). Both branches are reachable\nby softirq RX-path readers that load the corresponding info pointer\nvia implicit RCU before bh_lock_sock_nested() is taken.\n\nThe needs_md5 branch is fixed in the prior patch by re-introducing\nthe call_rcu() free in tcp_ao_destroy_sock(): the equivalent per-key\nloop runs inside tcp_ao_info_free_rcu(), the RCU callback, so by the\ntime it frees each tcp_ao_key all softirq readers that captured the\ncontainer have already completed rcu_read_unlock().\n\nThe needs_ao branch is not symmetric in the same way. The container\nfree can be deferred via kfree_rcu(md5sig, rcu) -- struct\ntcp_md5sig_info already has the required rcu member\n(include/net/tcp.h:1999-2002), and the rest of the tree already does\nthis in the tcp_md5sig_info_add() rollback paths\n(net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1410, 1436). But the per-key teardown is done\nby tcp_clear_md5_list() in process context BEFORE the container\u0027s\nRCU grace period: it walks \u0026md5sig-\u003ehead and frees each\ntcp_md5sig_key with bare hlist_del + kfree. A concurrent softirq\nreader in __tcp_md5_do_lookup() / __tcp_md5_do_lookup_exact()\n(tcp_ipv4.c:1253, 1298) walks the same list via\nhlist_for_each_entry_rcu() and races with that bare kfree on the\nkeys themselves -- a per-key slab use-after-free of the same class\nas the TCP-AO bug, on the same race window.\n\nFix this in two halves:\n\n 1. Convert the bare kfree() in tcp_connect() to kfree_rcu() so the\n md5sig_info container joins the rest of the md5sig lifecycle.\n The local-variable lift is mechanical and required because\n kfree_rcu() is a macro that expects an lvalue.\n\n 2. Make tcp_clear_md5_list() RCU-safe by replacing hlist_del +\n kfree(key) with hlist_del_rcu + kfree_rcu(key, rcu). struct\n tcp_md5sig_key already carries the rcu member\n (include/net/tcp.h:1995) and tcp_md5_do_del()\n (net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1456) already uses kfree_rcu, so this\n restores the lifecycle invariant the rest of the file follows\n rather than introducing a one-off.\n\nThe other caller of tcp_clear_md5_list() is tcp_md5_destruct_sock()\n(net/ipv4/tcp.c:412), which runs from the sock destructor when the\nsocket is already unhashed and unreachable; the extra grace period\nthere is unnecessary but harmless. Making the helper unconditionally\nRCU-safe is the cleaner contract.\n\nThe needs_ao branch is not reachable by the userns reproducer used\nto demonstrate the AO-side splat (the repro installs both keys but\nends up in the needs_md5 branch because the connect peer matches\nthe MD5 key, not the AO key); however the symmetric race exists\nand a maintainer touching this code should not have to think about\nwhich branch escapes RCU and which one does not.\n\n[also credits to Qihang, who found that this races with tcp-diag]"
}
],
"metrics": [
{
"cvssV3_1": {
"baseScore": 9.8,
"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"scenarios": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "AV:N - The UAF is driven by a race between tcp_connect() freeing MD5 keys and softirq RX handlers (tcp_v4_rcv\u2192tcp_inbound_hash\u2192__tcp_md5_do_lookup) on an ehashed SYN_SENT socket; forged inbound TCP segments reach this path over the network, matching internet-facing BGP/TCP-AO peers.\nAC:L - The attacker controls both sides of the race by calling connect() while concurrently spraying TCP segments (raw sockets or as the remote peer) at the socket 4-tuple; no victim-dependent timing or memory layout is required beyond standard heap reuse inherent to slab UAF.\nPR:N - Exploitation needs no host root: a remote BGP/TCP peer can send segments during the victim\u0027s outbound connect, and the demonstrated userns repro uses only uid=1000 with CLONE_NEWUSER|CLONE_NEWNET caps to install TCP_MD5/TCP-AO keys and trigger the race.\nUI:N - No end-user action is required; the bug fires during automated connect() handling (e.g., BGP session establishment) concurrent with inbound packet processing, without anyone opening files or confirming prompts.\nS:U - Impact is confined to kernel memory integrity/availability on the affected host; it does not cross VM, container, or IOMMU security boundaries into another authority.\nC:H - Concurrent hlist_for_each_entry_rcu() over tcp_md5sig_key objects that are being kfree()\u0027d is a slab use-after-free; freed key memory can be reallocated and read during RCU traversal, enabling kernel information disclosure.\nI:H - The per-key UAF corrupts RCU list traversal in softirq and allows attacker-influenced slab reuse, providing a standard path to heap grooming and arbitrary kernel write or control-flow hijack.\nA:H - The symmetric TCP-AO connect race in the same window produces kernel GPF/oops in softirq (KASAN wild-memory-access); this MD5-key UAF in the identical SYN_SENT/ehash race window can panic or hang the system."
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-08-17T05:40:48.870Z",
"orgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"shortName": "Linux"
},
"references": [
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/33a1bee413628378fd036a4f2b17ba86b0bc560c"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/da48b9bf1eb95a9cfd09d615ca58cfc2b03de369"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b74cd55038905d5e74c1de109ab78a30b2ea0e1f"
}
],
"title": "tcp: defer md5sig_info kfree past RCU grace period in tcp_connect",
"x_generator": {
"engine": "bippy-1.2.0"
}
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"assignerShortName": "Linux",
"cveId": "CVE-2026-72139",
"datePublished": "2026-08-15T05:53:13.279Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-08-09T03:40:39.908Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-08-17T05:40:48.870Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or seen somewhere by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability is confirmed from an analyst perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: This vulnerability was exploited and seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Patched: This vulnerability was successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not exploited: This vulnerability was not exploited or seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expresses doubt about the veracity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: This vulnerability was not successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
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