CVE-2026-71885 (GCVE-0-2026-71885)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5
Published
2026-10-03 08:51
Modified
2026-10-05 16:01
Severity ?
VLAI Severity ?
EPSS score ?
Summary
In Bouncy Castle for Java before 1.86, the Messaging Layer Security (MLS, RFC 9420) implementation did not bind an X.509 credential to a LeafNode's signature_key. LeafNode.verify() checked a leaf's signature against the signature_key carried in the leaf itself, while the credential's X.509 certificate chain was stored but never parsed or validated, so the end-entity certificate's public key was never required to match signature_key as RFC 9420 sec. 5.3 requires. A party could therefore present another party's certificate as its credential while signing the leaf, and the enclosing KeyPackage, with an unrelated key, and be accepted under that other party's identity through KeyPackage.verify() and the Group leaf-validation path. In a deployment that admits external commits without an independent credential-admission check, an unauthenticated attacker could be admitted under a victim's X.509 identity, evict the victim (resynchronization compares whole credentials rather than signing keys), derive the current epoch, decrypt subsequent group messages, and send messages accepted as the victim. TreeKEM.LeafNode now requires the end-entity certificate's subject public key, in the cipher suite's signature encoding, to equal signature_key for an X.509 credential and rejects the leaf otherwise, including an empty chain or a certificate whose key type does not match the cipher suite; certificate-chain and identity validation to a trust anchor remain the application's responsibility per RFC 9420 sec. 5.3.1. Deployments using only basic credentials are unaffected.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Legion of the Bouncy Castle Inc. | BC-JAVA |
Version: 0 |
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or seen somewhere by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability is confirmed from an analyst perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: This vulnerability was exploited and seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Patched: This vulnerability was successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not exploited: This vulnerability was not exploited or seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expresses doubt about the veracity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: This vulnerability was not successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
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