CVE-2026-68326 (GCVE-0-2026-68326)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5
Published
2026-08-10 12:03
Modified
2026-08-19 16:33
Severity ?
VLAI Severity ?
EPSS score ?
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mwifiex: bound uAP association event IEs to the event buffer
mwifiex_process_uap_event() handles EVENT_UAP_STA_ASSOC by exposing the
(re)association request IEs that the firmware copies into the event:
sinfo->assoc_req_ies = &event->data[len];
len = (u8 *)sinfo->assoc_req_ies - (u8 *)&event->frame_control;
sinfo->assoc_req_ies_len = le16_to_cpu(event->len) - (u16)len;
event->len is supplied by the device firmware and is never validated,
and the subtraction is unchecked. assoc_req_ies points into
adapter->event_body[MAX_EVENT_SIZE], a fixed-size array embedded in the
kmalloc()'d struct mwifiex_adapter.
On the ap_11n_enabled path mwifiex_set_sta_ht_cap() walks these IEs with
cfg80211_find_ie(), whose for_each_element() loop dereferences each
element header. A firmware-reported event->len larger than the bytes
actually received makes assoc_req_ies_len describe IEs that extend past
event_body, so the walk reads out of the adapter slab object, a
slab-out-of-bounds read (KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in cfg80211_find_ie).
An event->len smaller than the header instead makes the int subtraction
negative, which wraps to a huge size_t when stored in assoc_req_ies_len.
The same length is handed to cfg80211_new_sta(), so a more modest
over-claim can also copy stale event_body bytes into the
NL80211_CMD_NEW_STATION notification.
A malicious or malfunctioning mwifiex device (USB/SDIO/PCIe) can deliver
such an event while the interface is in AP/uAP mode.
Validate event->len before use: reject a length that underflows the
header or that would place the IEs outside the event_body[] buffer the
event was copied into. event->len here is struct mwifiex_assoc_event.len,
a payload field internal to this event, not the transport frame length,
so it is validated in this handler rather than at the generic
MWIFIEX_TYPE_EVENT receive path, which only sees the event cause and the
transport frame length. The bound is against event_body[MAX_EVENT_SIZE]
rather than the actually-received length because the transports store the
event differently (USB and SDIO leave the 4-byte event header in
event_skb, PCIe strips it via skb_pull), whereas event_body is the single
fixed buffer all of them copy the event into. This is the event-path
analogue of the receive-path bounds checks added in commit 119585281617
("wifi: mwifiex: Fix OOB and integer underflow when rx packets").
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Linux | Linux |
Version: e568634ae7ac379661c90731d480e067929420a1 Version: e568634ae7ac379661c90731d480e067929420a1 Version: e568634ae7ac379661c90731d480e067929420a1 Version: e568634ae7ac379661c90731d480e067929420a1 Version: e568634ae7ac379661c90731d480e067929420a1 Version: e568634ae7ac379661c90731d480e067929420a1 Version: e568634ae7ac379661c90731d480e067929420a1 Version: e568634ae7ac379661c90731d480e067929420a1 |
||
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/uap_event.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
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"status": "affected",
"version": "e568634ae7ac379661c90731d480e067929420a1",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
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"status": "affected",
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"versionType": "git"
},
{
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"status": "affected",
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"versionType": "git"
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{
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{
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}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/uap_event.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "3.5"
},
{
"lessThan": "3.5",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "5.10.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "5.10.265",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "5.15.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "5.15.216",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.1.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.1.183",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.6.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.6.148",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.12.101",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.42",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.1.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.1.6",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"cpeApplicability": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "5.10.265",
"versionStartIncluding": "3.5",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "5.15.216",
"versionStartIncluding": "3.5",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
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},
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},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
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{
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}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
]
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nwifi: mwifiex: bound uAP association event IEs to the event buffer\n\nmwifiex_process_uap_event() handles EVENT_UAP_STA_ASSOC by exposing the\n(re)association request IEs that the firmware copies into the event:\n\n\tsinfo-\u003eassoc_req_ies = \u0026event-\u003edata[len];\n\tlen = (u8 *)sinfo-\u003eassoc_req_ies - (u8 *)\u0026event-\u003eframe_control;\n\tsinfo-\u003eassoc_req_ies_len = le16_to_cpu(event-\u003elen) - (u16)len;\n\nevent-\u003elen is supplied by the device firmware and is never validated,\nand the subtraction is unchecked. assoc_req_ies points into\nadapter-\u003eevent_body[MAX_EVENT_SIZE], a fixed-size array embedded in the\nkmalloc()\u0027d struct mwifiex_adapter.\n\nOn the ap_11n_enabled path mwifiex_set_sta_ht_cap() walks these IEs with\ncfg80211_find_ie(), whose for_each_element() loop dereferences each\nelement header. A firmware-reported event-\u003elen larger than the bytes\nactually received makes assoc_req_ies_len describe IEs that extend past\nevent_body, so the walk reads out of the adapter slab object, a\nslab-out-of-bounds read (KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in cfg80211_find_ie).\nAn event-\u003elen smaller than the header instead makes the int subtraction\nnegative, which wraps to a huge size_t when stored in assoc_req_ies_len.\nThe same length is handed to cfg80211_new_sta(), so a more modest\nover-claim can also copy stale event_body bytes into the\nNL80211_CMD_NEW_STATION notification.\n\nA malicious or malfunctioning mwifiex device (USB/SDIO/PCIe) can deliver\nsuch an event while the interface is in AP/uAP mode.\n\nValidate event-\u003elen before use: reject a length that underflows the\nheader or that would place the IEs outside the event_body[] buffer the\nevent was copied into. event-\u003elen here is struct mwifiex_assoc_event.len,\na payload field internal to this event, not the transport frame length,\nso it is validated in this handler rather than at the generic\nMWIFIEX_TYPE_EVENT receive path, which only sees the event cause and the\ntransport frame length. The bound is against event_body[MAX_EVENT_SIZE]\nrather than the actually-received length because the transports store the\nevent differently (USB and SDIO leave the 4-byte event header in\nevent_skb, PCIe strips it via skb_pull), whereas event_body is the single\nfixed buffer all of them copy the event into. This is the event-path\nanalogue of the receive-path bounds checks added in commit 119585281617\n(\"wifi: mwifiex: Fix OOB and integer underflow when rx packets\")."
}
],
"metrics": [
{
"cvssV3_1": {
"baseScore": 8.8,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"scenarios": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "AV:A - The event payload is the firmware\u0027s rendering of an over-the-air (re)association request received by the mwifiex uAP interface, with event-\u003elen being the TLV length covering that frame, so the triggering input comes from a station within 802.11 radio range. This matches the Adjacent treatment used for other frame/event-driven mwifiex defects (CVE-2024-46755, CVE-2023-53226).\nAC:L - No race or attacker-uncontrollable state is involved: the attacker simply sends a crafted/oversized (re)association request to the AP, and the handler parses the resulting EVENT_UAP_STA_ASSOC unconditionally. The only precondition, an mwifiex interface in AP/uAP mode with ap_11n_enabled, is the normal steady state for tethering, Chromebook SoftAP and embedded AP deployments.\nPR:N - EVENT_UAP_STA_ASSOC is generated at association time, before the WPA/EAPOL handshake, so the attacker needs no credentials on or accepted association with the target host. No host user account or capability is involved anywhere on the path.\nUI:N - The event is consumed autonomously by mwifiex_process_uap_event() in the driver\u0027s main work handler as soon as the firmware delivers it; no local user or administrator action is required beyond the AP already running.\nS:U - The out-of-bounds read, the underflowed length and the resulting corruption are all confined to the host kernel\u0027s own security authority within the mwifiex/cfg80211 code; no hypervisor, IOMMU or sandbox boundary is crossed.\nC:H - An over-claimed event-\u003elen makes assoc_req_ies_len describe memory past adapter-\u003eevent_body[MAX_EVENT_SIZE], producing a slab-out-of-bounds read in cfg80211_find_ie() and, worse, causing nla_put() to copy up to tens of kilobytes of adjacent kernel slab memory into the NL80211_CMD_NEW_STATION notification delivered to userspace \u2014 an unbounded kernel heap disclosure, not a few stray bytes.\nI:H - An event-\u003elen below the header makes the int subtraction negative and wrap in size_t; that value reaches nla_put(), where nla_total_size() of the negative length evaluates to 0 and passes the tailroom check, so __nla_put()\u0027s memcpy() runs with the negative length widened to a huge size_t \u2014 an unbounded out-of-bounds write past the netlink skb. Driver 11n/AMSDU state is also set from out-of-bounds data.\nA:H - The commit documents a reproducible KASAN slab-out-of-bounds in cfg80211_find_ie, and the underflow path drives a memcpy of a near-2^64 length that guarantees an immediate kernel panic. The condition can be re-triggered at will by repeating the association attempt."
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-08-19T16:33:21.015Z",
"orgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"shortName": "Linux"
},
"references": [
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a616616b938f7922a93e79bef16b4643c57c0922"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1ae00b6d9a6c82eb3de151d9b04ed59e06cc100f"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e7e93d3e8c240bdb70c41e79d169d74dfb442843"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a3f47d7c75ddad1a14621a309286f9fae3cba191"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ad26c75ae25749313248f06510ebe43b5bf4adcc"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d21464d93f8ba464dc3d7b4b31c6e0adcd9f659c"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b6766d7ea43edf5de9d5a572bc58b631d09efe4b"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f0858bfc7d3cab411a447b88e3ef970e575032c9"
}
],
"title": "wifi: mwifiex: bound uAP association event IEs to the event buffer",
"x_generator": {
"engine": "bippy-1.2.0"
}
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"assignerShortName": "Linux",
"cveId": "CVE-2026-68326",
"datePublished": "2026-08-10T12:03:02.372Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-07-30T09:28:09.382Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-08-19T16:33:21.015Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or seen somewhere by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability is confirmed from an analyst perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: This vulnerability was exploited and seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Patched: This vulnerability was successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not exploited: This vulnerability was not exploited or seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expresses doubt about the veracity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: This vulnerability was not successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
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