CVE-2026-68266 (GCVE-0-2026-68266)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5
Published
2026-08-10 12:01
Modified
2026-10-19 20:58
Severity ?
7.8 (High) - CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/xe: Hold a dma-buf reference for imported BOs An imported dma-buf BO is created as a ttm_bo_type_sg BO whose reservation object is the exporter's dma_buf->resv. The importer, however, only takes a dma-buf reference after a successful dma_buf_dynamic_attach(). Until then nothing keeps the exporter alive, so if the exporter is freed while the BO still references its resv, a later access to that resv is a use-after-free: Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0x6b6b6b6b6b6b6b9c Workqueue: ttm ttm_bo_delayed_delete [ttm] RIP: 0010:mutex_can_spin_on_owner+0x3f/0xc0 This can be reached on two paths: - dma_buf_dynamic_attach() fails, or - ttm_bo_init_reserved() fails during BO creation. In both cases the BO already has bo->base.resv pointing at the exporter resv, and sg BOs are always torn down via ttm_bo_delayed_delete(), which locks bo->base.resv asynchronously - potentially after the exporter has been freed. Take the dma-buf reference in xe_bo_init_locked(), before ttm_bo_init_reserved(), so it also covers a creation failure there, and release it in xe_ttm_bo_destroy(). The reference is held for the whole BO lifetime, keeping the shared resv alive on every path. v2: - Reworked the fix to avoid creating the imported sg BO before dma_buf_dynamic_attach() succeeds. - Attach with importer_priv == NULL and make invalidate_mappings ignore incomplete imports. v3: - Dropped the xe-side reordering approach since importer_priv must be valid when dma_buf_dynamic_attach() publishes the attachment. - Per Christian's suggestion on the v1 thread, keyed the check on import_attach rather than removing the sg guard entirely. - Fixes both xe and amdgpu in a single TTM patch. v4: - Moved import_attach check to after dma_resv_copy_fences() so fences are copied before returning for successful imports (Thomas). - Removed exporter-alive claim from commit message (Thomas). v5: - Add drm/xe patch to keep imported sg BOs off the LRU before attach succeeds; the TTM fix alone is not sufficient for xe if the BO is already LRU-visible. (Thomas) v4 patch: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/736663/?series=169129&rev=2 - Patch 1 (drm/ttm) carries Christian's Reviewed-by from v4. v6: - Reworked the fix based on Thomas' suggestion. Instead of the TTM resv individualization (v1-v5) plus the xe off-LRU/placement handling (v5), just hold a dma-buf reference for the imported BO lifetime so the shared resv can never be freed while the BO still references it. Single xe patch, no TTM change. (Thomas) - Take the reference in xe_bo_init_locked() before ttm_bo_init_reserved() so a TTM creation failure is covered too (Thomas). - Dropped the v5 series (drm/ttm + drm/xe off-LRU); the off-LRU approach also regressed in CI BAT via ttm_bo_pipeline_gutting() creating a ghost BO that outlived the exporter. Link to v5: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/series/169984/ v7: - Move changelog above --- so it stays in the commit message. - Reorder changelog entries oldest-to-newest. (Thomas) (cherry picked from commit 3516f3fae6be35642f8f06f8a218da6425c0306a)
References
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
Linux Linux Version: dd08ebf6c3525a7ea2186e636df064ea47281987
Version: dd08ebf6c3525a7ea2186e636df064ea47281987
Version: dd08ebf6c3525a7ea2186e636df064ea47281987
Version: dd08ebf6c3525a7ea2186e636df064ea47281987
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            "drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_dma_buf.c"
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          "lang": "en",
          "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ndrm/xe: Hold a dma-buf reference for imported BOs\n\nAn imported dma-buf BO is created as a ttm_bo_type_sg BO whose\nreservation object is the exporter\u0027s dma_buf-\u003eresv. The importer,\nhowever, only takes a dma-buf reference after a successful\ndma_buf_dynamic_attach(). Until then nothing keeps the exporter alive,\nso if the exporter is freed while the BO still references its resv, a\nlater access to that resv is a use-after-free:\n\n  Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address\n        0x6b6b6b6b6b6b6b9c\n  Workqueue: ttm ttm_bo_delayed_delete [ttm]\n  RIP: 0010:mutex_can_spin_on_owner+0x3f/0xc0\n\nThis can be reached on two paths:\n\n - dma_buf_dynamic_attach() fails, or\n - ttm_bo_init_reserved() fails during BO creation.\n\nIn both cases the BO already has bo-\u003ebase.resv pointing at the exporter\nresv, and sg BOs are always torn down via ttm_bo_delayed_delete(), which\nlocks bo-\u003ebase.resv asynchronously - potentially after the exporter has\nbeen freed.\n\nTake the dma-buf reference in xe_bo_init_locked(), before\nttm_bo_init_reserved(), so it also covers a creation failure there, and\nrelease it in xe_ttm_bo_destroy(). The reference is held for the whole\nBO lifetime, keeping the shared resv alive on every path.\n\nv2:\n  - Reworked the fix to avoid creating the imported sg BO before\n    dma_buf_dynamic_attach() succeeds.\n  - Attach with importer_priv == NULL and make invalidate_mappings ignore\n    incomplete imports.\n\nv3:\n  - Dropped the xe-side reordering approach since importer_priv must be\n    valid when dma_buf_dynamic_attach() publishes the attachment.\n  - Per Christian\u0027s suggestion on the v1 thread, keyed the check on\n    import_attach rather than removing the sg guard entirely.\n  - Fixes both xe and amdgpu in a single TTM patch.\n\nv4:\n  - Moved import_attach check to after dma_resv_copy_fences() so fences\n    are copied before returning for successful imports (Thomas).\n  - Removed exporter-alive claim from commit message (Thomas).\n\nv5:\n  - Add drm/xe patch to keep imported sg BOs off the LRU before attach\n    succeeds; the TTM fix alone is not sufficient for xe if the BO is\n    already LRU-visible. (Thomas)\n    v4 patch:\n    https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/736663/?series=169129\u0026rev=2\n  - Patch 1 (drm/ttm) carries Christian\u0027s Reviewed-by from v4.\n\nv6:\n  - Reworked the fix based on Thomas\u0027 suggestion. Instead of the TTM resv\n    individualization (v1-v5) plus the xe off-LRU/placement handling (v5),\n    just hold a dma-buf reference for the imported BO lifetime so the\n    shared resv can never be freed while the BO still references it.\n    Single xe patch, no TTM change. (Thomas)\n  - Take the reference in xe_bo_init_locked() before ttm_bo_init_reserved()\n    so a TTM creation failure is covered too (Thomas).\n  - Dropped the v5 series (drm/ttm + drm/xe off-LRU); the off-LRU approach\n    also regressed in CI BAT via ttm_bo_pipeline_gutting() creating a ghost\n    BO that outlived the exporter.\n    Link to v5: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/series/169984/\n\nv7:\n  - Move changelog above --- so it stays in the commit message.\n  - Reorder changelog entries oldest-to-newest. (Thomas)\n\n(cherry picked from commit 3516f3fae6be35642f8f06f8a218da6425c0306a)"
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              "value": "AV:L - The bug is reached through DRM_IOCTL_PRIME_FD_TO_HANDLE on an Intel xe DRM render node (/dev/dri/renderD*), which requires local access to the device file; there is no remote or network-facing path into xe_gem_prime_import().\nAC:L - The attacker fully controls both halves: they pick an exporter whose attach fails deterministically (drm_gem_map_attach() returns -ENOSYS, xe_dma_buf_attach() returns -EOPNOTSUPP for non-p2p cross-device imports) or induce the -ENOMEM paths, then simply close the dma-buf fd while the sg BO teardown is still queued on the TTM workqueue. No condition outside their control is needed.\nPR:L - DRM_IOCTL_PRIME_FD_TO_HANDLE is marked DRM_RENDER_ALLOW, so any unprivileged local user holding the normally world/group-accessible render node (any GUI user on a distro, any app on Android/ChromeOS) can perform the import; no capabilities are checked.\nUI:N - The entire sequence \u2014 export a dma-buf, import it into xe, close the fd \u2014 is performed by the attacker\u0027s own process; no victim action or cooperation is required.\nS:U - The use-after-free occurs on kernel heap memory within the same kernel security authority; there is no crossing of a VM, IOMMU, or sandbox boundary.\nC:H - The freed dma_buf/dma_resv is a slab object the attacker can reclaim with sprayed content before ttm_bo_delayed_delete() dereferences it, so the stale bo-\u003ebase.resv can be aimed at attacker-chosen kernel addresses and the resulting ww_mutex/fence walks leaked back, giving arbitrary kernel memory disclosure.\nI:H - dma_resv_lock()/dma_resv_unlock() and the subsequent ttm_bo_cleanup_memtype_use() perform writes and list manipulation through the dangling pointer into reclaimed heap memory, so the UAF yields a controllable write primitive usable for control-flow hijacking and privilege escalation.\nA:H - Even unexploited, the flaw reliably produces a kernel oops \u2014 the reported general protection fault on poisoned memory in mutex_can_spin_on_owner() from the ttm workqueue \u2014 which is a fatal fault in kernel worker context and takes down the GPU stack or the whole machine."
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      "title": "drm/xe: Hold a dma-buf reference for imported BOs",
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    "cveId": "CVE-2026-68266",
    "datePublished": "2026-08-10T12:01:41.280Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-07-30T09:28:09.378Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-10-19T20:58:58.924Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
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No condition outside their control is needed.\\nPR:L - DRM_IOCTL_PRIME_FD_TO_HANDLE is marked DRM_RENDER_ALLOW, so any unprivileged local user holding the normally world/group-accessible render node (any GUI user on a distro, any app on Android/ChromeOS) can perform the import; no capabilities are checked.\\nUI:N - The entire sequence \\u2014 export a dma-buf, import it into xe, close the fd \\u2014 is performed by the attacker\u0027s own process; no victim action or cooperation is required.\\nS:U - The use-after-free occurs on kernel heap memory within the same kernel security authority; there is no crossing of a VM, IOMMU, or sandbox boundary.\\nC:H - The freed dma_buf/dma_resv is a slab object the attacker can reclaim with sprayed content before ttm_bo_delayed_delete() dereferences it, so the stale bo-\u003ebase.resv can be aimed at attacker-chosen kernel addresses and the resulting ww_mutex/fence walks leaked back, giving arbitrary kernel memory disclosure.\\nI:H - dma_resv_lock()/dma_resv_unlock() and the subsequent ttm_bo_cleanup_memtype_use() perform writes and list manipulation through the dangling pointer into reclaimed heap memory, so the UAF yields a controllable write primitive usable for control-flow hijacking and privilege escalation.\\nA:H - Even unexploited, the flaw reliably produces a kernel oops \\u2014 the reported general protection fault on poisoned memory in mutex_can_spin_on_owner() from the ttm workqueue \\u2014 which is a fatal fault in kernel worker context and takes down the GPU stack or the whole machine.\"}]}], \"affected\": [{\"repo\": \"https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git\", \"vendor\": \"Linux\", \"product\": \"Linux\", \"versions\": [{\"status\": \"affected\", \"version\": \"dd08ebf6c3525a7ea2186e636df064ea47281987\", \"lessThan\": \"c22d65d62b3318e237c0e5b1177d90ab83d9fe06\", \"versionType\": \"git\"}, {\"status\": \"affected\", \"version\": \"dd08ebf6c3525a7ea2186e636df064ea47281987\", \"lessThan\": \"c1954c66662de477a8f4309335b775f7b07bd28b\", \"versionType\": \"git\"}, {\"status\": \"affected\", \"version\": \"dd08ebf6c3525a7ea2186e636df064ea47281987\", \"lessThan\": \"ba8c4cbb31c6f81fa5b12d6e28f1f706040aff48\", \"versionType\": \"git\"}, {\"status\": \"affected\", \"version\": \"dd08ebf6c3525a7ea2186e636df064ea47281987\", \"lessThan\": \"62775525a27c3b0d56382e08ba81ee2d322058b6\", \"versionType\": \"git\"}], \"programFiles\": [\"drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_bo.c\", \"drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_bo.h\", \"drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_bo_types.h\", \"drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_dma_buf.c\"], \"defaultStatus\": \"unaffected\"}, {\"repo\": \"https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git\", \"vendor\": \"Linux\", \"product\": \"Linux\", \"versions\": [{\"status\": \"affected\", \"version\": \"6.8\"}, {\"status\": \"unaffected\", \"version\": \"0\", \"lessThan\": \"6.8\", \"versionType\": \"semver\"}, {\"status\": \"unaffected\", \"version\": \"6.12.103\", \"versionType\": \"semver\", \"lessThanOrEqual\": \"6.12.*\"}, {\"status\": \"unaffected\", \"version\": \"6.18.42\", \"versionType\": \"semver\", \"lessThanOrEqual\": \"6.18.*\"}, {\"status\": \"unaffected\", \"version\": \"7.1.6\", \"versionType\": \"semver\", \"lessThanOrEqual\": \"7.1.*\"}, {\"status\": \"unaffected\", \"version\": \"7.2\", \"versionType\": \"original_commit_for_fix\", \"lessThanOrEqual\": \"*\"}], \"programFiles\": [\"drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_bo.c\", \"drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_bo.h\", \"drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_bo_types.h\", \"drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_dma_buf.c\"], \"defaultStatus\": \"affected\"}], \"references\": [{\"url\": \"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c22d65d62b3318e237c0e5b1177d90ab83d9fe06\"}, {\"url\": \"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c1954c66662de477a8f4309335b775f7b07bd28b\"}, {\"url\": \"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ba8c4cbb31c6f81fa5b12d6e28f1f706040aff48\"}, {\"url\": \"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/62775525a27c3b0d56382e08ba81ee2d322058b6\"}], \"x_generator\": {\"engine\": \"bippy-1.2.0\"}, \"descriptions\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"value\": \"In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\\n\\ndrm/xe: Hold a dma-buf reference for imported BOs\\n\\nAn imported dma-buf BO is created as a ttm_bo_type_sg BO whose\\nreservation object is the exporter\u0027s dma_buf-\u003eresv. The importer,\\nhowever, only takes a dma-buf reference after a successful\\ndma_buf_dynamic_attach(). Until then nothing keeps the exporter alive,\\nso if the exporter is freed while the BO still references its resv, a\\nlater access to that resv is a use-after-free:\\n\\n  Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address\\n        0x6b6b6b6b6b6b6b9c\\n  Workqueue: ttm ttm_bo_delayed_delete [ttm]\\n  RIP: 0010:mutex_can_spin_on_owner+0x3f/0xc0\\n\\nThis can be reached on two paths:\\n\\n - dma_buf_dynamic_attach() fails, or\\n - ttm_bo_init_reserved() fails during BO creation.\\n\\nIn both cases the BO already has bo-\u003ebase.resv pointing at the exporter\\nresv, and sg BOs are always torn down via ttm_bo_delayed_delete(), which\\nlocks bo-\u003ebase.resv asynchronously - potentially after the exporter has\\nbeen freed.\\n\\nTake the dma-buf reference in xe_bo_init_locked(), before\\nttm_bo_init_reserved(), so it also covers a creation failure there, and\\nrelease it in xe_ttm_bo_destroy(). The reference is held for the whole\\nBO lifetime, keeping the shared resv alive on every path.\\n\\nv2:\\n  - Reworked the fix to avoid creating the imported sg BO before\\n    dma_buf_dynamic_attach() succeeds.\\n  - Attach with importer_priv == NULL and make invalidate_mappings ignore\\n    incomplete imports.\\n\\nv3:\\n  - Dropped the xe-side reordering approach since importer_priv must be\\n    valid when dma_buf_dynamic_attach() publishes the attachment.\\n  - Per Christian\u0027s suggestion on the v1 thread, keyed the check on\\n    import_attach rather than removing the sg guard entirely.\\n  - Fixes both xe and amdgpu in a single TTM patch.\\n\\nv4:\\n  - Moved import_attach check to after dma_resv_copy_fences() so fences\\n    are copied before returning for successful imports (Thomas).\\n  - Removed exporter-alive claim from commit message (Thomas).\\n\\nv5:\\n  - Add drm/xe patch to keep imported sg BOs off the LRU before attach\\n    succeeds; the TTM fix alone is not sufficient for xe if the BO is\\n    already LRU-visible. (Thomas)\\n    v4 patch:\\n    https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/736663/?series=169129\u0026rev=2\\n  - Patch 1 (drm/ttm) carries Christian\u0027s Reviewed-by from v4.\\n\\nv6:\\n  - Reworked the fix based on Thomas\u0027 suggestion. Instead of the TTM resv\\n    individualization (v1-v5) plus the xe off-LRU/placement handling (v5),\\n    just hold a dma-buf reference for the imported BO lifetime so the\\n    shared resv can never be freed while the BO still references it.\\n    Single xe patch, no TTM change. (Thomas)\\n  - Take the reference in xe_bo_init_locked() before ttm_bo_init_reserved()\\n    so a TTM creation failure is covered too (Thomas).\\n  - Dropped the v5 series (drm/ttm + drm/xe off-LRU); the off-LRU approach\\n    also regressed in CI BAT via ttm_bo_pipeline_gutting() creating a ghost\\n    BO that outlived the exporter.\\n    Link to v5: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/series/169984/\\n\\nv7:\\n  - Move changelog above --- so it stays in the commit message.\\n  - Reorder changelog entries oldest-to-newest. (Thomas)\\n\\n(cherry picked from commit 3516f3fae6be35642f8f06f8a218da6425c0306a)\"}], \"cpeApplicability\": [{\"nodes\": [{\"negate\": false, \"cpeMatch\": [{\"criteria\": \"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*\", \"vulnerable\": true, \"versionEndExcluding\": \"6.12.103\", \"versionStartIncluding\": \"6.8\"}, {\"criteria\": \"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*\", \"vulnerable\": true, \"versionEndExcluding\": \"6.18.42\", \"versionStartIncluding\": \"6.8\"}, {\"criteria\": \"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*\", \"vulnerable\": true, \"versionEndExcluding\": \"7.1.6\", \"versionStartIncluding\": \"6.8\"}, {\"criteria\": \"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*\", \"vulnerable\": true, \"versionEndExcluding\": \"7.2\", \"versionStartIncluding\": \"6.8\"}], \"operator\": \"OR\"}]}], \"providerMetadata\": {\"orgId\": \"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\", \"shortName\": \"Linux\", \"dateUpdated\": \"2026-08-17T05:01:59.066Z\"}}}",
      "cveMetadata": "{\"cveId\": \"CVE-2026-68266\", \"state\": \"PUBLISHED\", \"dateUpdated\": \"2026-10-19T20:58:58.924Z\", \"dateReserved\": \"2026-07-30T09:28:09.378Z\", \"assignerOrgId\": \"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\", \"datePublished\": \"2026-08-10T12:01:41.280Z\", \"assignerShortName\": \"Linux\"}",
      "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
      "dataVersion": "5.2"
    }
  }
}


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