CVE-2026-68100 (GCVE-0-2026-68100)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5
Published
2026-08-10 11:58
Modified
2026-08-23 12:45
Severity ?
VLAI Severity ?
EPSS score ?
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: validate num_subauth when copying ACE in set_ntacl_dacl
set_ntacl_dacl() copies each ACE from the attacker-controlled stored
security descriptor verbatim into the response DACL without checking
sid.num_subauth. The ACE bytes (including an unchecked num_subauth)
originate from an authenticated SMB2_SET_INFO(SecInfo=DACL) that is
stored raw via ksmbd_vfs_set_sd_xattr(); parse_dacl() rejects a bad ACE
with `break` rather than an error, so parse_sec_desc() still returns
success and the malformed SD reaches the xattr intact.
On a subsequent SMB2_QUERY_INFO(SecInfo=DACL) for an inode carrying a
POSIX access ACL, build_sec_desc() -> set_ntacl_dacl() ->
set_posix_acl_entries_dacl() walks the copied ACEs and reads
ntace->sid.sub_auth[ntace->sid.num_subauth - 1]
with num_subauth taken straight from the stored SD. Since sub_auth[]
is fixed at SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES (15), a crafted num_subauth (e.g.
255) drives an out-of-bounds heap read of ~1 KB with an offset fully
controlled by an authenticated client.
The sibling functions already gate this field:
parse_dacl() -- num_subauth == 0 || > SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES
parse_sid() -- num_subauth > SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES
smb_copy_sid() -- min_t(u8, num_subauth, SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES)
set_ntacl_dacl() is the lone inconsistent path that omits the check.
Add the same num_subauth validation in set_ntacl_dacl() before copying
the ACE, matching the gate already enforced by parse_dacl().
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Linux | Linux |
Version: e2f34481b24db2fd634b5edb0a5bd0e4d38cc6e9 Version: e2f34481b24db2fd634b5edb0a5bd0e4d38cc6e9 Version: e2f34481b24db2fd634b5edb0a5bd0e4d38cc6e9 Version: e2f34481b24db2fd634b5edb0a5bd0e4d38cc6e9 Version: e2f34481b24db2fd634b5edb0a5bd0e4d38cc6e9 Version: e2f34481b24db2fd634b5edb0a5bd0e4d38cc6e9 |
||
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"fs/smb/server/smbacl.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "26cb845e22a00c85bf566337417fa33492395f10",
"status": "affected",
"version": "e2f34481b24db2fd634b5edb0a5bd0e4d38cc6e9",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
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"status": "affected",
"version": "e2f34481b24db2fd634b5edb0a5bd0e4d38cc6e9",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
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"status": "affected",
"version": "e2f34481b24db2fd634b5edb0a5bd0e4d38cc6e9",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "b6d3cc6a524416dfdb2b47e4bba2e7e20011d056",
"status": "affected",
"version": "e2f34481b24db2fd634b5edb0a5bd0e4d38cc6e9",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
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"status": "affected",
"version": "e2f34481b24db2fd634b5edb0a5bd0e4d38cc6e9",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
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"status": "affected",
"version": "e2f34481b24db2fd634b5edb0a5bd0e4d38cc6e9",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"fs/smb/server/smbacl.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "5.15"
},
{
"lessThan": "5.15",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.1.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.1.184",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.6.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.6.148",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.12.101",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.42",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.1.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.1.6",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"cpeApplicability": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "6.1.184",
"versionStartIncluding": "5.15",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "6.6.148",
"versionStartIncluding": "5.15",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
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},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
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"versionStartIncluding": "5.15",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
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"versionStartIncluding": "5.15",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
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"versionStartIncluding": "5.15",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
]
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nksmbd: validate num_subauth when copying ACE in set_ntacl_dacl\n\nset_ntacl_dacl() copies each ACE from the attacker-controlled stored\nsecurity descriptor verbatim into the response DACL without checking\nsid.num_subauth. The ACE bytes (including an unchecked num_subauth)\noriginate from an authenticated SMB2_SET_INFO(SecInfo=DACL) that is\nstored raw via ksmbd_vfs_set_sd_xattr(); parse_dacl() rejects a bad ACE\nwith `break` rather than an error, so parse_sec_desc() still returns\nsuccess and the malformed SD reaches the xattr intact.\n\nOn a subsequent SMB2_QUERY_INFO(SecInfo=DACL) for an inode carrying a\nPOSIX access ACL, build_sec_desc() -\u003e set_ntacl_dacl() -\u003e\nset_posix_acl_entries_dacl() walks the copied ACEs and reads\n\n ntace-\u003esid.sub_auth[ntace-\u003esid.num_subauth - 1]\n\nwith num_subauth taken straight from the stored SD. Since sub_auth[]\nis fixed at SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES (15), a crafted num_subauth (e.g.\n255) drives an out-of-bounds heap read of ~1 KB with an offset fully\ncontrolled by an authenticated client.\n\nThe sibling functions already gate this field:\n parse_dacl() -- num_subauth == 0 || \u003e SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES\n parse_sid() -- num_subauth \u003e SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES\n smb_copy_sid() -- min_t(u8, num_subauth, SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES)\nset_ntacl_dacl() is the lone inconsistent path that omits the check.\n\nAdd the same num_subauth validation in set_ntacl_dacl() before copying\nthe ACE, matching the gate already enforced by parse_dacl()."
}
],
"metrics": [
{
"cvssV3_1": {
"baseScore": 8.1,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"scenarios": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "AV:N - ksmbd is the in-kernel SMB3 server on TCP/445; both SMB2_SET_INFO(SecInfo=DACL) and SMB2_QUERY_INFO(SecInfo=DACL) are handled from remote SMB2 PDUs in smb2_set_info()/smb2_query_info() via ksmbd_conn_handler_loop(), with no local syscall or physical access required.\nAC:L - Once ksmbd is running with ACL-xattr shares, an attacker deterministically plants a malformed DACL via SET_INFO and triggers the read on QUERY_INFO; num_subauth fully controls the OOB offset, with no race, timing window, or victim-dependent memory layout required.\nPR:L - SMB2_SET_INFO/QUERY_INFO require a valid post-authentication session (smb2_check_user_session) and SET_INFO SECURITY additionally requires FILE_WRITE_DAC/FILE_WRITE_OWNER on the open handle; this is a low-privilege authenticated SMB client, not a pre-auth or root-only path.\nUI:N - Exploitation is driven entirely by the attacker\u0027s own SMB2 SET_INFO and QUERY_INFO requests over the network; no local user, administrator, or victim client must perform any separate action.\nS:U - The out-of-bounds read and any resulting disclosure or crash occur entirely within kernel ksmbd server memory on the host; no VM, IOMMU, container, or other security-boundary escape is involved.\nC:H - Crafted num_subauth (e.g. 255) makes set_posix_acl_entries_dacl() index far past the 15-element sub_auth[] array, performing an attacker-offset-controlled ~1 KB out-of-bounds kernel heap read whose value is compared during DACL rebuild, enabling kernel memory disclosure.\nI:N - The defect is an out-of-bounds read during ACE deduplication; no kernel memory is written, no attacker-controlled data is persisted beyond the intentionally stored security descriptor, and no code-execution or arbitrary-write primitive is introduced.\nA:H - An unchecked multi-hundred-byte read past the smb_ace SID sub_auth array can cross slab/object boundaries and fault on hardened or KASAN builds; any unvalidated kernel out-of-bounds access is treated as capable of oops/panic and full host denial of service."
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-08-23T12:45:50.170Z",
"orgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"shortName": "Linux"
},
"references": [
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/26cb845e22a00c85bf566337417fa33492395f10"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e31fada5143784bc05c7ae44c79eed9b7a2e147e"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fb3dc8e6da46a1ccad1956cda57de29d9b3033e0"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b6d3cc6a524416dfdb2b47e4bba2e7e20011d056"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5acbd3012fd4a7ccfebd91ea6f784120084eb897"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/47f0b34f6bc98ed85bfdc293e8f3e432ec24958d"
}
],
"title": "ksmbd: validate num_subauth when copying ACE in set_ntacl_dacl",
"x_generator": {
"engine": "bippy-1.2.0"
}
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"assignerShortName": "Linux",
"cveId": "CVE-2026-68100",
"datePublished": "2026-08-10T11:58:15.233Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-07-30T09:28:09.368Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-08-23T12:45:50.170Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or seen somewhere by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability is confirmed from an analyst perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: This vulnerability was exploited and seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Patched: This vulnerability was successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not exploited: This vulnerability was not exploited or seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expresses doubt about the veracity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: This vulnerability was not successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
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