CVE-2026-67581 (GCVE-0-2026-67581)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5
Published
2026-08-19 17:20
Modified
2026-08-19 18:44
Severity ?
VLAI Severity ?
EPSS score ?
CWE
- CWE-294 - Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay
Summary
Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay in ZenHive mpp allows an unauthenticated remote client to obtain paid resources by resubmitting one settled on-chain transfer.
MPP.Methods.EVM.verify/2 accepts a transaction-hash credential and matches a transfer purely on token, to and amount (ERC-20) or to and value (native). It binds the proof neither to the challenge being verified nor to any record of prior use, and the generic MPP.Plug dedup store keys on challenge.id, which is regenerated for every 402 response. On a static-price route, a single historical transfer matching the charge therefore satisfies an unbounded number of later charges, including transfers an attacker can read off a public block explorer.
This issue affects mpp: from 0.3.0 before 0.6.3.
References
| URL | Tags | |
|---|---|---|
Impacted products
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or seen somewhere by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability is confirmed from an analyst perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: This vulnerability was exploited and seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Patched: This vulnerability was successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not exploited: This vulnerability was not exploited or seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expresses doubt about the veracity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: This vulnerability was not successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
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