CVE-2026-67330 (GCVE-0-2026-67330)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5
Published
2026-08-01 12:22
Modified
2026-08-03 15:38
Severity ?
9.4 (Critical) - CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H
9.9 (Critical) - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
9.9 (Critical) - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
VLAI Severity ?
EPSS score ?
CWE
- CWE-20 - Improper Input Validation
Summary
@better-auth/scim (a better-auth plugin) versions >= 1.4.0-beta.27 through <= 1.6.21 and >= 1.7.0-beta.0 through <= 1.7.0-beta.9 contain an authorization bypass. SCIM token issuance did not reject provider IDs already used by existing SSO, SAML, OIDC, generic OAuth, or social account providers, and the same logical provider ID was used for both SCIM provider configuration and account ownership. An authenticated user could mint a SCIM token whose provider ID collided with an existing provider namespace, causing SCIM user routes to resolve account rows the token never provisioned. This allowed listing, reading, updating (including rewriting global profile/email fields without uniqueness checks), and deleting global user accounts and sessions, resulting in account takeover and unauthorized deprovisioning. Fixed in 1.6.22 and 1.7.0-beta.10 (1.7.0-rc.0).
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| better-auth | scim |
Version: 1.4.0-beta.27 ≤ |
|||||||
|
|||||||||
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or seen somewhere by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability is confirmed from an analyst perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: This vulnerability was exploited and seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Patched: This vulnerability was successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not exploited: This vulnerability was not exploited or seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expresses doubt about the veracity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: This vulnerability was not successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
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