CVE-2026-65631 (GCVE-0-2026-65631)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5
Published
2026-10-26 19:53
Modified
2026-11-03 17:31
Severity ?
VLAI Severity ?
EPSS score ?
CWE
- CWE-407 - Inefficient Algorithmic Complexity
Summary
Inefficient Algorithmic Complexity in erlang-jose allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to cause a CPU-exhaustion denial of service by submitting a crafted RSA JSON Web Key.
When an application parses an untrusted JWK through the public jose_jwk:from_binary/1 or jose_jwk:from_map/1 API (or the Elixir wrappers JOSE.JWK.from_binary/1 and JOSE.JWK.from_map/1), an RSA private key that supplies d, e, and n but omits all Chinese Remainder Theorem parameters (p, q, dp, dq, qi) is routed into convert_sfm_to_crt/1, which tries to recover the missing primes by factoring the modulus. The three integers are read straight from the base64url input and are never validated as a real RSA key. When the modulus cannot be split into two factors (for example, when it is itself prime), the search loop convert_sfm_to_crt_find_p/6 performs a modular exponentiation over the attacker-sized modulus on every iteration and never succeeds. A single request of a few hundred bytes forces close to one CPU-second of work before an internal one-second watchdog kills the worker, and a larger modulus raises the cost further. By flooding such requests an attacker can saturate every scheduler and deny service, without credentials, a valid RSA key, or any special configuration.
This issue affects jose: from 1.7.7 before 1.11.13.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| potatosalad | jose |
Version: 1.7.7 ≤ cpe:2.3:a:potatosalad:jose:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* |
|||||||
|
|||||||||
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The three integers are read straight from the base64url input and are never validated as a real RSA key. When the modulus cannot be split into two factors (for example, when it is itself prime), the search loop \u003ccode\u003econvert_sfm_to_crt_find_p/6\u003c/code\u003e performs a modular exponentiation over the attacker-sized modulus on every iteration and never succeeds. A single request of a few hundred bytes forces close to one CPU-second of work before an internal one-second watchdog kills the worker, and a larger modulus raises the cost further. By flooding such requests an attacker can saturate every scheduler and deny service, without credentials, a valid RSA key, or any special configuration.\u003c/p\u003e\\n\u003cp\u003eThis issue affects jose: from 1.7.7 before 1.11.13.\u003c/p\u003e\", \"base64\": false}, {\"type\": \"text/markdown\", \"value\": \"Inefficient Algorithmic Complexity in erlang-jose allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to cause a CPU-exhaustion denial of service by submitting a crafted RSA JSON Web Key.\\n\\nWhen an application parses an untrusted JWK through the public `jose_jwk:from_binary/1` or `jose_jwk:from_map/1` API (or the Elixir wrappers `JOSE.JWK.from_binary/1` and `JOSE.JWK.from_map/1`), an RSA private key that supplies `d`, `e`, and `n` but omits all Chinese Remainder Theorem parameters (`p`, `q`, `dp`, `dq`, `qi`) is routed into `convert_sfm_to_crt/1`, which tries to recover the missing primes by factoring the modulus. The three integers are read straight from the base64url input and are never validated as a real RSA key. When the modulus cannot be split into two factors (for example, when it is itself prime), the search loop `convert_sfm_to_crt_find_p/6` performs a modular exponentiation over the attacker-sized modulus on every iteration and never succeeds. A single request of a few hundred bytes forces close to one CPU-second of work before an internal one-second watchdog kills the worker, and a larger modulus raises the cost further. By flooding such requests an attacker can saturate every scheduler and deny service, without credentials, a valid RSA key, or any special configuration.\\n\\nThis issue affects jose: from 1.7.7 before 1.11.13.\", \"base64\": false}]}], \"problemTypes\": [{\"descriptions\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"type\": \"CWE\", \"cweId\": \"CWE-407\", \"description\": \"CWE-407 Inefficient Algorithmic Complexity\"}]}], \"cpeApplicability\": [{\"nodes\": [{\"negate\": false, \"cpeMatch\": [{\"criteria\": \"cpe:2.3:a:potatosalad:jose:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*\", \"vulnerable\": true, \"versionEndExcluding\": \"1.11.13\", \"versionStartIncluding\": \"1.7.7\"}], \"operator\": \"OR\"}], \"operator\": \"AND\"}], \"providerMetadata\": {\"orgId\": \"6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db\", \"shortName\": \"EEF\", \"dateUpdated\": \"2026-10-26T19:53:45.204Z\"}}}",
"cveMetadata": "{\"cveId\": \"CVE-2026-65631\", \"state\": \"PUBLISHED\", \"dateUpdated\": \"2026-11-03T17:31:26.989Z\", \"dateReserved\": \"2026-07-22T13:58:26.233Z\", \"assignerOrgId\": \"6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db\", \"datePublished\": \"2026-10-26T19:53:45.204Z\", \"assignerShortName\": \"EEF\"}",
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2"
}
}
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or seen somewhere by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability is confirmed from an analyst perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: This vulnerability was exploited and seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Patched: This vulnerability was successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not exploited: This vulnerability was not exploited or seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expresses doubt about the veracity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: This vulnerability was not successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
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