CVE-2026-65628 (GCVE-0-2026-65628)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5
Published
2026-10-26 19:53
Modified
2026-11-02 21:29
Severity ?
VLAI Severity ?
EPSS score ?
CWE
- CWE-674 - Uncontrolled Recursion
Summary
jose_jwk:shared_secret/2 (exposed in Elixir as JOSE.JWK.shared_secret/2) derives an ECDH shared secret from two JWKs. Its first function clause only matches when both JWKs carry the same key type (kty) module, and its fallback clause re-invokes itself as shared_secret(from(YourJWK), from(MyJWK)). Because from/1 returns an already-parsed jose_jwk record unchanged, passing two JWKs whose key types differ (for example an EC key and an RSA key) makes the fallback clause re-enter with identical arguments, producing an unbounded tail-recursive loop that never returns and never crashes.
An application that derives a shared secret from an externally supplied peer public key without first checking that the peer key's type and curve match its own key can be driven into this loop by an attacker-controlled JWK, pinning an Erlang scheduler at 100% CPU. Repeated requests exhaust the available schedulers, resulting in a denial of service.
This issue affects jose: from 1.5.0 before 1.11.13.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| potatosalad | jose |
Version: 1.5.0 ≤ cpe:2.3:a:potatosalad:jose:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* |
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|
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or seen somewhere by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability is confirmed from an analyst perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: This vulnerability was exploited and seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Patched: This vulnerability was successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not exploited: This vulnerability was not exploited or seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expresses doubt about the veracity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: This vulnerability was not successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
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