CVE-2026-65625 (GCVE-0-2026-65625)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5
Published
2026-10-26 19:52
Modified
2026-11-02 19:43
Severity ?
VLAI Severity ?
EPSS score ?
CWE
- CWE-354 - Improper Validation of Integrity Check Value
Summary
The pure-Erlang AES-GCM fallback in jose_jwa_aes derives the number of verified authentication tag bits from the attacker-supplied tag itself. In the {aes_gcm, Bits} clause of block_decrypt/4, the incoming tag is guarded only by is_binary/1, with no check on its length. Verification in gcm_block_decrypt/6 then computes TBits = bit_size(T) and compares only those bits of the real 128-bit tag. An attacker who controls a JWE token can truncate the authentication tag to as little as 8 bits, so only 8 bits are ever checked. This reduces forgery resistance from 2^-128 to 2^-8, and a forged ciphertext is reliably accepted as authentic within 256 attempts without knowledge of the key (an authentication tag forgery and integrity bypass). Supplying a tag longer than 128 bits instead causes a badmatch that crashes the decrypting process. The fallback is reached through the public JWE decryption path whenever AES-GCM is not provided by a native crypto NIF, for example on FIPS or stripped or older OTP builds.
This issue affects jose: from 1.2.0 before 1.11.13.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| potatosalad | jose |
Version: 1.2.0 ≤ cpe:2.3:a:potatosalad:jose:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* |
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|
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In the `{aes_gcm, Bits}` clause of `block_decrypt/4`, the incoming tag is guarded only by `is_binary/1`, with no check on its length. Verification in `gcm_block_decrypt/6` then computes `TBits = bit_size(T)` and compares only those bits of the real 128-bit tag. An attacker who controls a JWE token can truncate the authentication tag to as little as 8 bits, so only 8 bits are ever checked. This reduces forgery resistance from 2^-128 to 2^-8, and a forged ciphertext is reliably accepted as authentic within 256 attempts without knowledge of the key (an authentication tag forgery and integrity bypass). Supplying a tag longer than 128 bits instead causes a badmatch that crashes the decrypting process. The fallback is reached through the public JWE decryption path whenever AES-GCM is not provided by a native crypto NIF, for example on FIPS or stripped or older OTP builds.\\n\\nThis issue affects jose: from 1.2.0 before 1.11.13.\", \"base64\": false}]}], \"problemTypes\": [{\"descriptions\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"type\": \"CWE\", \"cweId\": \"CWE-354\", \"description\": \"CWE-354 Improper Validation of Integrity Check Value\"}]}], \"configurations\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"value\": \"This vulnerability is only exploitable when AES-GCM is handled by the pure-Erlang jose_jwa_aes fallback. That fallback is used on deployments where the Erlang/OTP crypto NIF does not expose native AES-GCM (for example FIPS builds, or stripped or older OTP releases). Deployments with a native AES-GCM crypto provider dispatch GCM through crypto and are not affected.\", \"supportingMedia\": [{\"type\": \"text/html\", \"value\": \"\u003cp\u003eThis vulnerability is only exploitable when AES-GCM is handled by the pure-Erlang \u003ccode\u003ejose_jwa_aes\u003c/code\u003e fallback. That fallback is used on deployments where the Erlang/OTP \u003ccode\u003ecrypto\u003c/code\u003e NIF does not expose native AES-GCM (for example FIPS builds, or stripped or older OTP releases). Deployments with a native AES-GCM crypto provider dispatch GCM through \u003ccode\u003ecrypto\u003c/code\u003e and are not affected.\u003c/p\u003e\", \"base64\": false}, {\"type\": \"text/markdown\", \"value\": \"This vulnerability is only exploitable when AES-GCM is handled by the pure-Erlang `jose_jwa_aes` fallback. That fallback is used on deployments where the Erlang/OTP `crypto` NIF does not expose native AES-GCM (for example FIPS builds, or stripped or older OTP releases). Deployments with a native AES-GCM crypto provider dispatch GCM through `crypto` and are not affected.\", \"base64\": false}]}], \"cpeApplicability\": [{\"nodes\": [{\"negate\": false, \"cpeMatch\": [{\"criteria\": \"cpe:2.3:a:potatosalad:jose:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*\", \"vulnerable\": true, \"versionEndExcluding\": \"1.11.13\", \"versionStartIncluding\": \"1.2.0\"}], \"operator\": \"OR\"}], \"operator\": \"AND\"}], \"providerMetadata\": {\"orgId\": \"6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db\", \"shortName\": \"EEF\", \"dateUpdated\": \"2026-10-26T19:52:54.987Z\"}}}",
"cveMetadata": "{\"cveId\": \"CVE-2026-65625\", \"state\": \"PUBLISHED\", \"dateUpdated\": \"2026-11-02T19:43:05.255Z\", \"dateReserved\": \"2026-07-22T13:55:59.401Z\", \"assignerOrgId\": \"6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db\", \"datePublished\": \"2026-10-26T19:52:54.987Z\", \"assignerShortName\": \"EEF\"}",
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2"
}
}
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or seen somewhere by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability is confirmed from an analyst perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: This vulnerability was exploited and seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Patched: This vulnerability was successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not exploited: This vulnerability was not exploited or seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expresses doubt about the veracity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: This vulnerability was not successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
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