CVE-2026-64031 (GCVE-0-2026-64031)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5
Published
2026-07-19 15:39
Modified
2026-09-14 11:58
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: erofs: fix managed cache race for unaligned extents After unaligned compressed extents were introduced, the following race could occur: [Thread 1] [Thread 2] (z_erofs_fill_bio_vec) <handle a Z_EROFS_PREALLOCATED_FOLIO folio> ... filemap_add_folio (1) (z_erofs_bind_cache) <the same folio is found..> .. .. folio_attach_private (2) filemap_add_folio (3) again Since (1) is executed but (2) hasn't been executed yet, it's possible that another thread finds the same managed folio in z_erofs_bind_cache() for a different pcluster and calls filemap_add_folio() again since folio->private is still Z_EROFS_PREALLOCATED_FOLIO. Fix this by explicitly clearing folio->private before making the folio visible in the managed cache so that another pcluster can simply wait on the locked managed folio as what we did for other shared cases [1]. This only impacts unaligned data compression (`-E48bit` with zstd, for example). [1] Commit 9e2f9d34dd12 ("erofs: handle overlapped pclusters out of crafted images properly") was originally introduced to handle crafted overlapped extents, but it addresses unaligned extents as well.
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
Linux Linux Version: 722f0fcdb0bb7d12a5c6d9460b9a7de1f735f36d
Version: 7361d1e3763baaf7b9349c576137851458ad38d1
Version: 7361d1e3763baaf7b9349c576137851458ad38d1
Version: 7361d1e3763baaf7b9349c576137851458ad38d1
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{
  "containers": {
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "fs/erofs/zdata.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "2718cdb6db0fdbe375e61f2980aada27bafb323e",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "722f0fcdb0bb7d12a5c6d9460b9a7de1f735f36d",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "425d32d6288d7d845e486af9419bbedccd8c9103",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "7361d1e3763baaf7b9349c576137851458ad38d1",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "038166f873c4caf6e85cfd4ea0c5a5ba297b4e8b",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "7361d1e3763baaf7b9349c576137851458ad38d1",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "649932fc3815eda2f24eb4de4b3a5e94886ee0b9",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "7361d1e3763baaf7b9349c576137851458ad38d1",
              "versionType": "git"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "defaultStatus": "affected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "fs/erofs/zdata.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "6.15"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "6.15",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.18.34",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "7.0.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.0.11",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.1",
              "versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "cpeApplicability": [
        {
          "nodes": [
            {
              "cpeMatch": [
                {
                  "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                  "versionEndExcluding": "6.18.34",
                  "versionStartIncluding": "6.15",
                  "vulnerable": true
                },
                {
                  "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                  "versionEndExcluding": "7.0.11",
                  "versionStartIncluding": "6.15",
                  "vulnerable": true
                },
                {
                  "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                  "versionEndExcluding": "7.1",
                  "versionStartIncluding": "6.15",
                  "vulnerable": true
                }
              ],
              "negate": false,
              "operator": "OR"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nerofs: fix managed cache race for unaligned extents\n\nAfter unaligned compressed extents were introduced, the following race\ncould occur:\n\n[Thread 1]                                   [Thread 2]\n(z_erofs_fill_bio_vec)\n\u003chandle a Z_EROFS_PREALLOCATED_FOLIO folio\u003e\n...\nfilemap_add_folio (1)\n                                             (z_erofs_bind_cache)\n                                             \u003cthe same folio is found..\u003e\n                                             ..\n                                             ..\nfolio_attach_private (2)\n                                             filemap_add_folio (3) again\n\nSince (1) is executed but (2) hasn\u0027t been executed yet, it\u0027s possible\nthat another thread finds the same managed folio in z_erofs_bind_cache()\nfor a different pcluster and calls filemap_add_folio() again since\nfolio-\u003eprivate is still Z_EROFS_PREALLOCATED_FOLIO.\n\nFix this by explicitly clearing folio-\u003eprivate before making the folio\nvisible in the managed cache so that another pcluster can simply wait\non the locked managed folio as what we did for other shared cases [1].\n\nThis only impacts unaligned data compression (`-E48bit` with zstd,\nfor example).\n\n[1] Commit 9e2f9d34dd12 (\"erofs: handle overlapped pclusters out of\n crafted images properly\") was originally introduced to handle crafted\n overlapped extents, but it addresses unaligned extents as well."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV3_1": {
            "baseScore": 7.8,
            "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
            "version": "3.1"
          },
          "scenarios": [
            {
              "lang": "en",
              "value": "AV:L - The bug is reached only through local VFS read paths (`read`/`pread`/`mmap` faults) on a mounted EROFS volume, flowing through `z_erofs_read_folio`/`z_erofs_readahead` \u2192 `z_erofs_runqueue` \u2192 `z_erofs_submit_queue` \u2192 `z_erofs_fill_bio_vec` and `z_erofs_bind_cache`. There is no network-facing handler; exploitation requires local filesystem access.\nAC:L - The race is between concurrent read/decompress threads that the attacker fully controls by issuing parallel reads against a crafted image with overlapping unaligned compressed extents. No timing or layout conditions outside attacker control are required beyond crafting the image and spawning concurrent I/O.\nPR:L - Triggering the vulnerable managed-cache path requires mounting a crafted EROFS image with unaligned zstd extents, which is achievable with CAP_SYS_ADMIN inside an unprivileged user namespace (`unshare -Urn`) plus loop mount. After mount, only normal unprivileged file read access is needed to hit the race.\nUI:N - Once the attacker can mount the crafted image (e.g., via user namespace), exploitation is fully automated through concurrent reads and requires no additional victim interaction such as opening a specific application or clicking a link.\nS:U - Impact is confined to kernel memory corruption and privilege escalation within the same kernel/host security boundary; this is not a VM escape, IOMMU bypass, or cross-authority sandbox breakout.\nC:H - The race leaves managed folios visible in the page cache while `folio-\u003eprivate` still marks them preallocated, allowing duplicate `filemap_add_folio` and conflicting `folio_attach_private`/`folio_detach_private` bindings to different pclusters\u2014classic page-cache corruption that can yield arbitrary kernel memory disclosure via confused folio ownership.\nI:H - Associating one managed folio with multiple pclusters corrupts `folio-\u003eprivate` and compressed-bvec references, creating use-after-free/refcount confusion in the managed cache that is exploitable for arbitrary kernel writes or control-flow hijack, not merely a benign error return.\nA:H - The corrupted managed-cache state can cause kernel oops/panic, hung tasks, or deadlock (similar overlapped-pcluster crafted-image failures previously caused syzbot hangs), and any successful UAF in this path also implies high availability impact even before full exploitation."
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-09-14T11:58:35.405Z",
        "orgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
        "shortName": "Linux"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2718cdb6db0fdbe375e61f2980aada27bafb323e"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/425d32d6288d7d845e486af9419bbedccd8c9103"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/038166f873c4caf6e85cfd4ea0c5a5ba297b4e8b"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/649932fc3815eda2f24eb4de4b3a5e94886ee0b9"
        }
      ],
      "title": "erofs: fix managed cache race for unaligned extents",
      "x_generator": {
        "engine": "bippy-1.2.0"
      }
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
    "assignerShortName": "Linux",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-64031",
    "datePublished": "2026-07-19T15:39:21.609Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-07-19T07:54:57.028Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-09-14T11:58:35.405Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}


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  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or seen somewhere by the user.
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