CVE-2026-59185 (GCVE-0-2026-59185)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5
Published
2026-10-28 13:15
Modified
2026-10-28 16:07
Severity ?
VLAI Severity ?
EPSS score ?
Summary
identrail is a machine identity security platform for AWS, GitHub/OIDC, and Kubernetes. Prior to 1.0.2, the default-on `POST /v1/workspaces/:workspace_id/projects/:project_id/github/connect/complete` endpoint in `internal/api/router.go` accepts `installation_id` from the request body or `X-GitHub-Installation-ID` header without verifying the installation belongs to the caller's workspace. `CompleteGitHubConnection` in `internal/api/github_connect.go` rigorously binds `state` to the caller's tenant, workspace, and project, but checks only that the installation ID is positive before persisting it as the caller's connection. `ListInstallationRepositories` in `internal/connectors/github/repositories.go` invokes token creation through `internal/connectors/github/app.go` and `POST /app/installations/{installationId}/access_tokens`, using the application's JWT. An authenticated tenant who starts a legitimate connection can supply another customer's non-secret installation ID to read the victim organization's private repository inventory, content, and metadata or drive posture scans, provided identrail's GitHub App is installed there. The default-off V2 `CompleteGitHubConnector` path shares the installation-ownership gap and additionally matches pending `state` without rechecking caller scope. This issue is fixed in version 1.0.2.
References
| URL | Tags | ||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|||||||||||
{
"containers": {
"adp": [
{
"metrics": [
{
"other": {
"content": {
"id": "CVE-2026-59185",
"options": [
{
"Exploitation": "none"
},
{
"Automatable": "no"
},
{
"Technical Impact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-10-28T14:37:16.463171Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
},
"type": "ssvc"
}
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-10-28T16:07:10.634Z",
"orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"shortName": "CISA-ADP"
},
"title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
}
],
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"product": "identrail",
"vendor": "identrail",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "\u003c 1.0.2"
}
]
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "identrail is a machine identity security platform for AWS, GitHub/OIDC, and Kubernetes. Prior to 1.0.2, the default-on `POST /v1/workspaces/:workspace_id/projects/:project_id/github/connect/complete` endpoint in `internal/api/router.go` accepts `installation_id` from the request body or `X-GitHub-Installation-ID` header without verifying the installation belongs to the caller\u0027s workspace. `CompleteGitHubConnection` in `internal/api/github_connect.go` rigorously binds `state` to the caller\u0027s tenant, workspace, and project, but checks only that the installation ID is positive before persisting it as the caller\u0027s connection. `ListInstallationRepositories` in `internal/connectors/github/repositories.go` invokes token creation through `internal/connectors/github/app.go` and `POST /app/installations/{installationId}/access_tokens`, using the application\u0027s JWT. An authenticated tenant who starts a legitimate connection can supply another customer\u0027s non-secret installation ID to read the victim organization\u0027s private repository inventory, content, and metadata or drive posture scans, provided identrail\u0027s GitHub App is installed there. The default-off V2 `CompleteGitHubConnector` path shares the installation-ownership gap and additionally matches pending `state` without rechecking caller scope. This issue is fixed in version 1.0.2."
}
],
"metrics": [
{
"cvssV3_1": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "NONE",
"baseScore": 8.5,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "LOW",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "CHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N",
"version": "3.1"
}
}
],
"problemTypes": [
{
"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-639",
"description": "CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
},
{
"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-862",
"description": "CWE-862: Missing Authorization",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-10-28T13:15:53.456Z",
"orgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
"shortName": "GitHub_M"
},
"references": [
{
"name": "https://github.com/identrail/identrail/security/advisories/GHSA-cp3j-m783-3ph5",
"tags": [
"x_refsource_CONFIRM"
],
"url": "https://github.com/identrail/identrail/security/advisories/GHSA-cp3j-m783-3ph5"
},
{
"name": "https://github.com/identrail/identrail/commit/835e40517509d6ef5405c27fbf14f579bedff0e7",
"tags": [
"x_refsource_MISC"
],
"url": "https://github.com/identrail/identrail/commit/835e40517509d6ef5405c27fbf14f579bedff0e7"
},
{
"name": "https://github.com/identrail/identrail/releases/tag/v1.0.2",
"tags": [
"x_refsource_MISC"
],
"url": "https://github.com/identrail/identrail/releases/tag/v1.0.2"
}
],
"source": {
"advisory": "GHSA-cp3j-m783-3ph5",
"discovery": "UNKNOWN"
},
"title": "identrail: Cross-tenant GitHub installation binding without ownership verification"
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
"assignerShortName": "GitHub_M",
"cveId": "CVE-2026-59185",
"datePublished": "2026-10-28T13:15:53.456Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-07-02T19:53:48.830Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-10-28T16:07:10.634Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2",
"vulnerability-lookup:meta": {
"vulnrichment": {
"containers": "{\"adp\": [{\"title\": \"CISA ADP Vulnrichment\", \"metrics\": [{\"other\": {\"type\": \"ssvc\", \"content\": {\"id\": \"CVE-2026-59185\", \"role\": \"CISA Coordinator\", \"options\": [{\"Exploitation\": \"none\"}, {\"Automatable\": \"no\"}, {\"Technical Impact\": \"partial\"}], \"version\": \"2.0.3\", \"timestamp\": \"2026-10-28T14:37:16.463171Z\"}}}], \"providerMetadata\": {\"orgId\": \"134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0\", \"shortName\": \"CISA-ADP\", \"dateUpdated\": \"2026-10-28T14:37:21.536Z\"}}], \"cna\": {\"title\": \"identrail: Cross-tenant GitHub installation binding without ownership verification\", \"source\": {\"advisory\": \"GHSA-cp3j-m783-3ph5\", \"discovery\": \"UNKNOWN\"}, \"metrics\": [{\"cvssV3_1\": {\"scope\": \"CHANGED\", \"version\": \"3.1\", \"baseScore\": 8.5, \"attackVector\": \"NETWORK\", \"baseSeverity\": \"HIGH\", \"vectorString\": \"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N\", \"integrityImpact\": \"LOW\", \"userInteraction\": \"NONE\", \"attackComplexity\": \"LOW\", \"availabilityImpact\": \"NONE\", \"privilegesRequired\": \"LOW\", \"confidentialityImpact\": \"HIGH\"}}], \"affected\": [{\"vendor\": \"identrail\", \"product\": \"identrail\", \"versions\": [{\"status\": \"affected\", \"version\": \"\u003c 1.0.2\"}]}], \"references\": [{\"url\": \"https://github.com/identrail/identrail/security/advisories/GHSA-cp3j-m783-3ph5\", \"name\": \"https://github.com/identrail/identrail/security/advisories/GHSA-cp3j-m783-3ph5\", \"tags\": [\"x_refsource_CONFIRM\"]}, {\"url\": \"https://github.com/identrail/identrail/commit/835e40517509d6ef5405c27fbf14f579bedff0e7\", \"name\": \"https://github.com/identrail/identrail/commit/835e40517509d6ef5405c27fbf14f579bedff0e7\", \"tags\": [\"x_refsource_MISC\"]}, {\"url\": \"https://github.com/identrail/identrail/releases/tag/v1.0.2\", \"name\": \"https://github.com/identrail/identrail/releases/tag/v1.0.2\", \"tags\": [\"x_refsource_MISC\"]}], \"descriptions\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"value\": \"identrail is a machine identity security platform for AWS, GitHub/OIDC, and Kubernetes. Prior to 1.0.2, the default-on `POST /v1/workspaces/:workspace_id/projects/:project_id/github/connect/complete` endpoint in `internal/api/router.go` accepts `installation_id` from the request body or `X-GitHub-Installation-ID` header without verifying the installation belongs to the caller\u0027s workspace. `CompleteGitHubConnection` in `internal/api/github_connect.go` rigorously binds `state` to the caller\u0027s tenant, workspace, and project, but checks only that the installation ID is positive before persisting it as the caller\u0027s connection. `ListInstallationRepositories` in `internal/connectors/github/repositories.go` invokes token creation through `internal/connectors/github/app.go` and `POST /app/installations/{installationId}/access_tokens`, using the application\u0027s JWT. An authenticated tenant who starts a legitimate connection can supply another customer\u0027s non-secret installation ID to read the victim organization\u0027s private repository inventory, content, and metadata or drive posture scans, provided identrail\u0027s GitHub App is installed there. The default-off V2 `CompleteGitHubConnector` path shares the installation-ownership gap and additionally matches pending `state` without rechecking caller scope. This issue is fixed in version 1.0.2.\"}], \"problemTypes\": [{\"descriptions\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"type\": \"CWE\", \"cweId\": \"CWE-639\", \"description\": \"CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key\"}]}, {\"descriptions\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"type\": \"CWE\", \"cweId\": \"CWE-862\", \"description\": \"CWE-862: Missing Authorization\"}]}], \"providerMetadata\": {\"orgId\": \"a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa\", \"shortName\": \"GitHub_M\", \"dateUpdated\": \"2026-10-28T13:15:53.456Z\"}}}",
"cveMetadata": "{\"cveId\": \"CVE-2026-59185\", \"state\": \"PUBLISHED\", \"dateUpdated\": \"2026-10-28T16:07:10.634Z\", \"dateReserved\": \"2026-07-02T19:53:48.830Z\", \"assignerOrgId\": \"a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa\", \"datePublished\": \"2026-10-28T13:15:53.456Z\", \"assignerShortName\": \"GitHub_M\"}",
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2"
}
}
}
Loading…
Loading…
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or seen somewhere by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability is confirmed from an analyst perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: This vulnerability was exploited and seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Patched: This vulnerability was successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not exploited: This vulnerability was not exploited or seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expresses doubt about the veracity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: This vulnerability was not successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
Loading…
Loading…