CVE-2026-5843 (GCVE-0-2026-5843)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5
Published
2026-05-22 19:28
Modified
2026-05-27 03:55
CWE
  • CWE-829 - Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere
Summary
The MLX inference backend in Docker Model Runner on macOS uses the MLX-LM library, which unconditionally imports and executes arbitrary Python files from model directories via the model_file configuration field in config.json. When a model's config.json specifies a model_file pointing to a Python file, MLX-LM uses importlib to load and execute it with no trust_remote_code gate or equivalent safety check. The MLX backend runs without sandboxing, resulting in arbitrary code execution on the Docker host as the Docker Desktop user. Any container on the Docker network can trigger this by calling the model-runner.docker.internal API to pull a malicious model from an attacker-controlled OCI registry and request inference.
References
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
Docker Docker Desktop Version: 4.56.0   
Create a notification for this product.
Show details on NVD website


{
  "containers": {
    "adp": [
      {
        "metrics": [
          {
            "other": {
              "content": {
                "id": "CVE-2026-5843",
                "options": [
                  {
                    "Exploitation": "none"
                  },
                  {
                    "Automatable": "no"
                  },
                  {
                    "Technical Impact": "total"
                  }
                ],
                "role": "CISA Coordinator",
                "timestamp": "2026-05-26T00:00:00+00:00",
                "version": "2.0.3"
              },
              "type": "ssvc"
            }
          }
        ],
        "providerMetadata": {
          "dateUpdated": "2026-05-27T03:55:38.188Z",
          "orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
          "shortName": "CISA-ADP"
        },
        "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
      }
    ],
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "platforms": [
            "MacOS"
          ],
          "product": "Docker Desktop",
          "vendor": "Docker",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "4.71.0",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "4.56.0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "configurations": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "supportingMedia": [
            {
              "base64": false,
              "type": "text/html",
              "value": "Docker Model Runner enabled with the MLX inference backend on macOS"
            }
          ],
          "value": "Docker Model Runner enabled with the MLX inference backend on macOS"
        }
      ],
      "credits": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "type": "finder",
          "value": "David Rochester (@davidrxchester)"
        },
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "type": "finder",
          "value": "Nicholas Gould (@gouldnicholas)"
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "supportingMedia": [
            {
              "base64": false,
              "type": "text/html",
              "value": "The MLX inference backend in Docker Model Runner on macOS uses the MLX-LM library, which unconditionally imports and executes arbitrary Python files from model directories via the \u003ccode\u003emodel_file\u003c/code\u003e configuration field in \u003ccode\u003econfig.json\u003c/code\u003e. When a model\u0027s \u003ccode\u003econfig.json\u003c/code\u003e specifies a \u003ccode\u003emodel_file\u003c/code\u003e pointing to a Python file, MLX-LM uses \u003ccode\u003eimportlib\u003c/code\u003e to load and execute it with no \u003ccode\u003etrust_remote_code\u003c/code\u003e gate or equivalent safety check. The MLX backend runs without sandboxing, resulting in arbitrary code execution on the Docker host as the Docker Desktop user.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eAny container on the Docker network can trigger this by calling the \u003ccode\u003emodel-runner.docker.internal\u003c/code\u003e API to pull a malicious model from an attacker-controlled OCI registry and request inference."
            }
          ],
          "value": "The MLX inference backend in Docker Model Runner on macOS uses the MLX-LM library, which unconditionally imports and executes arbitrary Python files from model directories via the model_file configuration field in config.json. When a model\u0027s config.json specifies a model_file pointing to a Python file, MLX-LM uses importlib to load and execute it with no trust_remote_code gate or equivalent safety check. The MLX backend runs without sandboxing, resulting in arbitrary code execution on the Docker host as the Docker Desktop user.\n\nAny container on the Docker network can trigger this by calling the model-runner.docker.internal API to pull a malicious model from an attacker-controlled OCI registry and request inference."
        }
      ],
      "impacts": [
        {
          "capecId": "CAPEC-480",
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "lang": "en",
              "value": "CAPEC-480 Escaping Virtualization"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV4_0": {
            "Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
            "Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
            "Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
            "attackComplexity": "LOW",
            "attackRequirements": "PRESENT",
            "attackVector": "LOCAL",
            "baseScore": 8.8,
            "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
            "exploitMaturity": "NOT_DEFINED",
            "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
            "providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
            "subAvailabilityImpact": "HIGH",
            "subConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
            "subIntegrityImpact": "HIGH",
            "userInteraction": "NONE",
            "valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H",
            "version": "4.0",
            "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "HIGH",
            "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
            "vulnIntegrityImpact": "HIGH",
            "vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
          },
          "format": "CVSS",
          "scenarios": [
            {
              "lang": "en",
              "value": "GENERAL"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "cvssV3_1": {
            "attackComplexity": "LOW",
            "attackVector": "LOCAL",
            "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
            "baseScore": 8.2,
            "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
            "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
            "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
            "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
            "scope": "CHANGED",
            "userInteraction": "REQUIRED",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
            "version": "3.1"
          },
          "format": "CVSS",
          "scenarios": [
            {
              "lang": "en",
              "value": "GENERAL"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "problemTypes": [
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-829",
              "description": "CWE-829: Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-05-22T19:28:38.857Z",
        "orgId": "686469e6-3ff6-451b-ab8b-cf5b9e89401e",
        "shortName": "Docker"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "tags": [
            "release-notes"
          ],
          "url": "https://docs.docker.com/desktop/release-notes/#4710"
        }
      ],
      "source": {
        "discovery": "EXTERNAL"
      },
      "title": "Docker Model Runner container-to-host code execution via MLX-LM model_file importlib loading",
      "workarounds": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "supportingMedia": [
            {
              "base64": false,
              "type": "text/html",
              "value": "Disable Docker Model Runner or only run trusted containers on Docker Desktop instances where Model Runner is enabled."
            }
          ],
          "value": "Disable Docker Model Runner or only run trusted containers on Docker Desktop instances where Model Runner is enabled."
        }
      ],
      "x_generator": {
        "engine": "Vulnogram 0.2.0"
      }
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "686469e6-3ff6-451b-ab8b-cf5b9e89401e",
    "assignerShortName": "Docker",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-5843",
    "datePublished": "2026-05-22T19:28:38.857Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-04-08T17:43:50.508Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-05-27T03:55:38.188Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}


Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.


Loading…

Loading…

Loading…

Sightings

Author Source Type Date

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or seen somewhere by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability is confirmed from an analyst perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: This vulnerability was exploited and seen by the user reporting the sighting.
  • Patched: This vulnerability was successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
  • Not exploited: This vulnerability was not exploited or seen by the user reporting the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expresses doubt about the veracity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: This vulnerability was not successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.


Loading…

Loading…