CVE-2026-58202 (GCVE-0-2026-58202)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5
Published
2026-10-23 20:27
Modified
2026-10-23 20:27
Severity ?
VLAI Severity ?
EPSS score ?
CWE
- CWE-640 - Weak Password Recovery Mechanism for Forgotten Password
Summary
OpenReception's appointment booking software provides an end-to-end encrypted appointment booking platform. Prior to version 2.0.0, the account-confirmation link in emails is built from the request Host header, with no allowlist. The unauthenticated POST /api/auth/resend-confirmation rotates a pending invitee's confirmation token and emails a link whose host comes from the request. An attacker who sends one resend-confirmation with Host: attacker.example and a pending invitee's email causes that invitee to receive a confirmation email whose only link points to the attacker. If the invitee clicks, the one-time confirmation token reaches the attacker, who then confirms the account on the real tenant domain and registers a passkey they control, taking over the account before the legitimate invitee ever uses it. All released versions through v1.1.0 are affected; no patched version exists yet. Reaching the app with a spoofed Host depends on the front proxy: the stock Caddy catch-all forwards it, while an operator who configures explicit per-tenant proxy blocks is not affected (see Details 4). The invite path builds links from the trusted tenant.domain (invite/+server.ts:204-210); the resend-confirmation path builds them from the request Host. This issue has been patched in version 2.0.0.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| open-reception | appointment-booking-software |
Version: < 2.0.0 |
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"product": "appointment-booking-software",
"vendor": "open-reception",
"versions": [
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"status": "affected",
"version": "\u003c 2.0.0"
}
]
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],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "OpenReception\u0027s appointment booking software provides an end-to-end encrypted appointment booking platform. Prior to version 2.0.0, the account-confirmation link in emails is built from the request Host header, with no allowlist. The unauthenticated POST /api/auth/resend-confirmation rotates a pending invitee\u0027s confirmation token and emails a link whose host comes from the request. An attacker who sends one resend-confirmation with Host: attacker.example and a pending invitee\u0027s email causes that invitee to receive a confirmation email whose only link points to the attacker. If the invitee clicks, the one-time confirmation token reaches the attacker, who then confirms the account on the real tenant domain and registers a passkey they control, taking over the account before the legitimate invitee ever uses it. All released versions through v1.1.0 are affected; no patched version exists yet. Reaching the app with a spoofed Host depends on the front proxy: the stock Caddy catch-all forwards it, while an operator who configures explicit per-tenant proxy blocks is not affected (see Details 4). The invite path builds links from the trusted tenant.domain (invite/+server.ts:204-210); the resend-confirmation path builds them from the request Host. This issue has been patched in version 2.0.0."
}
],
"metrics": [
{
"cvssV3_1": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "LOW",
"baseScore": 8.3,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "REQUIRED",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L",
"version": "3.1"
}
}
],
"problemTypes": [
{
"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-640",
"description": "CWE-640: Weak Password Recovery Mechanism for Forgotten Password",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-10-23T20:27:36.090Z",
"orgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
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"references": [
{
"name": "https://github.com/open-reception/appointment-booking-software/security/advisories/GHSA-w5g9-g2p4-2g4m",
"tags": [
"x_refsource_CONFIRM"
],
"url": "https://github.com/open-reception/appointment-booking-software/security/advisories/GHSA-w5g9-g2p4-2g4m"
},
{
"name": "https://github.com/open-reception/appointment-booking-software/commit/df5432776a1a5b47c3a64d64e9d05dbe2b7a7819",
"tags": [
"x_refsource_MISC"
],
"url": "https://github.com/open-reception/appointment-booking-software/commit/df5432776a1a5b47c3a64d64e9d05dbe2b7a7819"
},
{
"name": "https://github.com/open-reception/appointment-booking-software/releases/tag/v2.0.0",
"tags": [
"x_refsource_MISC"
],
"url": "https://github.com/open-reception/appointment-booking-software/releases/tag/v2.0.0"
}
],
"source": {
"advisory": "GHSA-w5g9-g2p4-2g4m",
"discovery": "UNKNOWN"
},
"title": "OpenReception: Confirmation-email links built from the request Host enable pending-account takeover via `POST /api/auth/resend-confirmation`"
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
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"assignerShortName": "GitHub_M",
"cveId": "CVE-2026-58202",
"datePublished": "2026-10-23T20:27:36.090Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-06-29T17:09:25.872Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-10-23T20:27:36.090Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
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"vulnerability-lookup:meta": {
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"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
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}
}
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or seen somewhere by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability is confirmed from an analyst perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: This vulnerability was exploited and seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Patched: This vulnerability was successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not exploited: This vulnerability was not exploited or seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expresses doubt about the veracity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: This vulnerability was not successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
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