CVE-2026-55524 (GCVE-0-2026-55524)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5
Published
2026-08-05 19:58
Modified
2026-08-06 14:43
Severity ?
VLAI Severity ?
EPSS score ?
CWE
Summary
PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. In versions prior to 1.6.58, the web_crawl tool performs its SSRF check only on the initially supplied URL, allowing the protection to be bypassed so the tool connects to attacker-chosen internal destinations. The check resolves the hostname once with socket.gethostbyname and rejects private/loopback/link-local results, but then passes the URL to a fetcher using httpx.Client(follow_redirects=True) (or urllib.request.urlopen when httpx is absent, which also follows redirects) that re-resolves the hostname at connect time with no further validation. This validate-here/fetch-there gap is exploitable through both HTTP redirects and DNS rebinding. If an attacker can influence URLs passed to web_crawl(), directly or through an agent/tool workflow, they can cause the PraisonAI host to fetch loopback, private-network, or cloud metadata endpoints reachable from that host, with the response body returned in the web_crawl() result. This issue has been fixed in version 1.6.58.
References
| URL | Tags | |
|---|---|---|
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| MervinPraison | PraisonAI |
Version: < 1.6.58 |
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or seen somewhere by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability is confirmed from an analyst perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: This vulnerability was exploited and seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Patched: This vulnerability was successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not exploited: This vulnerability was not exploited or seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expresses doubt about the veracity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: This vulnerability was not successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
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