CVE-2026-54051 (GCVE-0-2026-54051)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5
Published
2026-07-20 16:24
Modified
2026-07-21 16:03
Severity ?
VLAI Severity ?
EPSS score ?
CWE
- CWE-78 - Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')
Summary
Network-AI is a TypeScript/Node.js multi-agent orchestrator. Prior to version 5.9.1, the agent sandbox gates shell commands behind an allowlist (`SandboxPolicy.isCommandAllowed`), which THREAT_MODEL.md calls the main control against a compromised agent (Adversary 3.2). The allowlist glob-matches the whole command string, but `ShellExecutor` runs that string through `/bin/sh -c`. So any wildcard allow such as `git *`, `npm *` or `node *` also matches `git status; <anything>`, and a scoped command becomes arbitrary execution. The issue is fixed in v5.9.1. `ShellExecutor` now executes via `spawn(file, args, { shell: false })` using a quote-aware parsed argv, so no shell is invoked. `SandboxPolicy.isCommandAllowed` and the new `SandboxPolicy.tokenizeCommand` reject any unquoted shell metacharacter (`; & | $ ` ` ` ( ) < > { }` newline) or unterminated quote before the allowlist glob match; quoted metacharacters are preserved as literal argument data. Users should upgrade to `network-ai@5.9.1` or later. As defense in depth, avoid broad wildcard allowlist entries such as `node *` / `npm *` which are direct code execution by design.
References
| URL | Tags | |
|---|---|---|
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jovancoding | Network-AI |
Version: < 5.9.1 |
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or seen somewhere by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability is confirmed from an analyst perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: This vulnerability was exploited and seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Patched: This vulnerability was successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not exploited: This vulnerability was not exploited or seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expresses doubt about the veracity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: This vulnerability was not successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
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