CVE-2026-53283 (GCVE-0-2026-53283)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5
Published
2026-06-26 19:40
Modified
2026-06-26 19:40
Severity ?
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iommu/amd: Bounds-check devid in __rlookup_amd_iommu() iommu_device_register() walks every device on the PCI bus via bus_for_each_dev() and calls amd_iommu_probe_device() for each. The inlined check_device() path computes the device's sbdf, calls rlookup_amd_iommu() to find the owning IOMMU, and only afterwards verifies devid <= pci_seg->last_bdf. __rlookup_amd_iommu() indexes rlookup_table[devid] with no bounds check of its own, so for a PCI device whose BDF is not described by the IVRS, the lookup reads past the end of the allocation before the caller's bounds check can run. This was harmless before commit e874c666b15b ("iommu/amd: Change rlookup, irq_lookup, and alias to use kvalloc()"): the table was a zeroed page-order allocation, so the over-read returned NULL and the caller's NULL check skipped the device. After that commit the table is a tight kvcalloc() and the over-read returns adjacent slab contents, which check_device() then dereferences as a struct amd_iommu *, causing a boot-time GPF. Seen on Google Compute Engine ct6e VMs, where the virtualized IVRS describes only the four TPU endpoints 00:04.0-07.0; the gVNIC at 00:08.0 (devid 0x40) indexes 56 bytes past the 456-byte allocation, into the adjacent kmalloc-512 slab object: pci 0000:00:04.0: Adding to iommu group 0 pci 0000:00:05.0: Adding to iommu group 1 pci 0000:00:06.0: Adding to iommu group 2 pci 0000:00:07.0: Adding to iommu group 3 Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0x3a64695f78746382: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.18.22 #1 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 12/06/2025 RIP: 0010:amd_iommu_probe_device+0x54/0x3a0 Call Trace: __iommu_probe_device+0x107/0x520 probe_iommu_group+0x29/0x50 bus_for_each_dev+0x7e/0xe0 iommu_device_register+0xc9/0x240 iommu_go_to_state+0x9c0/0x1c60 amd_iommu_init+0x14/0x40 pci_iommu_init+0x16/0x60 do_one_initcall+0x47/0x2f0 Guard the array access in __rlookup_amd_iommu(). With the fix applied on 6.18.22, the gVNIC at 00:08.0 is skipped cleanly and the VM boots.
References
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
Linux Linux Version: e874c666b15bcb6280c4e747d8de3879bb728829
Version: e874c666b15bcb6280c4e747d8de3879bb728829
Version: e874c666b15bcb6280c4e747d8de3879bb728829
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{
  "containers": {
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "drivers/iommu/amd/iommu.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "f0a0f01787ecece814414b0665df879b69849d09",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "e874c666b15bcb6280c4e747d8de3879bb728829",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "79db4cbab81f07ce69a93d379ebd40d3709ecfb2",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "e874c666b15bcb6280c4e747d8de3879bb728829",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "07d0f496fe7ec5abe3bee7e38be709521567bb33",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "e874c666b15bcb6280c4e747d8de3879bb728829",
              "versionType": "git"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "defaultStatus": "affected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "drivers/iommu/amd/iommu.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "6.16"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "6.16",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.18.33",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "7.0.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.0.10",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.1",
              "versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "cpeApplicability": [
        {
          "nodes": [
            {
              "cpeMatch": [
                {
                  "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                  "versionEndExcluding": "6.18.33",
                  "versionStartIncluding": "6.16",
                  "vulnerable": true
                },
                {
                  "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                  "versionEndExcluding": "7.0.10",
                  "versionStartIncluding": "6.16",
                  "vulnerable": true
                },
                {
                  "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                  "versionEndExcluding": "7.1",
                  "versionStartIncluding": "6.16",
                  "vulnerable": true
                }
              ],
              "negate": false,
              "operator": "OR"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\niommu/amd: Bounds-check devid in __rlookup_amd_iommu()\n\niommu_device_register() walks every device on the PCI bus via\nbus_for_each_dev() and calls amd_iommu_probe_device() for each. The\ninlined check_device() path computes the device\u0027s sbdf, calls\nrlookup_amd_iommu() to find the owning IOMMU, and only afterwards\nverifies devid \u003c= pci_seg-\u003elast_bdf. __rlookup_amd_iommu() indexes\nrlookup_table[devid] with no bounds check of its own, so for a PCI\ndevice whose BDF is not described by the IVRS, the lookup reads past\nthe end of the allocation before the caller\u0027s bounds check can run.\n\nThis was harmless before commit e874c666b15b (\"iommu/amd: Change\nrlookup, irq_lookup, and alias to use kvalloc()\"): the table was a\nzeroed page-order allocation, so the over-read returned NULL and the\ncaller\u0027s NULL check skipped the device. After that commit the table is\na tight kvcalloc() and the over-read returns adjacent slab contents,\nwhich check_device() then dereferences as a struct amd_iommu *,\ncausing a boot-time GPF.\n\nSeen on Google Compute Engine ct6e VMs, where the virtualized IVRS\ndescribes only the four TPU endpoints 00:04.0-07.0; the gVNIC at\n00:08.0 (devid 0x40) indexes 56 bytes past the 456-byte allocation,\ninto the adjacent kmalloc-512 slab object:\n\n  pci 0000:00:04.0: Adding to iommu group 0\n  pci 0000:00:05.0: Adding to iommu group 1\n  pci 0000:00:06.0: Adding to iommu group 2\n  pci 0000:00:07.0: Adding to iommu group 3\n  Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0x3a64695f78746382: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI\n  CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.18.22 #1\n  Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 12/06/2025\n  RIP: 0010:amd_iommu_probe_device+0x54/0x3a0\n  Call Trace:\n   __iommu_probe_device+0x107/0x520\n   probe_iommu_group+0x29/0x50\n   bus_for_each_dev+0x7e/0xe0\n   iommu_device_register+0xc9/0x240\n   iommu_go_to_state+0x9c0/0x1c60\n   amd_iommu_init+0x14/0x40\n   pci_iommu_init+0x16/0x60\n   do_one_initcall+0x47/0x2f0\n\nGuard the array access in __rlookup_amd_iommu(). With the fix applied\non 6.18.22, the gVNIC at 00:08.0 is skipped cleanly and the VM boots."
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-06-26T19:40:44.573Z",
        "orgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
        "shortName": "Linux"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f0a0f01787ecece814414b0665df879b69849d09"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/79db4cbab81f07ce69a93d379ebd40d3709ecfb2"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/07d0f496fe7ec5abe3bee7e38be709521567bb33"
        }
      ],
      "title": "iommu/amd: Bounds-check devid in __rlookup_amd_iommu()",
      "x_generator": {
        "engine": "bippy-1.2.0"
      }
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
    "assignerShortName": "Linux",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-53283",
    "datePublished": "2026-06-26T19:40:44.573Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-06-09T07:44:35.396Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-06-26T19:40:44.573Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}


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