CVE-2026-52738 (GCVE-0-2026-52738)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5
Published
2026-08-18 19:24
Modified
2026-08-19 15:19
Severity ?
VLAI Severity ?
EPSS score ?
CWE
- CWE-248 - Uncaught Exception
Summary
ZEBRA is a Zcash node written entirely in Rust. Prior to 4.5.0, a consensus-valid block containing a long chain of transparent self-spends to one address can permanently halt Zebra nodes. In zebra-state/src/service/finalized_state/zebra_db/transparent.rs, the finalized-state writer originally applied every newly created output as a credit before applying any spent-output debit from the same block. That credit-first ordering can make the intermediate per-address balance exceed MAX_MONEY even though the final net balance is valid, causing an expect-based panic under the panic equals abort release profile. Because zcashd accepts the triggering block and Zebra encounters it again after every restart, the halt persists until patched software is deployed; exploitation requires mining the specially constructed block and temporarily committing sufficient ZEC to the self-spend chain. This issue is fixed in version 4.5.0.
References
| URL | Tags | |
|---|---|---|
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ZcashFoundation | zebra |
Version: < 4.5.0 |
|||||||
|
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"metrics": [
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"options": [
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"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-08-19T15:18:53.096673Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
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"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
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"name": "https://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/security/advisories/GHSA-w834-cf6p-9m9w",
"tags": [
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"url": "https://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/security/advisories/GHSA-w834-cf6p-9m9w"
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"discovery": "UNKNOWN"
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"title": "ZEBRA: Finalized address balance credit-first overflow on consensus-valid blocks"
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"dateReserved": "2026-06-08T14:00:43.572Z",
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"state": "PUBLISHED"
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"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2"
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or seen somewhere by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability is confirmed from an analyst perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: This vulnerability was exploited and seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Patched: This vulnerability was successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not exploited: This vulnerability was not exploited or seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expresses doubt about the veracity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: This vulnerability was not successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
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