CVE-2026-49757 (GCVE-0-2026-49757)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5
Published
2026-06-15 10:07
Modified
2026-06-15 14:14
Severity ?
VLAI Severity ?
EPSS score ?
CWE
- CWE-290 - Authentication Bypass by Spoofing
Summary
Authentication Bypass by Spoofing vulnerability in team-alembic AshAuthentication allows account takeover of local users via OAuth2/OIDC sign-in.
AshAuthentication's OAuth2 and OIDC family strategies matched the local user by email address (an upsert on the email field, or a user-defined sign-in filter) rather than by the OpenID Connect iss/sub claim combination. Per OpenID Connect Core §5.7, only iss/sub uniquely and stably identifies an end-user; other claims, including email, MUST NOT be used as unique identifiers.
A provider login presenting a victim's email, including an unverified email, a reused email, or an account with email_verified: false, resolved to and signed in as the victim's existing local account. An unauthenticated attacker who can register an account on any accepted OAuth provider with the victim's email (or who benefits from provider-side email reuse or reclamation) obtains the victim's full local privileges.
The fix resolves users by the (strategy, sub) identity stored in a user identity resource, and only links a new sub to an existing local account by email when the provider's email_verified claim is trusted (trust_email_verified?).
This issue affects ash_authentication from 0.1.0 before 4.14.0 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.10.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| team-alembic | ash_authentication |
Version: 0.1.0 ≤ Version: 5.0.0-rc.0 ≤ cpe:2.3:a:team-alembic:ash_authentication:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* |
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|
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or seen somewhere by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability is confirmed from an analyst perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: This vulnerability was exploited and seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Patched: This vulnerability was successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not exploited: This vulnerability was not exploited or seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expresses doubt about the veracity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: This vulnerability was not successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
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