CVE-2026-48087 (GCVE-0-2026-48087)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5
Published
2026-08-06 21:32
Modified
2026-08-07 17:08
Severity ?
VLAI Severity ?
EPSS score ?
CWE
- CWE-287 - Improper Authentication
Summary
OpenReception's appointment booking software provides an end-to-end encrypted appointment booking platform. Prior to version 1.0.2, the registration handler at `POST /api/auth/register/{userId}` validates the relationship between the WebAuthn challenge and the registration cookie's email but never validates that the `userId` in the URL belongs to that email. An unauthenticated attacker requests a challenge for their own email, generates a registration response with their own authenticator, and submits it against any victim user's URL. The challenge-vs-cookie email match passes, the WebAuthn ceremony validates, and `addPasskey` writes the attacker's credential into the victim's `user_passkey` rows. The next victim-email login accepts a passkey assertion from the attacker's authenticator and issues a session as the victim. User IDs are not strictly secret on this platform, but the exact set of exposure surfaces should be assessed by the maintainers. Staff-list endpoints return user IDs to authenticated tenant members per the route signature; live verification of all exposure surfaces (whether user IDs leak through any unauthenticated route, through invite-confirmation URLs, or through other administrative views) is part of the pending live PoC. Where the attacker knows the victim's email and userId, the analysis below becomes account takeover. Version 1.0.2 fixes the issue.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| open-reception | appointment-booking-software |
Version: < 1.0.2 |
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or seen somewhere by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability is confirmed from an analyst perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: This vulnerability was exploited and seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Patched: This vulnerability was successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not exploited: This vulnerability was not exploited or seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expresses doubt about the veracity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: This vulnerability was not successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
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