CVE-2026-47073 (GCVE-0-2026-47073)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5
Published
2026-05-25 14:00
Modified
2026-05-27 15:41
Severity ?
VLAI Severity ?
EPSS score ?
CWE
- CWE-400 - Uncontrolled Resource Consumption
Summary
Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in benoitc hackney allows Flooding. The WebSocket client in src/hackney_ws.erl imposes no upper bound on memory consumption in three code paths. First, read_handshake_response/3 accumulates received bytes into a growing buffer with no size cap; the per-receive timeout resets on every chunk, so a server that streams bytes without ever sending \r\n\r\n causes the buffer to grow until memory is exhausted. Second, parse_payload/9 and parse_active_payload/8 do not validate the declared frame payload length against any limit; because RFC 6455 allows payload lengths up to 2^63-1 bytes, a server that announces a very large frame and dribbles bytes causes the accumulation buffer to grow until OOM. Third, the frag_buffer field in #ws_data{} accumulates continuation frames indefinitely; a server that sends an endless stream of non-final (nofin) fragmented frames without ever sending a final (fin) frame grows frag_buffer without bound.
In all three cases the attacker only needs to control the WebSocket server the hackney client connects to, with no authentication or special client configuration required.
This issue affects hackney: from 2.0.0 before 4.0.1.
References
Impacted products
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or seen somewhere by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability is confirmed from an analyst perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: This vulnerability was exploited and seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Patched: This vulnerability was successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not exploited: This vulnerability was not exploited or seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expresses doubt about the veracity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: This vulnerability was not successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
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