CVE-2026-46290 (GCVE-0-2026-46290)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-06-08 15:46 – Updated: 2026-06-14 18:06
VLAI
Title
x86/efi: Fix graceful fault handling after FPU softirq changes
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: x86/efi: Fix graceful fault handling after FPU softirq changes Since commit d02198550423 ("x86/fpu: Improve crypto performance by making kernel-mode FPU reliably usable in softirqs"), kernel_fpu_begin() calls fpregs_lock() which uses local_bh_disable() instead of the previous preempt_disable(). This sets SOFTIRQ_OFFSET in preempt_count during the entire EFI runtime service call, causing in_interrupt() to return true in normal task context. The graceful page fault handler efi_crash_gracefully_on_page_fault() uses in_interrupt() to bail out for faults in real interrupt context. With SOFTIRQ_OFFSET now set, the handler always bails out, leaving EFI firmware page faults unhandled. This escalates to die() which also sees in_interrupt() as true and calls panic("Fatal exception in interrupt"), resulting in a hard system freeze. On systems with buggy firmware that triggers page faults during EFI runtime calls (e.g., accessing unmapped memory in GetTime()), this causes an unrecoverable hang instead of the expected graceful EFI_ABORTED recovery. Fix by replacing in_interrupt() with !in_task(). This preserves the original intent of bailing for interrupts or NMI faults, while no longer falsely triggering from the FPU code path's local_bh_disable(). [ardb: Sashiko spotted that using 'in_hardirq() || in_nmi()' leaves a window where a softirq may be taken before fpregs_lock() is called, but after efi_rts_work.efi_rts_id has been assigned, and any page faults occurring in that window will then be misidentified as having been caused by the firmware. Instead, use !in_task(), which incorporates in_serving_softirq(). ]
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
Linux CNA
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
Linux Linux Affected: d02198550423a0b695e7a24ec77153209ad45b09 , < 22b365ba1af3d8c6036b8e5112fffe80998b85a0 (git)
Affected: d02198550423a0b695e7a24ec77153209ad45b09 , < db155b86d1523e85941f61efd7d7ffb594cc9a29 (git)
Affected: d02198550423a0b695e7a24ec77153209ad45b09 , < 088f65e206087bf903743bd18417261d7a4c9644 (git)
Create a notification for this product.
Linux Linux Affected: 6.15
Unaffected: 0 , < 6.15 (semver)
Unaffected: 6.18.30 , ≤ 6.18.* (semver)
Unaffected: 7.0.7 , ≤ 7.0.* (semver)
Unaffected: 7.1 , ≤ * (original_commit_for_fix)
Create a notification for this product.
Show details on NVD website

{
  "containers": {
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "arch/x86/platform/efi/quirks.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "22b365ba1af3d8c6036b8e5112fffe80998b85a0",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "d02198550423a0b695e7a24ec77153209ad45b09",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "db155b86d1523e85941f61efd7d7ffb594cc9a29",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "d02198550423a0b695e7a24ec77153209ad45b09",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "088f65e206087bf903743bd18417261d7a4c9644",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "d02198550423a0b695e7a24ec77153209ad45b09",
              "versionType": "git"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "defaultStatus": "affected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "arch/x86/platform/efi/quirks.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "6.15"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "6.15",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.18.30",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "7.0.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.0.7",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.1",
              "versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "cpeApplicability": [
        {
          "nodes": [
            {
              "cpeMatch": [
                {
                  "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                  "versionEndExcluding": "6.18.30",
                  "versionStartIncluding": "6.15",
                  "vulnerable": true
                },
                {
                  "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                  "versionEndExcluding": "7.0.7",
                  "versionStartIncluding": "6.15",
                  "vulnerable": true
                },
                {
                  "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                  "versionEndExcluding": "7.1",
                  "versionStartIncluding": "6.15",
                  "vulnerable": true
                }
              ],
              "negate": false,
              "operator": "OR"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nx86/efi: Fix graceful fault handling after FPU softirq changes\n\nSince commit d02198550423 (\"x86/fpu: Improve crypto performance by\nmaking kernel-mode FPU reliably usable in softirqs\"), kernel_fpu_begin()\ncalls fpregs_lock() which uses local_bh_disable() instead of the\nprevious preempt_disable(). This sets SOFTIRQ_OFFSET in preempt_count\nduring the entire EFI runtime service call, causing in_interrupt() to\nreturn true in normal task context.\n\nThe graceful page fault handler efi_crash_gracefully_on_page_fault()\nuses in_interrupt() to bail out for faults in real interrupt context.\nWith SOFTIRQ_OFFSET now set, the handler always bails out, leaving EFI\nfirmware page faults unhandled. This escalates to die() which also sees\nin_interrupt() as true and calls panic(\"Fatal exception in interrupt\"),\nresulting in a hard system freeze. On systems with buggy firmware that\ntriggers page faults during EFI runtime calls (e.g., accessing unmapped\nmemory in GetTime()), this causes an unrecoverable hang instead of the\nexpected graceful EFI_ABORTED recovery.\n\nFix by replacing in_interrupt() with !in_task(). This preserves the\noriginal intent of bailing for interrupts or NMI faults, while no longer\nfalsely triggering from the FPU code path\u0027s local_bh_disable().\n\n[ardb: Sashiko spotted that using \u0027in_hardirq() || in_nmi()\u0027 leaves a\n       window where a softirq may be taken before fpregs_lock() is\n       called, but after efi_rts_work.efi_rts_id has been assigned,\n       and any page faults occurring in that window will then be\n       misidentified as having been caused by the firmware. Instead,\n       use !in_task(), which incorporates in_serving_softirq(). ]"
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-06-14T18:06:47.501Z",
        "orgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
        "shortName": "Linux"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/22b365ba1af3d8c6036b8e5112fffe80998b85a0"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/db155b86d1523e85941f61efd7d7ffb594cc9a29"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/088f65e206087bf903743bd18417261d7a4c9644"
        }
      ],
      "title": "x86/efi: Fix graceful fault handling after FPU softirq changes",
      "x_generator": {
        "engine": "bippy-1.2.0"
      }
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
    "assignerShortName": "Linux",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-46290",
    "datePublished": "2026-06-08T15:46:17.224Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-05-13T15:03:33.110Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-06-14T18:06:47.501Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2",
  "vulnerability-lookup:meta": {
    "epss": {
      "cve": "CVE-2026-46290",
      "date": "2026-11-19",
      "epss": "0.00121",
      "percentile": "0.01948"
    },
    "redhat_vex": {
      "aggregate_severity": "None",
      "current_release_date": "2026-11-06T18:48:40+00:00",
      "cve": "CVE-2026-46290",
      "id": "CVE-2026-46290",
      "initial_release_date": "2026-06-08T00:00:00+00:00",
      "product_status:known_not_affected": "200",
      "source": "Red Hat CSAF VEX",
      "status": "final",
      "title": "kernel: x86/efi: Fix graceful fault handling after FPU softirq changes",
      "url": "https://security.access.redhat.com/data/csaf/v2/vex/2026/cve-2026-46290.json",
      "version": "3"
    },
    "suse_vex": {
      "aggregate_severity": "moderate",
      "current_release_date": "2026-06-15T01:21:04Z",
      "cve": "CVE-2026-46290",
      "id": "CVE-2026-46290",
      "initial_release_date": "2026-06-09T02:20:59Z",
      "product_status:known_not_affected": "291",
      "product_status:recommended": "4",
      "source": "SUSE CSAF VEX",
      "status": "interim",
      "title": "SUSE CVE CVE-2026-46290",
      "url": "https://ftp.suse.com/pub/projects/security/csaf-vex/2026/cve-2026-46290.json",
      "version": "4"
    }
  }
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.


Loading…

Loading…

Loading…

Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline

Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC

JSON
How durations are calculated

Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.

Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.

Events included in the timeline

Loading timeline…


    Loading…

    Loading…

    Loading…

    Related by attack behaviour

    Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.