CVE-2026-43023 (GCVE-0-2026-43023)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5
Published
2026-05-01 14:15
Modified
2026-10-19 19:06
Severity ?
7.8 (High) - CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: SCO: fix race conditions in sco_sock_connect() sco_sock_connect() checks sk_state and sk_type without holding the socket lock. Two concurrent connect() syscalls on the same socket can both pass the check and enter sco_connect(), leading to use-after-free. The buggy scenario involves three participants and was confirmed with additional logging instrumentation: Thread A (connect): HCI disconnect: Thread B (connect): sco_sock_connect(sk) sco_sock_connect(sk) sk_state==BT_OPEN sk_state==BT_OPEN (pass, no lock) (pass, no lock) sco_connect(sk): sco_connect(sk): hci_dev_lock hci_dev_lock hci_connect_sco <- blocked -> hcon1 sco_conn_add->conn1 lock_sock(sk) sco_chan_add: conn1->sk = sk sk->conn = conn1 sk_state=BT_CONNECT release_sock hci_dev_unlock hci_dev_lock sco_conn_del: lock_sock(sk) sco_chan_del: sk->conn=NULL conn1->sk=NULL sk_state= BT_CLOSED SOCK_ZAPPED release_sock hci_dev_unlock (unblocked) hci_connect_sco -> hcon2 sco_conn_add -> conn2 lock_sock(sk) sco_chan_add: sk->conn=conn2 sk_state= BT_CONNECT // zombie sk! release_sock hci_dev_unlock Thread B revives a BT_CLOSED + SOCK_ZAPPED socket back to BT_CONNECT. Subsequent cleanup triggers double sock_put() and use-after-free. Meanwhile conn1 is leaked as it was orphaned when sco_conn_del() cleared the association. Fix this by: - Moving lock_sock() before the sk_state/sk_type checks in sco_sock_connect() to serialize concurrent connect attempts - Fixing the sk_type != SOCK_SEQPACKET check to actually return the error instead of just assigning it - Adding a state re-check in sco_connect() after lock_sock() to catch state changes during the window between the locks - Adding sco_pi(sk)->conn check in sco_chan_add() to prevent double-attach of a socket to multiple connections - Adding hci_conn_drop() on sco_chan_add failure to prevent HCI connection leaks
References
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
Linux Linux Version: 70a13b1e25fef37c87c8a1228ddb8900efbca7cf
Version: 9a8ec9e8ebb5a7c0cfbce2d6b4a6b67b2b78e8f3
Version: 9a8ec9e8ebb5a7c0cfbce2d6b4a6b67b2b78e8f3
Version: 9a8ec9e8ebb5a7c0cfbce2d6b4a6b67b2b78e8f3
Version: 9a8ec9e8ebb5a7c0cfbce2d6b4a6b67b2b78e8f3
Version: 9a8ec9e8ebb5a7c0cfbce2d6b4a6b67b2b78e8f3
Version: 6.1.109   ≤
Create a notification for this product.
Show details on NVD website

To clipboard 

{
  "containers": {
    "adp": [
      {
        "metrics": [
          {
            "other": {
              "content": {
                "id": "CVE-2026-43023",
                "options": [
                  {
                    "Exploitation": "none"
                  },
                  {
                    "Automatable": "no"
                  },
                  {
                    "Technical Impact": "total"
                  }
                ],
                "role": "CISA Coordinator",
                "timestamp": "2026-10-16T15:13:36.010372Z",
                "version": "2.0.3"
              },
              "type": "ssvc"
            }
          }
        ],
        "problemTypes": [
          {
            "descriptions": [
              {
                "cweId": "CWE-362",
                "description": "CWE-362 Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization (\u0027Race Condition\u0027)",
                "lang": "en",
                "type": "CWE"
              }
            ]
          }
        ],
        "providerMetadata": {
          "dateUpdated": "2026-10-19T19:06:09.917Z",
          "orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
          "shortName": "CISA-ADP"
        },
        "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
      }
    ],
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "net/bluetooth/sco.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "dabf22269242e2f2bf44c43fcdc2fa763df7f9cc",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "70a13b1e25fef37c87c8a1228ddb8900efbca7cf",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "adb90cd0f9f7a8d438fcb93354040fbafc5ae2a0",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "9a8ec9e8ebb5a7c0cfbce2d6b4a6b67b2b78e8f3",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "7e296ffdab5bdab718dff7c14288fdcb9154fa27",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "9a8ec9e8ebb5a7c0cfbce2d6b4a6b67b2b78e8f3",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "98c8d3bfdaa657d8f472dbbebd7ea8cd816d8a8d",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "9a8ec9e8ebb5a7c0cfbce2d6b4a6b67b2b78e8f3",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "d002bd11024bd231bcb606877e33951ffb7bed14",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "9a8ec9e8ebb5a7c0cfbce2d6b4a6b67b2b78e8f3",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "8a5b0135d4a5d9683203a3d9a12a711ccec5936b",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "9a8ec9e8ebb5a7c0cfbce2d6b4a6b67b2b78e8f3",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "6.1.168",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "6.1.109",
              "versionType": "semver"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "defaultStatus": "affected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "net/bluetooth/sco.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "6.3"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "6.3",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.1.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.1.168",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.6.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.6.134",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.12.81",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.18.22",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.19.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.19.12",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.0",
              "versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "cpeApplicability": [
        {
          "nodes": [
            {
              "cpeMatch": [
                {
                  "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                  "versionEndExcluding": "6.1.168",
                  "versionStartIncluding": "6.1.109",
                  "vulnerable": true
                },
                {
                  "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                  "versionEndExcluding": "6.6.134",
                  "versionStartIncluding": "6.3",
                  "vulnerable": true
                },
                {
                  "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                  "versionEndExcluding": "6.12.81",
                  "versionStartIncluding": "6.3",
                  "vulnerable": true
                },
                {
                  "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                  "versionEndExcluding": "6.18.22",
                  "versionStartIncluding": "6.3",
                  "vulnerable": true
                },
                {
                  "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                  "versionEndExcluding": "6.19.12",
                  "versionStartIncluding": "6.3",
                  "vulnerable": true
                },
                {
                  "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                  "versionEndExcluding": "7.0",
                  "versionStartIncluding": "6.3",
                  "vulnerable": true
                }
              ],
              "negate": false,
              "operator": "OR"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nBluetooth: SCO: fix race conditions in sco_sock_connect()\n\nsco_sock_connect() checks sk_state and sk_type without holding\nthe socket lock. Two concurrent connect() syscalls on the same\nsocket can both pass the check and enter sco_connect(), leading\nto use-after-free.\n\nThe buggy scenario involves three participants and was confirmed\nwith additional logging instrumentation:\n\n  Thread A (connect):    HCI disconnect:      Thread B (connect):\n\n  sco_sock_connect(sk)                        sco_sock_connect(sk)\n  sk_state==BT_OPEN                           sk_state==BT_OPEN\n  (pass, no lock)                             (pass, no lock)\n  sco_connect(sk):                            sco_connect(sk):\n    hci_dev_lock                                hci_dev_lock\n    hci_connect_sco                               \u003c- blocked\n      -\u003e hcon1\n    sco_conn_add-\u003econn1\n    lock_sock(sk)\n    sco_chan_add:\n      conn1-\u003esk = sk\n      sk-\u003econn = conn1\n    sk_state=BT_CONNECT\n    release_sock\n    hci_dev_unlock\n                           hci_dev_lock\n                           sco_conn_del:\n                             lock_sock(sk)\n                             sco_chan_del:\n                               sk-\u003econn=NULL\n                               conn1-\u003esk=NULL\n                               sk_state=\n                                 BT_CLOSED\n                               SOCK_ZAPPED\n                             release_sock\n                           hci_dev_unlock\n                                                  (unblocked)\n                                                  hci_connect_sco\n                                                    -\u003e hcon2\n                                                  sco_conn_add\n                                                    -\u003e conn2\n                                                  lock_sock(sk)\n                                                  sco_chan_add:\n                                                    sk-\u003econn=conn2\n                                                  sk_state=\n                                                    BT_CONNECT\n                                                  // zombie sk!\n                                                  release_sock\n                                                  hci_dev_unlock\n\nThread B revives a BT_CLOSED + SOCK_ZAPPED socket back to\nBT_CONNECT. Subsequent cleanup triggers double sock_put() and\nuse-after-free. Meanwhile conn1 is leaked as it was orphaned\nwhen sco_conn_del() cleared the association.\n\nFix this by:\n- Moving lock_sock() before the sk_state/sk_type checks in\n  sco_sock_connect() to serialize concurrent connect attempts\n- Fixing the sk_type != SOCK_SEQPACKET check to actually\n  return the error instead of just assigning it\n- Adding a state re-check in sco_connect() after lock_sock()\n  to catch state changes during the window between the locks\n- Adding sco_pi(sk)-\u003econn check in sco_chan_add() to prevent\n  double-attach of a socket to multiple connections\n- Adding hci_conn_drop() on sco_chan_add failure to prevent\n  HCI connection leaks"
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV3_1": {
            "baseScore": 7.8,
            "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
            "version": "3.1"
          },
          "scenarios": [
            {
              "lang": "en",
              "value": "AV:L - The vulnerable code is reached through the local connect() syscall on an AF_BLUETOOTH/SCO socket. A Bluetooth peer or HCI disconnect can influence timing, but an adjacent attacker alone cannot race two connect() calls on the same local socket.\nAC:L - The attacker can create the race by issuing concurrent connect() syscalls on the same socket and repeating attempts while the normal HCI failure/disconnect path runs. Under the higher-severity rule, this attacker-controlled race is Low complexity.\nPR:L - SCO socket creation and connect do not impose a capability check, though AF_BLUETOOTH is limited to init_net rather than unprivileged network namespaces. A basic unprivileged local user on the host can open and race BTPROTO_SCO sockets.\nUI:N - No victim action is required once the attacker can run local code. The attacker directly invokes socket/connect operations and can repeat the race.\nS:U - The bug corrupts kernel Bluetooth socket/connection state within the same kernel security authority. It is a standard local kernel compromise/DoS path, not a VM escape or cross-scope boundary bypass.\nC:H - The race leads to a use-after-free/double sock_put on kernel socket objects. Kernel UAFs are defensibly scored as high confidentiality impact because freed objects can be reused for information disclosure primitives.\nI:H - The same UAF/double-free condition can be leveraged through heap reuse and spraying to corrupt kernel objects or control flow. Under the required guidance, UAF memory corruption is High integrity impact.\nA:H - Even without full exploitation, the double sock_put/use-after-free can crash or destabilize the kernel. Kernel crashes and UAF-triggered oops/panic conditions are High availability impact."
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-08-05T12:25:19.630Z",
        "orgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
        "shortName": "Linux"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/dabf22269242e2f2bf44c43fcdc2fa763df7f9cc"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/adb90cd0f9f7a8d438fcb93354040fbafc5ae2a0"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7e296ffdab5bdab718dff7c14288fdcb9154fa27"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/98c8d3bfdaa657d8f472dbbebd7ea8cd816d8a8d"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d002bd11024bd231bcb606877e33951ffb7bed14"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8a5b0135d4a5d9683203a3d9a12a711ccec5936b"
        }
      ],
      "title": "Bluetooth: SCO: fix race conditions in sco_sock_connect()",
      "x_generator": {
        "engine": "bippy-1.2.0"
      }
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
    "assignerShortName": "Linux",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-43023",
    "datePublished": "2026-05-01T14:15:25.736Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-05-01T14:12:55.975Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-10-19T19:06:09.917Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2",
  "vulnerability-lookup:meta": {
    "vulnrichment": {
      "containers": "{\"adp\": [{\"title\": \"CISA ADP Vulnrichment\", \"metrics\": [{\"other\": {\"type\": \"ssvc\", \"content\": {\"id\": \"CVE-2026-43023\", \"role\": \"CISA Coordinator\", \"options\": [{\"Exploitation\": \"none\"}, {\"Automatable\": \"no\"}, {\"Technical Impact\": \"total\"}], \"version\": \"2.0.3\", \"timestamp\": \"2026-10-16T15:13:36.010372Z\"}}}], \"problemTypes\": [{\"descriptions\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"type\": \"CWE\", \"cweId\": \"CWE-362\", \"description\": \"CWE-362 Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization (\u0027Race Condition\u0027)\"}]}], \"providerMetadata\": {\"orgId\": \"134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0\", \"shortName\": \"CISA-ADP\", \"dateUpdated\": \"2026-10-16T15:13:36.581Z\"}}], \"cna\": {\"title\": \"Bluetooth: SCO: fix race conditions in sco_sock_connect()\", \"metrics\": [{\"cvssV3_1\": {\"version\": \"3.1\", \"baseScore\": 7.8, \"baseSeverity\": \"HIGH\", \"vectorString\": \"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H\"}, \"scenarios\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"value\": \"AV:L - The vulnerable code is reached through the local connect() syscall on an AF_BLUETOOTH/SCO socket. A Bluetooth peer or HCI disconnect can influence timing, but an adjacent attacker alone cannot race two connect() calls on the same local socket.\\nAC:L - The attacker can create the race by issuing concurrent connect() syscalls on the same socket and repeating attempts while the normal HCI failure/disconnect path runs. Under the higher-severity rule, this attacker-controlled race is Low complexity.\\nPR:L - SCO socket creation and connect do not impose a capability check, though AF_BLUETOOTH is limited to init_net rather than unprivileged network namespaces. A basic unprivileged local user on the host can open and race BTPROTO_SCO sockets.\\nUI:N - No victim action is required once the attacker can run local code. The attacker directly invokes socket/connect operations and can repeat the race.\\nS:U - The bug corrupts kernel Bluetooth socket/connection state within the same kernel security authority. It is a standard local kernel compromise/DoS path, not a VM escape or cross-scope boundary bypass.\\nC:H - The race leads to a use-after-free/double sock_put on kernel socket objects. Kernel UAFs are defensibly scored as high confidentiality impact because freed objects can be reused for information disclosure primitives.\\nI:H - The same UAF/double-free condition can be leveraged through heap reuse and spraying to corrupt kernel objects or control flow. Under the required guidance, UAF memory corruption is High integrity impact.\\nA:H - Even without full exploitation, the double sock_put/use-after-free can crash or destabilize the kernel. Kernel crashes and UAF-triggered oops/panic conditions are High availability impact.\"}]}], \"affected\": [{\"repo\": \"https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git\", \"vendor\": \"Linux\", \"product\": \"Linux\", \"versions\": [{\"status\": \"affected\", \"version\": \"70a13b1e25fef37c87c8a1228ddb8900efbca7cf\", \"lessThan\": \"dabf22269242e2f2bf44c43fcdc2fa763df7f9cc\", \"versionType\": \"git\"}, {\"status\": \"affected\", \"version\": \"9a8ec9e8ebb5a7c0cfbce2d6b4a6b67b2b78e8f3\", \"lessThan\": \"adb90cd0f9f7a8d438fcb93354040fbafc5ae2a0\", \"versionType\": \"git\"}, {\"status\": \"affected\", \"version\": \"9a8ec9e8ebb5a7c0cfbce2d6b4a6b67b2b78e8f3\", \"lessThan\": \"7e296ffdab5bdab718dff7c14288fdcb9154fa27\", \"versionType\": \"git\"}, {\"status\": \"affected\", \"version\": \"9a8ec9e8ebb5a7c0cfbce2d6b4a6b67b2b78e8f3\", \"lessThan\": \"98c8d3bfdaa657d8f472dbbebd7ea8cd816d8a8d\", \"versionType\": \"git\"}, {\"status\": \"affected\", \"version\": \"9a8ec9e8ebb5a7c0cfbce2d6b4a6b67b2b78e8f3\", \"lessThan\": \"d002bd11024bd231bcb606877e33951ffb7bed14\", \"versionType\": \"git\"}, {\"status\": \"affected\", \"version\": \"9a8ec9e8ebb5a7c0cfbce2d6b4a6b67b2b78e8f3\", \"lessThan\": \"8a5b0135d4a5d9683203a3d9a12a711ccec5936b\", \"versionType\": \"git\"}, {\"status\": \"affected\", \"version\": \"6.1.109\", \"lessThan\": \"6.1.168\", \"versionType\": \"semver\"}], \"programFiles\": [\"net/bluetooth/sco.c\"], \"defaultStatus\": \"unaffected\"}, {\"repo\": \"https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git\", \"vendor\": \"Linux\", \"product\": \"Linux\", \"versions\": [{\"status\": \"affected\", \"version\": \"6.3\"}, {\"status\": \"unaffected\", \"version\": \"0\", \"lessThan\": \"6.3\", \"versionType\": \"semver\"}, {\"status\": \"unaffected\", \"version\": \"6.1.168\", \"versionType\": \"semver\", \"lessThanOrEqual\": \"6.1.*\"}, {\"status\": \"unaffected\", \"version\": \"6.6.134\", \"versionType\": \"semver\", \"lessThanOrEqual\": \"6.6.*\"}, {\"status\": \"unaffected\", \"version\": \"6.12.81\", \"versionType\": \"semver\", \"lessThanOrEqual\": \"6.12.*\"}, {\"status\": \"unaffected\", \"version\": \"6.18.22\", \"versionType\": \"semver\", \"lessThanOrEqual\": \"6.18.*\"}, {\"status\": \"unaffected\", \"version\": \"6.19.12\", \"versionType\": \"semver\", \"lessThanOrEqual\": \"6.19.*\"}, {\"status\": \"unaffected\", \"version\": \"7.0\", \"versionType\": \"original_commit_for_fix\", \"lessThanOrEqual\": \"*\"}], \"programFiles\": [\"net/bluetooth/sco.c\"], \"defaultStatus\": \"affected\"}], \"references\": [{\"url\": \"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/dabf22269242e2f2bf44c43fcdc2fa763df7f9cc\"}, {\"url\": \"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/adb90cd0f9f7a8d438fcb93354040fbafc5ae2a0\"}, {\"url\": \"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7e296ffdab5bdab718dff7c14288fdcb9154fa27\"}, {\"url\": \"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/98c8d3bfdaa657d8f472dbbebd7ea8cd816d8a8d\"}, {\"url\": \"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d002bd11024bd231bcb606877e33951ffb7bed14\"}, {\"url\": \"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8a5b0135d4a5d9683203a3d9a12a711ccec5936b\"}], \"x_generator\": {\"engine\": \"bippy-1.2.0\"}, \"descriptions\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"value\": \"In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\\n\\nBluetooth: SCO: fix race conditions in sco_sock_connect()\\n\\nsco_sock_connect() checks sk_state and sk_type without holding\\nthe socket lock. Two concurrent connect() syscalls on the same\\nsocket can both pass the check and enter sco_connect(), leading\\nto use-after-free.\\n\\nThe buggy scenario involves three participants and was confirmed\\nwith additional logging instrumentation:\\n\\n  Thread A (connect):    HCI disconnect:      Thread B (connect):\\n\\n  sco_sock_connect(sk)                        sco_sock_connect(sk)\\n  sk_state==BT_OPEN                           sk_state==BT_OPEN\\n  (pass, no lock)                             (pass, no lock)\\n  sco_connect(sk):                            sco_connect(sk):\\n    hci_dev_lock                                hci_dev_lock\\n    hci_connect_sco                               \u003c- blocked\\n      -\u003e hcon1\\n    sco_conn_add-\u003econn1\\n    lock_sock(sk)\\n    sco_chan_add:\\n      conn1-\u003esk = sk\\n      sk-\u003econn = conn1\\n    sk_state=BT_CONNECT\\n    release_sock\\n    hci_dev_unlock\\n                           hci_dev_lock\\n                           sco_conn_del:\\n                             lock_sock(sk)\\n                             sco_chan_del:\\n                               sk-\u003econn=NULL\\n                               conn1-\u003esk=NULL\\n                               sk_state=\\n                                 BT_CLOSED\\n                               SOCK_ZAPPED\\n                             release_sock\\n                           hci_dev_unlock\\n                                                  (unblocked)\\n                                                  hci_connect_sco\\n                                                    -\u003e hcon2\\n                                                  sco_conn_add\\n                                                    -\u003e conn2\\n                                                  lock_sock(sk)\\n                                                  sco_chan_add:\\n                                                    sk-\u003econn=conn2\\n                                                  sk_state=\\n                                                    BT_CONNECT\\n                                                  // zombie sk!\\n                                                  release_sock\\n                                                  hci_dev_unlock\\n\\nThread B revives a BT_CLOSED + SOCK_ZAPPED socket back to\\nBT_CONNECT. Subsequent cleanup triggers double sock_put() and\\nuse-after-free. Meanwhile conn1 is leaked as it was orphaned\\nwhen sco_conn_del() cleared the association.\\n\\nFix this by:\\n- Moving lock_sock() before the sk_state/sk_type checks in\\n  sco_sock_connect() to serialize concurrent connect attempts\\n- Fixing the sk_type != SOCK_SEQPACKET check to actually\\n  return the error instead of just assigning it\\n- Adding a state re-check in sco_connect() after lock_sock()\\n  to catch state changes during the window between the locks\\n- Adding sco_pi(sk)-\u003econn check in sco_chan_add() to prevent\\n  double-attach of a socket to multiple connections\\n- Adding hci_conn_drop() on sco_chan_add failure to prevent\\n  HCI connection leaks\"}], \"cpeApplicability\": [{\"nodes\": [{\"negate\": false, \"cpeMatch\": [{\"criteria\": \"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*\", \"vulnerable\": true, \"versionEndExcluding\": \"6.1.168\", \"versionStartIncluding\": \"6.1.109\"}, {\"criteria\": \"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*\", \"vulnerable\": true, \"versionEndExcluding\": \"6.6.134\", \"versionStartIncluding\": \"6.3\"}, {\"criteria\": \"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*\", \"vulnerable\": true, \"versionEndExcluding\": \"6.12.81\", \"versionStartIncluding\": \"6.3\"}, {\"criteria\": \"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*\", \"vulnerable\": true, \"versionEndExcluding\": \"6.18.22\", \"versionStartIncluding\": \"6.3\"}, {\"criteria\": \"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*\", \"vulnerable\": true, \"versionEndExcluding\": \"6.19.12\", \"versionStartIncluding\": \"6.3\"}, {\"criteria\": \"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*\", \"vulnerable\": true, \"versionEndExcluding\": \"7.0\", \"versionStartIncluding\": \"6.3\"}], \"operator\": \"OR\"}]}], \"providerMetadata\": {\"orgId\": \"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\", \"shortName\": \"Linux\", \"dateUpdated\": \"2026-08-05T12:25:19.630Z\"}}}",
      "cveMetadata": "{\"cveId\": \"CVE-2026-43023\", \"state\": \"PUBLISHED\", \"dateUpdated\": \"2026-10-19T19:06:09.917Z\", \"dateReserved\": \"2026-05-01T14:12:55.975Z\", \"assignerOrgId\": \"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\", \"datePublished\": \"2026-05-01T14:15:25.736Z\", \"assignerShortName\": \"Linux\"}",
      "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
      "dataVersion": "5.2"
    }
  }
}


Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.




Sightings

Author Source Type Date

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or seen somewhere by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability is confirmed from an analyst perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: This vulnerability was exploited and seen by the user reporting the sighting.
  • Patched: This vulnerability was successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
  • Not exploited: This vulnerability was not exploited or seen by the user reporting the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expresses doubt about the veracity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: This vulnerability was not successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.