CVE-2026-33621 (GCVE-0-2026-33621)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-03-26 20:42 – Updated: 2026-03-27 13:55
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
PinchTab: Unapplied Rate Limiting Middleware Allows Unbounded Brute-Force of API Token
Summary
PinchTab is a standalone HTTP server that gives AI agents direct control over a Chrome browser. PinchTab `v0.7.7` through `v0.8.4` contain incomplete request-throttling protections for auth-checkable endpoints. In `v0.7.7` through `v0.8.3`, a fully implemented `RateLimitMiddleware` existed in `internal/handlers/middleware.go` but was not inserted into the production HTTP handler chain, so requests were not subject to the intended per-IP throttle. In the same pre-`v0.8.4` range, the original limiter also keyed clients using `X-Forwarded-For`, which would have allowed client-controlled header spoofing if the middleware had been enabled. `v0.8.4` addressed those two issues by wiring the limiter into the live handler chain and switching the key to the immediate peer IP, but it still exempted `/health` and `/metrics` from rate limiting even though `/health` remained an auth-checkable endpoint when a token was configured. This issue weakens defense in depth for deployments where an attacker can reach the API, especially if a weak human-chosen token is used. It is not a direct authentication bypass or token disclosure issue by itself. PinchTab is documented as local-first by default and uses `127.0.0.1` plus a generated random token in the recommended setup. PinchTab's default deployment model is a local-first, user-controlled environment between the user and their agents; wider exposure is an intentional operator choice. This lowers practical risk in the default configuration, even though it does not by itself change the intrinsic base characteristics of the bug. This was fully addressed in `v0.8.5` by applying `RateLimitMiddleware` in the production handler chain, deriving the client address from the immediate peer IP instead of trusting forwarded headers by default, and removing the `/health` and `/metrics` exemption so auth-checkable endpoints are throttled as well.
Severity
4.8 (Medium)
SSVC
Exploitation: poc
Automatable: no
Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-03-27 13:35 UTC
CWE
Assigner
GitHub_M
CNA
References
3 references
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/pinchtab/pinchtab/security/adv… | x_refsource_CONFIRM |
| https://github.com/pinchtab/pinchtab/commit/c619c… | x_refsource_MISC |
| https://github.com/pinchtab/pinchtab/releases/tag… | x_refsource_MISC |
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Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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