CVE-2026-28742 (GCVE-0-2026-28742)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5
Published
2026-06-12 18:03
Modified
2026-06-12 19:02
Severity ?
9.2 (Critical) - CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
9.8 (Critical) - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
CWE
  • CWE-321 - Use of hard-coded cryptographic key
Summary
Naxclow devices use a uniform request-signing scheme based on a hard-coded, platform-wide salt embedded in every firmware image. Once this salt is recovered from any device, an attacker can generate valid signatures for arbitrary device or account operations due to the absence of per-device keys, server-side nonce tracking, or replay protections. Combined with the system’s use of plain HTTP for control-plane traffic, the construction enables broad request forgery and impersonation across the platform.
References
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
Naxclow Smart Doorbell X3 Version: All
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