CVE-2026-118516 (GCVE-0-2026-118516)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5
Published
2026-11-04 12:33
Modified
2026-11-04 18:10
Severity ?
6.3 (Medium) - CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
CWE
Summary
The Symfony Routing components CompiledUrlMatcher and UrlMatcher interpret the host and path information differently, allowing path-based authorization rules to be bypassed in Symfony versions prior to 5.4.56, 6.x prior to 6.4.50, 7.x prior to 7.4.23, and 8.x prior to 8.1.11. For routes that define a host, CompiledUrlMatcher matches the string $host.'.'.$pathinfo against the host regular expression followed by the path regular expression, while UrlMatcher matches the host and the path separately. A host placeholder can therefore  match /, and consume the beginning of the path, so the request is routed to a controller, while UrlMatcher  would find no route. Rules that look at the path, such as access_control entries and firewall patterns, are evaluated against the actual request path, so they do not apply while the controller of the route runs, potentially allowing an unauthenticated request to reach a protected controller. For example, with the route /admin/report/{id}, the host app.{domain} and the rule access_control: [{ path: ^/admin, roles: ROLE_ADMIN }], an anonymous request for /admin/report/1 is sent to the login page. A request with the Host header app and path /x./admin/report/1 instead reaches the controller, with domain="/x". With the required domain: .+, the real hostname works: app.example.com and /x./admin/report/1 match with domain="example.com./x". Applications are affected if they have routes with host placeholders protected by path-based rules. With the default requirement, the Host header must be the host of the route without its last labels, such as app: framework.trusted_hosts blocks that, while a web server that only serves known names may not, for instance, Nginx passing the raw Host header to FastCGI for a request line that carries an absolute URI. If the requirement accepts /, such as .+, a real hostname works, and trusted_hosts does not help.
References
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
sensiolabs symfony Version: 0
Version: 6.0.0
Version: 7.0.0
Version: 8.0.0
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{
  "containers": {
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "collectionURL": "https://packagist.org/packages/symfony/routing",
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "modules": [
            "Symfony\\Component\\Routing\\Matcher\\CompiledUrlMatcher"
          ],
          "packageName": "symfony/routing",
          "product": "symfony",
          "repo": "https://github.com/symfony/routing",
          "vendor": "sensiolabs",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "5.4.56",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "6.4.50",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "6.0.0",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "7.4.23",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "7.0.0",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "8.1.11",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "8.0.0",
              "versionType": "git"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "cpeApplicability": [
        {
          "nodes": [
            {
              "cpeMatch": [
                {
                  "criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:sensiolabs:symfony:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                  "versionEndExcluding": "5.4.56",
                  "versionStartIncluding": "0",
                  "vulnerable": true
                },
                {
                  "criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:sensiolabs:symfony:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                  "versionEndExcluding": "6.4.50",
                  "versionStartIncluding": "6.0.0",
                  "vulnerable": true
                },
                {
                  "criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:sensiolabs:symfony:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                  "versionEndExcluding": "7.4.23",
                  "versionStartIncluding": "7.0.0",
                  "vulnerable": true
                },
                {
                  "criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:sensiolabs:symfony:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                  "versionEndExcluding": "8.1.11",
                  "versionStartIncluding": "8.0.0",
                  "vulnerable": true
                }
              ],
              "negate": false,
              "operator": "OR"
            }
          ],
          "operator": "OR"
        }
      ],
      "credits": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "type": "reporter",
          "value": "Vincent Cassiau (CyberVanguard)"
        },
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "type": "remediation developer",
          "value": "Nicolas Grekas"
        }
      ],
      "datePublic": "2026-11-04T12:32:00.000Z",
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "supportingMedia": [
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              "value": "\u003cdiv\u003eThe Symfony Routing components\u0026nbsp;\u003ccode\u003eCompiledUrlMatcher\u003c/code\u003e and \u003ccode\u003eUrlMatcher\u0026nbsp;\u003c/code\u003e\u003cspan\u003einterpret the host and path information differently, allowing\u0026nbsp;\u003c/span\u003epath-based authorization rules to be bypassed in Symfony versions prior to 5.4.56, 6.x prior to 6.4.50, 7.x prior to 7.4.23, and 8.x prior to 8.1.11.\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv\u003eFor routes that define a host,\u0026nbsp;\u003ccode\u003eCompiledUrlMatcher\u003c/code\u003e\u0026nbsp;matches the string\u0026nbsp;\u003ccode\u003e$host.\u0027.\u0027.$pathinfo\u0026nbsp;\u003c/code\u003eagainst the host regular expression followed by the path regular expression, while\u0026nbsp;\u003ccode\u003eUrlMatcher\u003c/code\u003e\u0026nbsp;matches the host and the path separately. A\u003cspan\u003e\u0026nbsp;host placeholder can therefore\u0026nbsp; match\u0026nbsp;\u003c/span\u003e\u003ccode\u003e/\u003c/code\u003e\u003cspan\u003e,\u0026nbsp;\u003c/span\u003eand consume the beginning of the path\u003cspan\u003e, so the request is routed to a controller, while\u0026nbsp;\u003c/span\u003e\u003ccode\u003eUrlMatcher\u003c/code\u003e\u003cspan\u003e\u0026nbsp; would find no route.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003eRules that look at the path, such as\u0026nbsp;\u003c/span\u003e\u003ccode\u003eaccess_control\u003c/code\u003e\u003cspan\u003e\u0026nbsp;entries and firewall patterns,\u0026nbsp;\u003c/span\u003eare evaluated against the actual request path\u003cspan\u003e, so they do not apply while the controller of the route runs,\u0026nbsp;\u003c/span\u003epotentially allowing an unauthenticated request to reach a protected controller. For example, w\u003cspan\u003eith the route\u0026nbsp;\u003c/span\u003e\u003ccode\u003e/admin/report/{id}\u003c/code\u003e\u003cspan\u003e, the host\u0026nbsp;\u003c/span\u003e\u003ccode\u003eapp.{domain}\u003c/code\u003e\u003cspan\u003e\u0026nbsp;and the rule\u0026nbsp;\u003c/span\u003e\u003ccode\u003eaccess_control:\u0026nbsp;[{ path: ^/admin, roles: ROLE_ADMIN }]\u003c/code\u003e\u003cspan\u003e, an anonymous request for\u0026nbsp;\u003c/span\u003e\u003ccode\u003e/admin/report/1\u003c/code\u003e\u003cspan\u003e\u0026nbsp;is sent to the login page. A request with the Host header\u0026nbsp;\u003c/span\u003e\u003ccode\u003eapp\u003c/code\u003e\u003cspan\u003e\u0026nbsp;and path\u0026nbsp;\u003c/span\u003e\u003ccode\u003e/x./admin/report/1\u003c/code\u003e\u003cspan\u003e\u0026nbsp;instead reaches the controller, with\u0026nbsp;\u003c/span\u003e\u003ccode\u003edomain=\"/x\"\u003c/code\u003e\u003cspan\u003e. With the required\u0026nbsp;\u003c/span\u003e\u003ccode\u003edomain: .+\u003c/code\u003e\u003cspan\u003e, the real hostname works:\u0026nbsp;\u003c/span\u003e\u003ccode\u003eapp.example.com\u003c/code\u003e\u003cspan\u003e\u0026nbsp;and\u0026nbsp;\u003c/span\u003e\u003ccode\u003e/x./admin/report/1\u0026nbsp;\u003c/code\u003e\u003cspan\u003ematch with\u0026nbsp;\u003c/span\u003e\u003ccode\u003edomain=\"example.com./x\"\u003c/code\u003e\u003cspan\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\u003cspan\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\u003cspan\u003eApplications are affected if they have routes with host placeholders protected by path-based rules. With the default requirement, the Host header must be the host of the route without its last labels, such as\u0026nbsp;\u003c/span\u003e\u003ccode\u003eapp: framework.trusted_hosts\u003c/code\u003e\u003cspan\u003e\u0026nbsp;blocks that, while a web server that only serves known names may not, for instance, Nginx passing the raw Host header to FastCGI for a request line that carries an absolute URI. If the requirement accepts /, such as .+, a real hostname works, and\u0026nbsp;\u003c/span\u003e\u003ccode\u003etrusted_hosts\u003c/code\u003e\u003cspan\u003e\u0026nbsp;does not help.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/div\u003e"
            }
          ],
          "value": "The Symfony Routing components\u00a0CompiledUrlMatcher and UrlMatcher\u00a0interpret the host and path information differently, allowing\u00a0path-based authorization rules to be bypassed in Symfony versions prior to 5.4.56, 6.x prior to 6.4.50, 7.x prior to 7.4.23, and 8.x prior to 8.1.11.\n\n\n\n\nFor routes that define a host,\u00a0CompiledUrlMatcher\u00a0matches the string\u00a0$host.\u0027.\u0027.$pathinfo\u00a0against the host regular expression followed by the path regular expression, while\u00a0UrlMatcher\u00a0matches the host and the path separately. A\u00a0host placeholder can therefore\u00a0 match\u00a0/,\u00a0and consume the beginning of the path, so the request is routed to a controller, while\u00a0UrlMatcher\u00a0 would find no route.\u00a0Rules that look at the path, such as\u00a0access_control\u00a0entries and firewall patterns,\u00a0are evaluated against the actual request path, so they do not apply while the controller of the route runs,\u00a0potentially allowing an unauthenticated request to reach a protected controller. For example, with the route\u00a0/admin/report/{id}, the host\u00a0app.{domain}\u00a0and the rule\u00a0access_control:\u00a0[{ path: ^/admin, roles: ROLE_ADMIN }], an anonymous request for\u00a0/admin/report/1\u00a0is sent to the login page. A request with the Host header\u00a0app\u00a0and path\u00a0/x./admin/report/1\u00a0instead reaches the controller, with\u00a0domain=\"/x\". With the required\u00a0domain: .+, the real hostname works:\u00a0app.example.com\u00a0and\u00a0/x./admin/report/1\u00a0match with\u00a0domain=\"example.com./x\".\n\n\n\n\nApplications are affected if they have routes with host placeholders protected by path-based rules. With the default requirement, the Host header must be the host of the route without its last labels, such as\u00a0app: framework.trusted_hosts\u00a0blocks that, while a web server that only serves known names may not, for instance, Nginx passing the raw Host header to FastCGI for a request line that carries an absolute URI. If the requirement accepts /, such as .+, a real hostname works, and\u00a0trusted_hosts\u00a0does not help."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV4_0": {
            "Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
            "Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
            "Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
            "attackComplexity": "LOW",
            "attackRequirements": "PRESENT",
            "attackVector": "NETWORK",
            "baseScore": 6.3,
            "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
            "exploitMaturity": "NOT_DEFINED",
            "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
            "providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
            "subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
            "subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
            "subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
            "userInteraction": "NONE",
            "valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
            "version": "4.0",
            "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
            "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "LOW",
            "vulnIntegrityImpact": "LOW",
            "vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
          },
          "format": "CVSS",
          "scenarios": [
            {
              "lang": "en",
              "value": "GENERAL"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "problemTypes": [
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-436",
              "description": "CWE-436 Interpretation Conflict",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-863",
              "description": "CWE-863 Incorrect Authorization",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-11-04T18:10:27.489Z",
        "orgId": "596c5446-0ce5-4ba2-aa66-48b3b757a647",
        "shortName": "Checkmarx"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "tags": [
            "third-party-advisory"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/symfony/symfony/security/advisories/GHSA-xqw3-x93m-887x"
        },
        {
          "tags": [
            "patch"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/symfony/symfony/commit/067cde51e29f6d605de4de53322a02c6e23b5416"
        }
      ],
      "source": {
        "advisory": "GHSA-xqw3-x93m-887x",
        "discovery": "UNKNOWN"
      },
      "title": "Symfony: Host Placeholders Can Match the Start of the Path in Compiled URL Matchers, Bypassing Path-Based Access Control",
      "x_generator": {
        "engine": "Vulnogram 1.0.5"
      }
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "596c5446-0ce5-4ba2-aa66-48b3b757a647",
    "assignerShortName": "Checkmarx",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-118516",
    "datePublished": "2026-11-04T12:33:08.482Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-10-28T14:33:36.992Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-11-04T18:10:27.489Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}


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