CVE-2026-116250 (GCVE-0-2026-116250)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5
Published
2026-10-30 19:55
Modified
2026-10-30 19:55
Severity ?
6.5 (Medium) - CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L
7.3 (High) - CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:H/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
7.3 (High) - CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:H/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
VLAI Severity ?
EPSS score ?
CWE
Summary
In server mode pgAdmin 4 validates a path a user gives for a file in their storage directory with check_access_permission() and then opened it by name. Several places opened it with a plain open() or handed the path to a utility that opened it later: the servers.json export and import and the import file listing, and the files given to pg_dump, pg_dumpall, pg_restore and psql by Backup, Restore and Import/Export Data. A symbolic link swapped in at the file or at any parent directory between the check and the open redirected the operation outside the storage directory, so a file could be written, overwritten or read, or loaded into a table, as the operating-system account running pgAdmin. A hard link to an outside file, which O_NOFOLLOW does not detect, and a FIFO, which could hang a request, had the same effect. CVE-2026-86861 fixed this for the File Manager's save_file; these were the remaining paths.
Exploitation requires creating such a link or FIFO inside the user's storage directory. pgAdmin offers no way to do so, and the per-user storage directories belong to the pgAdmin account, so this requires write access to the storage backend as a different operating-system user, for example a shared or network-mounted storage directory, and winning the race.
The fix opens each file by walking down from the storage directory one component at a time with O_NOFOLLOW, accepting only a regular file with one link, and passes the utilities the open descriptor (/dev/fd/N) on Linux. Error messages no longer include the server path.
This issue affects pgAdmin 4: before 9.19.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| pgadmin.org | pgAdmin 4 |
Version: 0 < 9.19 |
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"modules": [
"File Manager",
"Import/Export Servers",
"Backup",
"Restore",
"Import/Export Data"
],
"product": "pgAdmin 4",
"programFiles": [
"https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/blob/master/web/pgadmin/misc/file_manager/__init__.py",
"https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/blob/master/web/pgadmin/utils/__init__.py",
"https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/blob/master/web/pgadmin/tools/import_export_servers/__init__.py"
],
"repo": "https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4",
"vendor": "pgadmin.org",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "9.19",
"status": "affected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "custom"
}
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "finder",
"value": "MUTED CYBERSECURITY S.L. \u003ccybersec@mut3dcybersecurity.com\u003e"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "remediation developer",
"value": "Dave Page \u003cdpage@pgadmin.org\u003e"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "remediation developer",
"value": "Hitesh Jambhale \u003chitesh.jambhale@enterprisedb.com\u003e"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "remediation reviewer",
"value": "Hitesh Jambhale \u003chitesh.jambhale@enterprisedb.com\u003e"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "remediation reviewer",
"value": "Ashesh Vashi \u003cashesh.vashi@enterprisedb.com\u003e"
}
],
"datePublic": "2026-10-29T00:00:00.000Z",
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In server mode pgAdmin 4 validates a path a user gives for a file in their storage directory with check_access_permission() and then opened it by name. Several places opened it with a plain open() or handed the path to a utility that opened it later: the servers.json export and import and the import file listing, and the files given to pg_dump, pg_dumpall, pg_restore and psql by Backup, Restore and Import/Export Data. A symbolic link swapped in at the file or at any parent directory between the check and the open redirected the operation outside the storage directory, so a file could be written, overwritten or read, or loaded into a table, as the operating-system account running pgAdmin. A hard link to an outside file, which O_NOFOLLOW does not detect, and a FIFO, which could hang a request, had the same effect. CVE-2026-86861 fixed this for the File Manager\u0027s save_file; these were the remaining paths.\n\nExploitation requires creating such a link or FIFO inside the user\u0027s storage directory. pgAdmin offers no way to do so, and the per-user storage directories belong to the pgAdmin account, so this requires write access to the storage backend as a different operating-system user, for example a shared or network-mounted storage directory, and winning the race.\n\nThe fix opens each file by walking down from the storage directory one component at a time with O_NOFOLLOW, accepting only a regular file with one link, and passes the utilities the open descriptor (/dev/fd/N) on Linux. Error messages no longer include the server path.\n\nThis issue affects pgAdmin 4: before 9.19."
}
],
"metrics": [
{
"cvssV3_1": {
"attackComplexity": "HIGH",
"attackVector": "LOCAL",
"availabilityImpact": "LOW",
"baseScore": 6.5,
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L",
"version": "3.1"
},
"format": "CVSS",
"scenarios": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Threat model: an operating-system user other than the pgAdmin service account who can write into a storage directory pgAdmin uses (a shared or network-mounted storage backend), and who also has, or works with, a pgAdmin account using it. An attacker with access to the host as the service account gains nothing from this flaw, so the Attack Vector is Local. Attack Complexity is High: the link must be planted and a race between the check and the open won. Confidentiality and Integrity are High because a file readable or writable by the pgAdmin account can be read (including loaded into a table) or overwritten; Availability is Low for a clobbered file or a hung request. Scope is Unchanged: the operations run with the authority pgAdmin already holds."
}
]
},
{
"cvssV4_0": {
"baseScore": 7.3,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:H/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"version": "4.0"
},
"format": "CVSS",
"scenarios": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Same reasoning as the CVSS 3.1 entry. AT:P for the race and for the write access to the storage backend obtained outside pgAdmin. VC:H/VI:H/VA:L as above; no subsequent-system impact."
}
]
}
],
"problemTypes": [
{
"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-367",
"description": "CWE-367 Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
},
{
"cweId": "CWE-59",
"description": "CWE-59 Improper Link Resolution Before File Access (\u0027Link Following\u0027)",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-10-30T19:55:18.713Z",
"orgId": "f86ef6dc-4d3a-42ad-8f28-e6d5547a5007",
"shortName": "PostgreSQL"
},
"references": [
{
"tags": [
"issue-tracking"
],
"url": "https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/issues/10647"
},
{
"tags": [
"patch"
],
"url": "https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/commit/99f5606e2ebc7c94c7acdbab877ce7de54bfc756"
},
{
"tags": [
"patch"
],
"url": "https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/commit/c4321b9968342716f34bc5f10de6cac3c0567e68"
},
{
"tags": [
"patch"
],
"url": "https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/commit/730d1e783c339ec696a1f77f2eee6f4b52cb6c37"
}
],
"source": {
"discovery": "EXTERNAL"
},
"title": "pgAdmin 4: Files opened in a storage directory follow a symbolic link, hard link or FIFO planted after the containment check"
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "f86ef6dc-4d3a-42ad-8f28-e6d5547a5007",
"assignerShortName": "PostgreSQL",
"cveId": "CVE-2026-116250",
"datePublished": "2026-10-30T19:55:18.713Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-10-25T16:26:16.420Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-10-30T19:55:18.713Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or seen somewhere by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability is confirmed from an analyst perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: This vulnerability was exploited and seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Patched: This vulnerability was successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not exploited: This vulnerability was not exploited or seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expresses doubt about the veracity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: This vulnerability was not successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
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