{
  "containers": {
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "hMailServer",
          "repo": "https://gitlab.com/hmailserver/hmailserver",
          "vendor": "Progressive Robot Ltd",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.3.6",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "6.0.0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "credits": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "type": "finder",
          "value": "Found in the hMailServer project\u0027s own security review (Progressive Robot Ltd)"
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "Missing authorization in the REST and COM administration APIs of Progressive Robot hMailServer 6.0.0 through 6.3.6 allows a remote authenticated user whose credential is confined to named domains to change mail routing and domain configuration beyond those domains on a multi-tenant server. A domain administrator, an account or API key given another role that manages accounts in named domains, or a full-scope API key issued for named domains could create a domain alias for any name (so that other tenants\u0027 mail for that name is diverted to an address the attacker controls, or denied), rename a domain to any name the server does not host, set a rule\u0027s bind-to-address, send-using-route or script-function action to reach one of the server\u0027s own addresses, a configured route\u0027s stored credentials or a function of the server\u0027s event script, and set the domain\u0027s relay host - which delivery then connects to with no address rule - to an address on the server\u0027s own network; and over the COM API any account could set the three rule actions on its own rules, where the script-function action runs at delivery. The authorization gate did not refuse these routes to a confined credential and the handlers were not given the caller; over COM the domain-alias save performed no authorization check at all, the domain rename required only a domain administrator, and a rule save required at most that the caller could change the rule\u0027s owner."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV3_1": {
            "attackComplexity": "LOW",
            "attackVector": "NETWORK",
            "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
            "baseScore": 8.1,
            "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
            "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
            "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
            "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
            "scope": "UNCHANGED",
            "userInteraction": "NONE",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
            "version": "3.1"
          },
          "format": "CVSS",
          "scenarios": [
            {
              "lang": "en",
              "value": "GENERAL"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "problemTypes": [
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-862",
              "description": "CWE-862: Missing Authorization",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-10-21T15:34:06.371Z",
        "orgId": "ceab7361-8a18-47b1-92ba-4d7d25f6715a",
        "shortName": "GitLab"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "url": "https://gitlab.com/hmailserver/hmailserver/-/work_items/86"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://gitlab.com/hmailserver/hmailserver/-/releases/v6.3.7"
        }
      ],
      "solutions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "Upgrade to hMailServer 6.3.7, which refuses the domain-alias create, the domain rename and an internal relay host to a credential that is confined to named domains, and the reaching rule actions (bind-to-address, send-using-route, script-function on an owned rule) to anyone but the server administrator, over both the REST and the COM APIs, while keeping the changes that stay inside the credential\u0027s domains. Until then, on a multi-tenant server, do not give a domain-administrator credential, a role that manages accounts in named domains, or a named-domain API key to a party not trusted with the whole server; keep the REST API off (RestApiPort=0, the default) where it is not needed; and review existing domain aliases, domain names, relay hosts and account/domain rule actions for entries a confined credential should not have made, and the accounts\u0027 own rules for these three actions, which withholding such credentials does not stop an account setting on its own rules over COM (do this after upgrading as well, since an upgrade does not undo a change already made)."
        }
      ],
      "title": "Missing Authorization in hMailServer"
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "ceab7361-8a18-47b1-92ba-4d7d25f6715a",
    "assignerShortName": "GitLab",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-114489",
    "datePublished": "2026-10-21T15:34:06.371Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-10-21T15:33:56.489Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-10-21T15:34:06.371Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}