{
  "containers": {
    "adp": [
      {
        "providerMetadata": {
          "dateUpdated": "2026-10-28T20:06:58.727Z",
          "orgId": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
          "shortName": "CVE"
        },
        "references": [
          {
            "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/10/28/18"
          }
        ],
        "title": "CVE Program Container"
      }
    ],
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "collectionURL": "https://repo.maven.apache.org/maven2",
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "packageName": "org.apache.kafka:kafka",
          "packageURL": "pkg:maven/org.apache.kafka/kafka",
          "product": "Apache Kafka",
          "vendor": "Apache Software Foundation",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "4.1.2",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "0.11.0.0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "4.2.1",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "4.2.0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "4.3.1",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "4.3.0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "credits": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "type": "reporter",
          "value": "Peyton Kennedy \u003cpkennedy@endor.ai\u003e"
        },
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "type": "reporter",
          "value": "Trung Nguyen \u003ctrungnh@cystack.net\u003e, CyStack"
        },
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "type": "reporter",
          "value": "Bart\u0142omiej Dmitruk \u003cbartek@striga.ai\u003e, Striga"
        },
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "type": "reporter",
          "value": "\uc784\uc131\ubbfc \u003cat_haemil@naver.com\u003e"
        },
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "type": "reporter",
          "value": "Mike Read (GitHub: Michael-JRead)"
        },
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "type": "reporter",
          "value": "Salman Aljardan \u003csalman1aljardan@gmail.com\u003e"
        },
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "type": "reporter",
          "value": "Yuchao Zhang \u003cndaugoing@gmail.com\u003e"
        },
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "type": "reporter",
          "value": "Yu Bao \u003cyubao@paypal.com\u003e, PayPal Cyber Security Team"
        },
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "type": "reporter",
          "value": "Vamsi K \u003cxh081ix@gmail.com\u003e"
        },
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "type": "remediation developer",
          "value": "Srinivas Akhil Mallela \u003csrinivasakhil@gmail.com\u003e"
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "supportingMedia": [
            {
              "base64": false,
              "type": "text/html",
              "value": "\u003cbr\u003e\u003cdiv\u003eWhen a broker decodes a compressed record batch, the per-record decoder reads a declared body\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan\u003esize from the decompressed stream and allocates a buffer of that size before validating it\u0026nbsp;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003eagainst the bytes available or any configured limit. The size is attacker-controlled, and the\u0026nbsp;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003ebatch CRC does not constrain it, so a small (around 90-byte), CRC-valid compressed produce\u0026nbsp;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003erequest can declare a body size of up to about 2 GiB and force the broker to attempt that\u0026nbsp;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003eallocation, raising OutOfMemoryError. The record size limit (max.message.bytes), the request\u0026nbsp;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003esize limit, and client/broker quotas bound only the compressed wire size, not the declared\u0026nbsp;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003edecompressed size.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cdiv\u003eImpact:\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv\u003eAn authenticated principal with Write on a topic can crash broker request-handler threads\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan\u003e(reached when a batch\u0027s codec differs from the topic\u0027s compression.type and records are\u0026nbsp;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003ere-encoded) and any consumer that fetches the record, denying service. On brokers started\u0026nbsp;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003ewith -XX:+ExitOnOutOfMemoryError, a common hardening, a single crafted request terminates the\u0026nbsp;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003ebroker JVM. More seriously, a\u0026nbsp;crafted record\u0026nbsp;\u0026nbsp;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003eis accepted at ingest and written to disk; when the log-cleaner later reads it\u0026nbsp;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003eon a compacted topic, the OutOfMemoryError (an Error, not an Exception) terminates the cleaner\u0026nbsp;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003ethread, which is not restarted. With the default of a single cleaner thread, log compaction\u0026nbsp;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003ethen stops for the entire broker, including the internal __consumer_offsets and\u0026nbsp;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003e__transaction_state topics, and the condition persists across restarts until the offending\u0026nbsp;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003erecord is removed. The impact is availability only; no data is disclosed or altered.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cdiv\u003eMitigation:\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv\u003eUpgrade to Apache Kafka 4.2.2, 4.3.2, or 4.4.0, and set max.decompressed.message.bytes (at the\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan\u003ebroker and/or topic level) to a bounded value appropriate for your workload. Upgrading alone is\u0026nbsp;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003enot sufficient: for backward compatibility this configuration defaults to an effectively\u0026nbsp;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003eunlimited value (about 2 GiB), so a broker remains exposed until the limit is set. Choose a\u0026nbsp;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003evalue at or slightly above the largest legitimate decompressed record your applications\u0026nbsp;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003eproduce, and comfortably below the broker heap divided by the number of request-handler and\u0026nbsp;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003ecleaner threads. Until you can upgrade and configure the limit, restrict Write access to\u0026nbsp;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003etrusted producers; quotas and max.message.bytes do not mitigate this issue.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cdiv\u003eResolution:\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv\u003eFrom Apache Kafka 4.2.2, 4.3.2, and 4.4.0: the broker validates a record\u0027s declared decompressed\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan\u003ebody size against max.decompressed.message.bytes before allocating, on the produce-validation,\u0026nbsp;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003elog-compaction, and timestamp-lookup paths, and rejects oversized or negative sizes with\u0026nbsp;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003eInvalidRecordException. Operators must set this configuration to a bounded value to be protected,\u0026nbsp;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003eas its default is effectively unlimited.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/div\u003e"
            }
          ],
          "value": "When a broker decodes a compressed record batch, the per-record decoder reads a declared body\u00a0size from the decompressed stream and allocates a buffer of that size before validating it\u00a0against the bytes available or any configured limit. The size is attacker-controlled, and the\u00a0batch CRC does not constrain it, so a small (around 90-byte), CRC-valid compressed produce\u00a0request can declare a body size of up to about 2 GiB and force the broker to attempt that\u00a0allocation, raising OutOfMemoryError. The record size limit (max.message.bytes), the request\u00a0size limit, and client/broker quotas bound only the compressed wire size, not the declared\u00a0decompressed size.\n\n\nImpact:\n\nAn authenticated principal with Write on a topic can crash broker request-handler threads\u00a0(reached when a batch\u0027s codec differs from the topic\u0027s compression.type and records are\u00a0re-encoded) and any consumer that fetches the record, denying service. On brokers started\u00a0with -XX:+ExitOnOutOfMemoryError, a common hardening, a single crafted request terminates the\u00a0broker JVM. More seriously, a\u00a0crafted record\u00a0\u00a0is accepted at ingest and written to disk; when the log-cleaner later reads it\u00a0on a compacted topic, the OutOfMemoryError (an Error, not an Exception) terminates the cleaner\u00a0thread, which is not restarted. With the default of a single cleaner thread, log compaction\u00a0then stops for the entire broker, including the internal __consumer_offsets and\u00a0__transaction_state topics, and the condition persists across restarts until the offending\u00a0record is removed. The impact is availability only; no data is disclosed or altered.\n\n\nMitigation:\n\nUpgrade to Apache Kafka 4.2.2, 4.3.2, or 4.4.0, and set max.decompressed.message.bytes (at the\u00a0broker and/or topic level) to a bounded value appropriate for your workload. Upgrading alone is\u00a0not sufficient: for backward compatibility this configuration defaults to an effectively\u00a0unlimited value (about 2 GiB), so a broker remains exposed until the limit is set. Choose a\u00a0value at or slightly above the largest legitimate decompressed record your applications\u00a0produce, and comfortably below the broker heap divided by the number of request-handler and\u00a0cleaner threads. Until you can upgrade and configure the limit, restrict Write access to\u00a0trusted producers; quotas and max.message.bytes do not mitigate this issue.\n\n\nResolution:\n\nFrom Apache Kafka 4.2.2, 4.3.2, and 4.4.0: the broker validates a record\u0027s declared decompressed\u00a0body size against max.decompressed.message.bytes before allocating, on the produce-validation,\u00a0log-compaction, and timestamp-lookup paths, and rejects oversized or negative sizes with\u00a0InvalidRecordException. Operators must set this configuration to a bounded value to be protected,\u00a0as its default is effectively unlimited."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "other": {
            "content": {
              "text": "important"
            },
            "type": "Textual description of severity"
          },
          "scenarios": [
            {
              "lang": "en",
              "value": "GENERAL"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "problemTypes": [
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-789",
              "description": "CWE-789 Memory allocation with excessive size value",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-400",
              "description": "CWE-400 Uncontrolled Resource Consumption",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-1284",
              "description": "CWE-1284 Improper validation of specified quantity in input",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-10-28T16:46:54.920Z",
        "orgId": "f0158376-9dc2-43b6-827c-5f631a4d8d09",
        "shortName": "apache"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "tags": [
            "vendor-advisory"
          ],
          "url": "https://kafka.apache.org/cve-list"
        }
      ],
      "source": {
        "discovery": "EXTERNAL"
      },
      "title": "Apache Kafka: Denial of service via unbounded memory allocation when decoding compressed record batches",
      "x_generator": {
        "engine": "Vulnogram 1.0.3"
      }
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "f0158376-9dc2-43b6-827c-5f631a4d8d09",
    "assignerShortName": "apache",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-114349",
    "datePublished": "2026-10-28T16:46:54.920Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-10-21T08:14:55.090Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-10-28T20:06:58.727Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}