CVE-2026-114213 (GCVE-0-2026-114213)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5
Published
2026-10-26 13:30
Modified
2026-10-26 15:35
CWE
  • CWE-770 - Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling
Summary
Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in the WebSocket fragment reassembly of mtrudel bandit allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to exhaust server memory via a fragmented message made of many 1-byte continuation frames. Bandit.WebSocket.Connection checks max_fragmented_message_size against the payload bytes received, but keeps every non-final continuation frame as a new list cell around its own binary, and nothing limits the number of fragments. A 1-byte fragment costs 7 bytes on the wire but about 150 to 170 bytes of server memory, so one connection can hold about 150 times the configured limit, roughly 1.2 to 1.4 GB at the default 8 MB. Ping frames between fragments keep the connection alive past the idle timeout. This issue affects bandit: from 1.11.0 before 1.14.0.
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
mtrudel bandit Version: 1.11.0   ≤
    cpe:2.3:a:mtrudel:bandit:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Create a notification for this product.
   mtrudel bandit Version: 21612c7c7b1ce43eccd36d3af3a2299d23513667
    cpe:2.3:a:mtrudel:bandit:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Create a notification for this product.
Show details on NVD website


{
  "containers": {
    "adp": [
      {
        "metrics": [
          {
            "other": {
              "content": {
                "id": "CVE-2026-114213",
                "options": [
                  {
                    "Exploitation": "none"
                  },
                  {
                    "Automatable": "yes"
                  },
                  {
                    "Technical Impact": "partial"
                  }
                ],
                "role": "CISA Coordinator",
                "timestamp": "2026-10-26T15:03:01.722486Z",
                "version": "2.0.3"
              },
              "type": "ssvc"
            }
          }
        ],
        "providerMetadata": {
          "dateUpdated": "2026-10-26T15:35:51.785Z",
          "orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
          "shortName": "CISA-ADP"
        },
        "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
      }
    ],
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "collectionURL": "https://repo.hex.pm",
          "cpes": [
            "cpe:2.3:a:mtrudel:bandit:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
          ],
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "packageName": "bandit",
          "packageURL": "pkg:hex/bandit",
          "product": "bandit",
          "repo": "https://github.com/mtrudel/bandit",
          "vendor": "mtrudel",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "1.14.0",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "1.11.0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "collectionURL": "https://github.com",
          "cpes": [
            "cpe:2.3:a:mtrudel:bandit:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
          ],
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "packageName": "mtrudel/bandit",
          "packageURL": "pkg:github/mtrudel/bandit",
          "product": "bandit",
          "repo": "https://github.com/mtrudel/bandit",
          "vendor": "mtrudel",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "220b9dfd27f9a21305be2afc75cbe585ddc24e7a",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "21612c7c7b1ce43eccd36d3af3a2299d23513667",
              "versionType": "git"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "cpeApplicability": [
        {
          "nodes": [
            {
              "cpeMatch": [
                {
                  "criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:mtrudel:bandit:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                  "versionEndExcluding": "1.14.0",
                  "versionStartIncluding": "1.11.0",
                  "vulnerable": true
                }
              ],
              "negate": false,
              "operator": "OR"
            }
          ],
          "operator": "AND"
        }
      ],
      "credits": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "type": "reporter",
          "value": "Peter Ullrich"
        },
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "type": "remediation developer",
          "value": "Mat Trudel"
        },
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "type": "analyst",
          "value": "Jonatan M\u00e4nnchen / EEF"
        }
      ],
      "dateAssigned": "2026-10-23T12:53:37.000Z",
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "supportingMedia": [
            {
              "base64": false,
              "type": "text/html",
              "value": "\u003cp\u003eAllocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in the WebSocket fragment reassembly of mtrudel bandit allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to exhaust server memory via a fragmented message made of many 1-byte continuation frames.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ccode\u003eBandit.WebSocket.Connection\u003c/code\u003e checks \u003ccode\u003emax_fragmented_message_size\u003c/code\u003e against the payload bytes received, but keeps every non-final continuation frame as a new list cell around its own binary, and nothing limits the number of fragments. A 1-byte fragment costs 7 bytes on the wire but about 150 to 170 bytes of server memory, so one connection can hold about 150 times the configured limit, roughly 1.2 to 1.4 GB at the default 8 MB. Ping frames between fragments keep the connection alive past the idle timeout.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThis issue affects bandit: from 1.11.0 before 1.14.0.\u003c/p\u003e"
            },
            {
              "base64": false,
              "type": "text/markdown",
              "value": "Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in the WebSocket fragment reassembly of mtrudel bandit allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to exhaust server memory via a fragmented message made of many 1-byte continuation frames.\n\n`Bandit.WebSocket.Connection` checks `max_fragmented_message_size` against the payload bytes received, but keeps every non-final continuation frame as a new list cell around its own binary, and nothing limits the number of fragments. A 1-byte fragment costs 7 bytes on the wire but about 150 to 170 bytes of server memory, so one connection can hold about 150 times the configured limit, roughly 1.2 to 1.4 GB at the default 8 MB. Ping frames between fragments keep the connection alive past the idle timeout.\n\nThis issue affects bandit: from 1.11.0 before 1.14.0."
            }
          ],
          "value": "Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in the WebSocket fragment reassembly of mtrudel bandit allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to exhaust server memory via a fragmented message made of many 1-byte continuation frames.\n\nBandit.WebSocket.Connection checks max_fragmented_message_size against the payload bytes received, but keeps every non-final continuation frame as a new list cell around its own binary, and nothing limits the number of fragments. A 1-byte fragment costs 7 bytes on the wire but about 150 to 170 bytes of server memory, so one connection can hold about 150 times the configured limit, roughly 1.2 to 1.4 GB at the default 8 MB. Ping frames between fragments keep the connection alive past the idle timeout.\n\nThis issue affects bandit: from 1.11.0 before 1.14.0."
        }
      ],
      "impacts": [
        {
          "capecId": "CAPEC-130",
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "lang": "en",
              "supportingMedia": [
                {
                  "base64": false,
                  "type": "text/html",
                  "value": "\u003cp\u003eAn unauthenticated client can make one WebSocket connection hold about 150 times \u003ccode\u003emax_fragmented_message_size\u003c/code\u003e in server memory (about 82 MB for 3.5 MB of traffic in the reporter\u0027s test). This affects any Bandit server that accepts WebSocket upgrades with default settings, including Phoenix LiveView and Channels apps.\u003c/p\u003e"
                },
                {
                  "base64": false,
                  "type": "text/markdown",
                  "value": "An unauthenticated client can make one WebSocket connection hold about 150 times `max_fragmented_message_size` in server memory (about 82 MB for 3.5 MB of traffic in the reporter\u0027s test). This affects any Bandit server that accepts WebSocket upgrades with default settings, including Phoenix LiveView and Channels apps."
                }
              ],
              "value": "An unauthenticated client can make one WebSocket connection hold about 150 times max_fragmented_message_size in server memory (about 82 MB for 3.5 MB of traffic in the reporter\u0027s test). This affects any Bandit server that accepts WebSocket upgrades with default settings, including Phoenix LiveView and Channels apps."
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV4_0": {
            "Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
            "Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
            "Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
            "attackComplexity": "LOW",
            "attackRequirements": "NONE",
            "attackVector": "NETWORK",
            "baseScore": 8.7,
            "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
            "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
            "providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
            "subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
            "subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
            "subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
            "userInteraction": "NONE",
            "valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
            "version": "4.0",
            "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "HIGH",
            "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
            "vulnIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
            "vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
          },
          "format": "CVSS",
          "scenarios": [
            {
              "lang": "en",
              "value": "GENERAL"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "problemTypes": [
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-770",
              "description": "CWE-770 Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-10-26T13:30:58.262Z",
        "orgId": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
        "shortName": "EEF"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "name": "WebSocket 1-byte continuation frames bypass `max_fragmented_message_size` in Bandit",
          "tags": [
            "vendor-advisory",
            "related"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/mtrudel/bandit/security/advisories/GHSA-cpx7-qf6w-jc63"
        },
        {
          "name": "EEF CNA record for CVE-2026-114213",
          "tags": [
            "related"
          ],
          "url": "https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-114213.html"
        },
        {
          "name": "OSV record EEF-CVE-2026-114213",
          "tags": [
            "related"
          ],
          "url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-114213"
        },
        {
          "name": "Introducing commit 21612c7 in mtrudel/bandit",
          "tags": [
            "related"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/mtrudel/bandit/commit/21612c7c7b1ce43eccd36d3af3a2299d23513667"
        },
        {
          "name": "Fix commit 220b9df in mtrudel/bandit",
          "tags": [
            "patch"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/mtrudel/bandit/commit/220b9dfd27f9a21305be2afc75cbe585ddc24e7a"
        }
      ],
      "source": {
        "discovery": "UNKNOWN"
      },
      "title": "WebSocket 1-byte continuation frames bypass `max_fragmented_message_size` in Bandit",
      "workarounds": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "supportingMedia": [
            {
              "base64": false,
              "type": "text/html",
              "value": "\u003cp\u003eLower \u003ccode\u003ewebsocket_options: [max_fragmented_message_size: ...]\u003c/code\u003e to the largest fragmented message the application needs, for example \u003ccode\u003e65_536\u003c/code\u003e. Memory per connection stays at about 150 times this limit, so a lower limit lowers the ceiling.\u003c/p\u003e"
            },
            {
              "base64": false,
              "type": "text/markdown",
              "value": "Lower `websocket_options: [max_fragmented_message_size: ...]` to the largest fragmented message the application needs, for example `65_536`. Memory per connection stays at about 150 times this limit, so a lower limit lowers the ceiling."
            }
          ],
          "value": "Lower websocket_options: [max_fragmented_message_size: ...] to the largest fragmented message the application needs, for example 65_536. Memory per connection stays at about 150 times this limit, so a lower limit lowers the ceiling."
        }
      ],
      "x_proofOfConcept": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "supportingMedia": [
            {
              "base64": false,
              "type": "text/html",
              "value": "\u003col\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eRun Bandit with default settings and a WebSock that accepts every connection.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eComplete the WebSocket upgrade and send a non-final text frame with a 1-byte payload.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eSend 500,000 masked non-final continuation frames with 1-byte payloads, 3.5 MB in all.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eSend a Ping. The server answers with a Pong, and BEAM memory has grown by about 82 MB while the message is still far below the 8 MB cap.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ol\u003e"
            },
            {
              "base64": false,
              "type": "text/markdown",
              "value": "1. Run Bandit with default settings and a WebSock that accepts every connection.\n2. Complete the WebSocket upgrade and send a non-final text frame with a 1-byte payload.\n3. Send 500,000 masked non-final continuation frames with 1-byte payloads, 3.5 MB in all.\n4. Send a Ping. The server answers with a Pong, and BEAM memory has grown by about 82 MB while the message is still far below the 8 MB cap."
            }
          ],
          "value": "* Run Bandit with default settings and a WebSock that accepts every connection.\n* Complete the WebSocket upgrade and send a non-final text frame with a 1-byte payload.\n* Send 500,000 masked non-final continuation frames with 1-byte payloads, 3.5 MB in all.\n* Send a Ping. The server answers with a Pong, and BEAM memory has grown by about 82 MB while the message is still far below the 8 MB cap."
        }
      ],
      "x_technicalAnalysis": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "supportingMedia": [
            {
              "base64": false,
              "type": "text/html",
              "value": "\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e1. Byte-only limit.\u003c/strong\u003e In \u003ccode\u003eBandit.WebSocket.Connection\u003c/code\u003e (\u003ccode\u003elib/bandit/websocket/connection.ex\u003c/code\u003e), the fragment limit is checked against \u003ccode\u003efragment_size\u003c/code\u003e, which only adds up payload bytes (\u003ccode\u003eIO.iodata_length(frame.data)\u003c/code\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e2. Per-fragment accumulation.\u003c/strong\u003e Each non-final continuation frame is stored as a new cons cell around its own binary, \u003ccode\u003e[connection.fragment_frame.data | frame.data]\u003c/code\u003e. Only zero-length fragments are kept out, so 1-byte fragments are accepted. Each costs 7 bytes on the wire but keeps about 150 to 170 bytes in memory. Against 1.12.5, 1M fragments kept about 169 MB and 3M kept about 450 MB, growing linearly, and about 56 MB of traffic reaches the 8 MB payload cap.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e3. Kept alive.\u003c/strong\u003e Ping frames sent between fragments are handled by \u003ccode\u003ehandle_control_frame\u003c/code\u003e without touching the fragment state, so they keep the connection alive past the idle timeout.\u003c/p\u003e"
            },
            {
              "base64": false,
              "type": "text/markdown",
              "value": "**1. Byte-only limit.** In `Bandit.WebSocket.Connection` (`lib/bandit/websocket/connection.ex`), the fragment limit is checked against `fragment_size`, which only adds up payload bytes (`IO.iodata_length(frame.data)`).\n\n**2. Per-fragment accumulation.** Each non-final continuation frame is stored as a new cons cell around its own binary, `[connection.fragment_frame.data | frame.data]`. Only zero-length fragments are kept out, so 1-byte fragments are accepted. Each costs 7 bytes on the wire but keeps about 150 to 170 bytes in memory. Against 1.12.5, 1M fragments kept about 169 MB and 3M kept about 450 MB, growing linearly, and about 56 MB of traffic reaches the 8 MB payload cap.\n\n**3. Kept alive.** Ping frames sent between fragments are handled by `handle_control_frame` without touching the fragment state, so they keep the connection alive past the idle timeout."
            }
          ],
          "value": "1. Byte-only limit. In Bandit.WebSocket.Connection (lib/bandit/websocket/connection.ex), the fragment limit is checked against fragment_size, which only adds up payload bytes (IO.iodata_length(frame.data)).\n\n2. Per-fragment accumulation. Each non-final continuation frame is stored as a new cons cell around its own binary, [connection.fragment_frame.data | frame.data]. Only zero-length fragments are kept out, so 1-byte fragments are accepted. Each costs 7 bytes on the wire but keeps about 150 to 170 bytes in memory. Against 1.12.5, 1M fragments kept about 169 MB and 3M kept about 450 MB, growing linearly, and about 56 MB of traffic reaches the 8 MB payload cap.\n\n3. Kept alive. Ping frames sent between fragments are handled by handle_control_frame without touching the fragment state, so they keep the connection alive past the idle timeout."
        }
      ]
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
    "assignerShortName": "EEF",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-114213",
    "datePublished": "2026-10-26T13:30:58.262Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-10-23T09:15:01.838Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-10-26T15:35:51.785Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2",
  "vulnerability-lookup:meta": {
    "vulnrichment": {
      "containers": "{\"adp\": [{\"title\": \"CISA ADP Vulnrichment\", \"metrics\": [{\"other\": {\"type\": \"ssvc\", \"content\": {\"id\": \"CVE-2026-114213\", \"role\": \"CISA Coordinator\", \"options\": [{\"Exploitation\": \"none\"}, {\"Automatable\": \"yes\"}, {\"Technical Impact\": \"partial\"}], \"version\": \"2.0.3\", \"timestamp\": \"2026-10-26T15:03:01.722486Z\"}}}], \"providerMetadata\": {\"orgId\": \"134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0\", \"shortName\": \"CISA-ADP\", \"dateUpdated\": \"2026-10-26T15:32:57.015Z\"}}], \"cna\": {\"title\": \"WebSocket 1-byte continuation frames bypass `max_fragmented_message_size` in Bandit\", \"source\": {\"discovery\": \"UNKNOWN\"}, \"credits\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"type\": \"reporter\", \"value\": \"Peter Ullrich\"}, {\"lang\": \"en\", \"type\": \"remediation developer\", \"value\": \"Mat Trudel\"}, {\"lang\": \"en\", \"type\": \"analyst\", \"value\": \"Jonatan M\\u00e4nnchen / EEF\"}], \"impacts\": [{\"capecId\": \"CAPEC-130\", \"descriptions\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"value\": \"An unauthenticated client can make one WebSocket connection hold about 150 times max_fragmented_message_size in server memory (about 82 MB for 3.5 MB of traffic in the reporter\u0027s test). This affects any Bandit server that accepts WebSocket upgrades with default settings, including Phoenix LiveView and Channels apps.\", \"supportingMedia\": [{\"type\": \"text/html\", \"value\": \"\u003cp\u003eAn unauthenticated client can make one WebSocket connection hold about 150 times \u003ccode\u003emax_fragmented_message_size\u003c/code\u003e in server memory (about 82 MB for 3.5 MB of traffic in the reporter\u0027s test). This affects any Bandit server that accepts WebSocket upgrades with default settings, including Phoenix LiveView and Channels apps.\u003c/p\u003e\", \"base64\": false}, {\"type\": \"text/markdown\", \"value\": \"An unauthenticated client can make one WebSocket connection hold about 150 times `max_fragmented_message_size` in server memory (about 82 MB for 3.5 MB of traffic in the reporter\u0027s test). This affects any Bandit server that accepts WebSocket upgrades with default settings, including Phoenix LiveView and Channels apps.\", \"base64\": false}]}]}], \"metrics\": [{\"format\": \"CVSS\", \"cvssV4_0\": {\"Safety\": \"NOT_DEFINED\", \"version\": \"4.0\", \"Recovery\": \"NOT_DEFINED\", \"baseScore\": 8.7, \"Automatable\": \"NOT_DEFINED\", \"attackVector\": \"NETWORK\", \"baseSeverity\": \"HIGH\", \"valueDensity\": \"NOT_DEFINED\", \"vectorString\": \"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N\", \"providerUrgency\": \"NOT_DEFINED\", \"userInteraction\": \"NONE\", \"attackComplexity\": \"LOW\", \"attackRequirements\": \"NONE\", \"privilegesRequired\": \"NONE\", \"subIntegrityImpact\": \"NONE\", \"vulnIntegrityImpact\": \"NONE\", \"subAvailabilityImpact\": \"NONE\", \"vulnAvailabilityImpact\": \"HIGH\", \"subConfidentialityImpact\": \"NONE\", \"vulnConfidentialityImpact\": \"NONE\", \"vulnerabilityResponseEffort\": \"NOT_DEFINED\"}, \"scenarios\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"value\": \"GENERAL\"}]}], \"affected\": [{\"cpes\": [\"cpe:2.3:a:mtrudel:bandit:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*\"], \"repo\": \"https://github.com/mtrudel/bandit\", \"vendor\": \"mtrudel\", \"product\": \"bandit\", \"versions\": [{\"status\": \"affected\", \"version\": \"1.11.0\", \"lessThan\": \"1.14.0\", \"versionType\": \"semver\"}], \"packageURL\": \"pkg:hex/bandit\", \"packageName\": \"bandit\", \"collectionURL\": \"https://repo.hex.pm\", \"defaultStatus\": \"unaffected\"}, {\"cpes\": [\"cpe:2.3:a:mtrudel:bandit:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*\"], \"repo\": \"https://github.com/mtrudel/bandit\", \"vendor\": \"mtrudel\", \"product\": \"bandit\", \"versions\": [{\"status\": \"affected\", \"version\": \"21612c7c7b1ce43eccd36d3af3a2299d23513667\", \"lessThan\": \"220b9dfd27f9a21305be2afc75cbe585ddc24e7a\", \"versionType\": \"git\"}], \"packageURL\": \"pkg:github/mtrudel/bandit\", \"packageName\": \"mtrudel/bandit\", \"collectionURL\": \"https://github.com\", \"defaultStatus\": \"unaffected\"}], \"references\": [{\"url\": \"https://github.com/mtrudel/bandit/security/advisories/GHSA-cpx7-qf6w-jc63\", \"name\": \"WebSocket 1-byte continuation frames bypass `max_fragmented_message_size` in Bandit\", \"tags\": [\"vendor-advisory\", \"related\"]}, {\"url\": \"https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-114213.html\", \"name\": \"EEF CNA record for CVE-2026-114213\", \"tags\": [\"related\"]}, {\"url\": \"https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-114213\", \"name\": \"OSV record EEF-CVE-2026-114213\", \"tags\": [\"related\"]}, {\"url\": \"https://github.com/mtrudel/bandit/commit/21612c7c7b1ce43eccd36d3af3a2299d23513667\", \"name\": \"Introducing commit 21612c7 in mtrudel/bandit\", \"tags\": [\"related\"]}, {\"url\": \"https://github.com/mtrudel/bandit/commit/220b9dfd27f9a21305be2afc75cbe585ddc24e7a\", \"name\": \"Fix commit 220b9df in mtrudel/bandit\", \"tags\": [\"patch\"]}], \"workarounds\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"value\": \"Lower websocket_options: [max_fragmented_message_size: ...] to the largest fragmented message the application needs, for example 65_536. Memory per connection stays at about 150 times this limit, so a lower limit lowers the ceiling.\", \"supportingMedia\": [{\"type\": \"text/html\", \"value\": \"\u003cp\u003eLower \u003ccode\u003ewebsocket_options: [max_fragmented_message_size: ...]\u003c/code\u003e to the largest fragmented message the application needs, for example \u003ccode\u003e65_536\u003c/code\u003e. Memory per connection stays at about 150 times this limit, so a lower limit lowers the ceiling.\u003c/p\u003e\", \"base64\": false}, {\"type\": \"text/markdown\", \"value\": \"Lower `websocket_options: [max_fragmented_message_size: ...]` to the largest fragmented message the application needs, for example `65_536`. Memory per connection stays at about 150 times this limit, so a lower limit lowers the ceiling.\", \"base64\": false}]}], \"dateAssigned\": \"2026-10-23T12:53:37.000Z\", \"descriptions\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"value\": \"Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in the WebSocket fragment reassembly of mtrudel bandit allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to exhaust server memory via a fragmented message made of many 1-byte continuation frames.\\n\\nBandit.WebSocket.Connection checks max_fragmented_message_size against the payload bytes received, but keeps every non-final continuation frame as a new list cell around its own binary, and nothing limits the number of fragments. A 1-byte fragment costs 7 bytes on the wire but about 150 to 170 bytes of server memory, so one connection can hold about 150 times the configured limit, roughly 1.2 to 1.4 GB at the default 8 MB. Ping frames between fragments keep the connection alive past the idle timeout.\\n\\nThis issue affects bandit: from 1.11.0 before 1.14.0.\", \"supportingMedia\": [{\"type\": \"text/html\", \"value\": \"\u003cp\u003eAllocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in the WebSocket fragment reassembly of mtrudel bandit allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to exhaust server memory via a fragmented message made of many 1-byte continuation frames.\u003c/p\u003e\\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ccode\u003eBandit.WebSocket.Connection\u003c/code\u003e checks \u003ccode\u003emax_fragmented_message_size\u003c/code\u003e against the payload bytes received, but keeps every non-final continuation frame as a new list cell around its own binary, and nothing limits the number of fragments. A 1-byte fragment costs 7 bytes on the wire but about 150 to 170 bytes of server memory, so one connection can hold about 150 times the configured limit, roughly 1.2 to 1.4 GB at the default 8 MB. Ping frames between fragments keep the connection alive past the idle timeout.\u003c/p\u003e\\n\u003cp\u003eThis issue affects bandit: from 1.11.0 before 1.14.0.\u003c/p\u003e\", \"base64\": false}, {\"type\": \"text/markdown\", \"value\": \"Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in the WebSocket fragment reassembly of mtrudel bandit allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to exhaust server memory via a fragmented message made of many 1-byte continuation frames.\\n\\n`Bandit.WebSocket.Connection` checks `max_fragmented_message_size` against the payload bytes received, but keeps every non-final continuation frame as a new list cell around its own binary, and nothing limits the number of fragments. A 1-byte fragment costs 7 bytes on the wire but about 150 to 170 bytes of server memory, so one connection can hold about 150 times the configured limit, roughly 1.2 to 1.4 GB at the default 8 MB. Ping frames between fragments keep the connection alive past the idle timeout.\\n\\nThis issue affects bandit: from 1.11.0 before 1.14.0.\", \"base64\": false}]}], \"problemTypes\": [{\"descriptions\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"type\": \"CWE\", \"cweId\": \"CWE-770\", \"description\": \"CWE-770 Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling\"}]}], \"cpeApplicability\": [{\"nodes\": [{\"negate\": false, \"cpeMatch\": [{\"criteria\": \"cpe:2.3:a:mtrudel:bandit:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*\", \"vulnerable\": true, \"versionEndExcluding\": \"1.14.0\", \"versionStartIncluding\": \"1.11.0\"}], \"operator\": \"OR\"}], \"operator\": \"AND\"}], \"providerMetadata\": {\"orgId\": \"6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db\", \"shortName\": \"EEF\", \"dateUpdated\": \"2026-10-26T13:30:58.262Z\"}, \"x_proofOfConcept\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"value\": \"* Run Bandit with default settings and a WebSock that accepts every connection.\\n* Complete the WebSocket upgrade and send a non-final text frame with a 1-byte payload.\\n* Send 500,000 masked non-final continuation frames with 1-byte payloads, 3.5 MB in all.\\n* Send a Ping. The server answers with a Pong, and BEAM memory has grown by about 82 MB while the message is still far below the 8 MB cap.\", \"supportingMedia\": [{\"type\": \"text/html\", \"value\": \"\u003col\u003e\\n\u003cli\u003eRun Bandit with default settings and a WebSock that accepts every connection.\u003c/li\u003e\\n\u003cli\u003eComplete the WebSocket upgrade and send a non-final text frame with a 1-byte payload.\u003c/li\u003e\\n\u003cli\u003eSend 500,000 masked non-final continuation frames with 1-byte payloads, 3.5 MB in all.\u003c/li\u003e\\n\u003cli\u003eSend a Ping. The server answers with a Pong, and BEAM memory has grown by about 82 MB while the message is still far below the 8 MB cap.\u003c/li\u003e\\n\u003c/ol\u003e\", \"base64\": false}, {\"type\": \"text/markdown\", \"value\": \"1. Run Bandit with default settings and a WebSock that accepts every connection.\\n2. Complete the WebSocket upgrade and send a non-final text frame with a 1-byte payload.\\n3. Send 500,000 masked non-final continuation frames with 1-byte payloads, 3.5 MB in all.\\n4. Send a Ping. The server answers with a Pong, and BEAM memory has grown by about 82 MB while the message is still far below the 8 MB cap.\", \"base64\": false}]}], \"x_technicalAnalysis\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"value\": \"1. Byte-only limit. In Bandit.WebSocket.Connection (lib/bandit/websocket/connection.ex), the fragment limit is checked against fragment_size, which only adds up payload bytes (IO.iodata_length(frame.data)).\\n\\n2. Per-fragment accumulation. Each non-final continuation frame is stored as a new cons cell around its own binary, [connection.fragment_frame.data | frame.data]. Only zero-length fragments are kept out, so 1-byte fragments are accepted. Each costs 7 bytes on the wire but keeps about 150 to 170 bytes in memory. Against 1.12.5, 1M fragments kept about 169 MB and 3M kept about 450 MB, growing linearly, and about 56 MB of traffic reaches the 8 MB payload cap.\\n\\n3. Kept alive. Ping frames sent between fragments are handled by handle_control_frame without touching the fragment state, so they keep the connection alive past the idle timeout.\", \"supportingMedia\": [{\"type\": \"text/html\", \"value\": \"\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e1. Byte-only limit.\u003c/strong\u003e In \u003ccode\u003eBandit.WebSocket.Connection\u003c/code\u003e (\u003ccode\u003elib/bandit/websocket/connection.ex\u003c/code\u003e), the fragment limit is checked against \u003ccode\u003efragment_size\u003c/code\u003e, which only adds up payload bytes (\u003ccode\u003eIO.iodata_length(frame.data)\u003c/code\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e2. Per-fragment accumulation.\u003c/strong\u003e Each non-final continuation frame is stored as a new cons cell around its own binary, \u003ccode\u003e[connection.fragment_frame.data | frame.data]\u003c/code\u003e. Only zero-length fragments are kept out, so 1-byte fragments are accepted. Each costs 7 bytes on the wire but keeps about 150 to 170 bytes in memory. Against 1.12.5, 1M fragments kept about 169 MB and 3M kept about 450 MB, growing linearly, and about 56 MB of traffic reaches the 8 MB payload cap.\u003c/p\u003e\\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e3. Kept alive.\u003c/strong\u003e Ping frames sent between fragments are handled by \u003ccode\u003ehandle_control_frame\u003c/code\u003e without touching the fragment state, so they keep the connection alive past the idle timeout.\u003c/p\u003e\", \"base64\": false}, {\"type\": \"text/markdown\", \"value\": \"**1. Byte-only limit.** In `Bandit.WebSocket.Connection` (`lib/bandit/websocket/connection.ex`), the fragment limit is checked against `fragment_size`, which only adds up payload bytes (`IO.iodata_length(frame.data)`).\\n\\n**2. Per-fragment accumulation.** Each non-final continuation frame is stored as a new cons cell around its own binary, `[connection.fragment_frame.data | frame.data]`. Only zero-length fragments are kept out, so 1-byte fragments are accepted. Each costs 7 bytes on the wire but keeps about 150 to 170 bytes in memory. Against 1.12.5, 1M fragments kept about 169 MB and 3M kept about 450 MB, growing linearly, and about 56 MB of traffic reaches the 8 MB payload cap.\\n\\n**3. Kept alive.** Ping frames sent between fragments are handled by `handle_control_frame` without touching the fragment state, so they keep the connection alive past the idle timeout.\", \"base64\": false}]}]}}",
      "cveMetadata": "{\"cveId\": \"CVE-2026-114213\", \"state\": \"PUBLISHED\", \"dateUpdated\": \"2026-10-26T15:35:51.785Z\", \"dateReserved\": \"2026-10-23T09:15:01.838Z\", \"assignerOrgId\": \"6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db\", \"datePublished\": \"2026-10-26T13:30:58.262Z\", \"assignerShortName\": \"EEF\"}",
      "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
      "dataVersion": "5.2"
    }
  }
}


Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.


Loading…

Loading…

Loading…

Sightings

Author Source Type Date

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or seen somewhere by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability is confirmed from an analyst perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: This vulnerability was exploited and seen by the user reporting the sighting.
  • Patched: This vulnerability was successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
  • Not exploited: This vulnerability was not exploited or seen by the user reporting the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expresses doubt about the veracity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: This vulnerability was not successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.


Loading…

Loading…