CVE-2026-111108 (GCVE-0-2026-111108)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5
Published
2026-10-28 16:38
Modified
2026-10-28 20:06
Severity ?
CWE
  • CWE-770 - Allocation of resources without limits or throttling
  • CWE-789 - Memory allocation with excessive size value
  • CWE-400 - Uncontrolled Resource Consumption
Summary
Apache Kafka's code-generated protocol readers pre-size an array's collection from the element count declared by the sender. That count is checked only against the bytes remaining in the request buffer, which assumes about one byte per element; because most elements need several bytes, a request can declare far more elements than the buffer holds and still pass. For a keyed array the reader then allocates an ImplicitLinkedHashCollection of capacity (2 * count +1), so a request of a few tens of megabytes can force a heap allocation several times larger before any element is read. The pattern is emitted into every generated reader, so it affects all Kafka API types with an array field.  Impact: Request parsing happens before any authorization check. On a listener that does not require authentication (for example PLAINTEXT), an unauthenticated attacker can send a few concurrent requests that each declare a very large= array length and allocate many times their wire size in broker heap, crashing the broker with an OutOfMemoryError. The reporter demonstrated three concurrent ~90 MB ProduceRequest (v3) connections exhausting a 1 GB heap (~8x amplification). On listeners that require authentication, the attacker needs valid credentials but no specific ACL, since parsing precedes authorization.. Mitigation: Upgrade to Apache Kafka 4.2.2, 4.3.2, or 4.4.0. Until then, lowering socket.request.max.bytes and restricting network access to broker listeners reduces, but does not remove, exposure. Resolution: From Apache Kafka 4.2.2, 4.3.2, and 4.4.0: generated readers cap the initial array pre-allocation at MessageUtil.MAX_PREALLOCATED_ARRAY_CAPACITY (1000) and grow it on demand, and reject a declared array length above MessageUtil.MAX_ARRAY_LENGTH (1,000,000).
References
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
Apache Software Foundation Apache Kafka Version: 3.3.0   ≤ 4.1.2
Version: 4.2.0   ≤ 4.2.1
Version: 4.3.0   ≤ 4.3.1
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