CVE-2026-110499 (GCVE-0-2026-110499)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5
Published
2026-10-26 13:32
Modified
2026-10-26 15:35
Severity ?
VLAI Severity ?
EPSS score ?
CWE
- CWE-770 - Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling
Summary
Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in the HTTP/2 implementation of mtrudel bandit allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to grow per-connection memory and CPU cost without bound via a large SETTINGS_HEADER_TABLE_SIZE. Bandit resizes its HPACK encoder table to whatever size the client advertises, up to 2^32-1 bytes, and indexes response headers into it. Because responses carry distinct values such as date or content-length, nothing is evicted and the table grows with every response for the life of the connection, while each lookup scans it linearly.
The SETTINGS handling in Bandit.HTTP2.Connection (lib/bandit/http2/connection.ex) passes remote_settings.header_table_size to HPAX.resize/2 with no server-side cap, and encode_headers encodes every response header as :store. Serving N responses on one connection therefore costs O(N²) CPU in the connection process.
This issue affects bandit: from 0.3.6 before 1.14.0.
References
Impacted products
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"value": "\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e1. Table size\u003c/strong\u003e (\u003ccode\u003elib/bandit/http2/connection.ex\u003c/code\u003e)\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eOn every SETTINGS frame, \u003ccode\u003eBandit.HTTP2.Connection\u003c/code\u003e passes the peer\u0027s \u003ccode\u003eSETTINGS_HEADER_TABLE_SIZE\u003c/code\u003e straight to \u003ccode\u003eHPAX.resize/2\u003c/code\u003e for the encoder table, accepting values up to 2^32-1. No server-side limit is applied.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e2. Indexing\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ccode\u003eencode_headers\u003c/code\u003e encodes every response header as \u003ccode\u003e:store\u003c/code\u003e, adding it to the dynamic table. Headers whose values differ per response (\u003ccode\u003edate\u003c/code\u003e, \u003ccode\u003econtent-length\u003c/code\u003e, \u003ccode\u003eset-cookie\u003c/code\u003e, \u003ccode\u003ex-request-id\u003c/code\u003e, a reflected \u003ccode\u003elocation\u003c/code\u003e) produce new entries, and with a limit of about 4 GB none are evicted.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e3. Cost\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eHPAX\u0027s \u003ccode\u003elookup_by_header\u003c/code\u003e scans the table linearly for each header it encodes, so every response costs more than the one before it. Serving N responses on one connection costs O(N\u00b2) CPU in the connection process, and the table holds every entry for as long as the connection stays open.\u003c/p\u003e"
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Alternatively, disable HTTP/2 with http_2_options: [enabled: false].\", \"supportingMedia\": [{\"type\": \"text/html\", \"value\": \"\u003cp\u003eFrom 0.7.0, cap the requests one HTTP/2 connection may serve, for example with \u003ccode\u003ehttp_2_options: [max_requests: 1000]\u003c/code\u003e, so each connection and its encoder table is closed before the cost grows large. Alternatively, disable HTTP/2 with \u003ccode\u003ehttp_2_options: [enabled: false]\u003c/code\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\", \"base64\": false}, {\"type\": \"text/markdown\", \"value\": \"From 0.7.0, cap the requests one HTTP/2 connection may serve, for example with `http_2_options: [max_requests: 1000]`, so each connection and its encoder table is closed before the cost grows large. Alternatively, disable HTTP/2 with `http_2_options: [enabled: false]`.\", \"base64\": false}]}], \"dateAssigned\": \"2026-10-23T10:42:03.000Z\", \"descriptions\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"value\": \"Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in the HTTP/2 implementation of mtrudel bandit allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to grow per-connection memory and CPU cost without bound via a large SETTINGS_HEADER_TABLE_SIZE. Bandit resizes its HPACK encoder table to whatever size the client advertises, up to 2^32-1 bytes, and indexes response headers into it. Because responses carry distinct values such as date or content-length, nothing is evicted and the table grows with every response for the life of the connection, while each lookup scans it linearly.\\n\\nThe SETTINGS handling in Bandit.HTTP2.Connection (lib/bandit/http2/connection.ex) passes remote_settings.header_table_size to HPAX.resize/2 with no server-side cap, and encode_headers encodes every response header as :store. Serving N responses on one connection therefore costs O(N\\u00b2) CPU in the connection process.\\n\\nThis issue affects bandit: from 0.3.6 before 1.14.0.\", \"supportingMedia\": [{\"type\": \"text/html\", \"value\": \"\u003cp\u003eAllocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in the HTTP/2 implementation of mtrudel bandit allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to grow per-connection memory and CPU cost without bound via a large \u003ccode\u003eSETTINGS_HEADER_TABLE_SIZE\u003c/code\u003e. Bandit resizes its HPACK encoder table to whatever size the client advertises, up to 2^32-1 bytes, and indexes response headers into it. Because responses carry distinct values such as \u003ccode\u003edate\u003c/code\u003e or \u003ccode\u003econtent-length\u003c/code\u003e, nothing is evicted and the table grows with every response for the life of the connection, while each lookup scans it linearly.\u003c/p\u003e\\n\u003cp\u003eThe SETTINGS handling in \u003ccode\u003eBandit.HTTP2.Connection\u003c/code\u003e (\u003ccode\u003elib/bandit/http2/connection.ex\u003c/code\u003e) passes \u003ccode\u003eremote_settings.header_table_size\u003c/code\u003e to \u003ccode\u003eHPAX.resize/2\u003c/code\u003e with no server-side cap, and \u003ccode\u003eencode_headers\u003c/code\u003e encodes every response header as \u003ccode\u003e:store\u003c/code\u003e. Serving N responses on one connection therefore costs O(N\\u00b2) CPU in the connection process.\u003c/p\u003e\\n\u003cp\u003eThis issue affects bandit: from 0.3.6 before 1.14.0.\u003c/p\u003e\", \"base64\": false}, {\"type\": \"text/markdown\", \"value\": \"Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in the HTTP/2 implementation of mtrudel bandit allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to grow per-connection memory and CPU cost without bound via a large `SETTINGS_HEADER_TABLE_SIZE`. Bandit resizes its HPACK encoder table to whatever size the client advertises, up to 2^32-1 bytes, and indexes response headers into it. Because responses carry distinct values such as `date` or `content-length`, nothing is evicted and the table grows with every response for the life of the connection, while each lookup scans it linearly.\\n\\nThe SETTINGS handling in `Bandit.HTTP2.Connection` (`lib/bandit/http2/connection.ex`) passes `remote_settings.header_table_size` to `HPAX.resize/2` with no server-side cap, and `encode_headers` encodes every response header as `:store`. Serving N responses on one connection therefore costs O(N\\u00b2) CPU in the connection process.\\n\\nThis issue affects bandit: from 0.3.6 before 1.14.0.\", \"base64\": false}]}], \"problemTypes\": [{\"descriptions\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"type\": \"CWE\", \"cweId\": \"CWE-770\", \"description\": \"CWE-770 Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling\"}]}], \"cpeApplicability\": [{\"nodes\": [{\"negate\": false, \"cpeMatch\": [{\"criteria\": \"cpe:2.3:a:mtrudel:bandit:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*\", \"vulnerable\": true, \"versionEndExcluding\": \"1.14.0\", \"versionStartIncluding\": \"0.3.6\"}], \"operator\": \"OR\"}], \"operator\": \"AND\"}], \"providerMetadata\": {\"orgId\": \"6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db\", \"shortName\": \"EEF\", \"dateUpdated\": \"2026-10-26T13:32:38.613Z\"}, \"x_proofOfConcept\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"value\": \"* Open an HTTP/2 connection and advertise a SETTINGS_HEADER_TABLE_SIZE of 4294967295 in the initial SETTINGS frame.\\n* Send cheap requests one after another on that connection, each to an endpoint whose response carries a header value that changes per request.\\n* Time the round trips. In the reporter\u0027s run, the last 1,000 of 12,000 requests took 3.68 times as long as the first 1,000.\", \"supportingMedia\": [{\"type\": \"text/html\", \"value\": \"\u003col\u003e\\n\u003cli\u003eOpen an HTTP/2 connection and advertise a \u003ccode\u003eSETTINGS_HEADER_TABLE_SIZE\u003c/code\u003e of 4294967295 in the initial SETTINGS frame.\u003c/li\u003e\\n\u003cli\u003eSend cheap requests one after another on that connection, each to an endpoint whose response carries a header value that changes per request.\u003c/li\u003e\\n\u003cli\u003eTime the round trips. In the reporter\u0027s run, the last 1,000 of 12,000 requests took 3.68 times as long as the first 1,000.\u003c/li\u003e\\n\u003c/ol\u003e\", \"base64\": false}, {\"type\": \"text/markdown\", \"value\": \"1. Open an HTTP/2 connection and advertise a `SETTINGS_HEADER_TABLE_SIZE` of 4294967295 in the initial SETTINGS frame.\\n2. Send cheap requests one after another on that connection, each to an endpoint whose response carries a header value that changes per request.\\n3. Time the round trips. In the reporter\u0027s run, the last 1,000 of 12,000 requests took 3.68 times as long as the first 1,000.\", \"base64\": false}]}], \"x_technicalAnalysis\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"value\": \"1. Table size (lib/bandit/http2/connection.ex)\\n\\nOn every SETTINGS frame, Bandit.HTTP2.Connection passes the peer\u0027s SETTINGS_HEADER_TABLE_SIZE straight to HPAX.resize/2 for the encoder table, accepting values up to 2^32-1. No server-side limit is applied.\\n\\n2. Indexing\\n\\nencode_headers encodes every response header as :store, adding it to the dynamic table. Headers whose values differ per response (date, content-length, set-cookie, x-request-id, a reflected location) produce new entries, and with a limit of about 4 GB none are evicted.\\n\\n3. Cost\\n\\nHPAX\u0027s lookup_by_header scans the table linearly for each header it encodes, so every response costs more than the one before it. Serving N responses on one connection costs O(N\\u00b2) CPU in the connection process, and the table holds every entry for as long as the connection stays open.\", \"supportingMedia\": [{\"type\": \"text/html\", \"value\": \"\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e1. Table size\u003c/strong\u003e (\u003ccode\u003elib/bandit/http2/connection.ex\u003c/code\u003e)\u003c/p\u003e\\n\u003cp\u003eOn every SETTINGS frame, \u003ccode\u003eBandit.HTTP2.Connection\u003c/code\u003e passes the peer\u0027s \u003ccode\u003eSETTINGS_HEADER_TABLE_SIZE\u003c/code\u003e straight to \u003ccode\u003eHPAX.resize/2\u003c/code\u003e for the encoder table, accepting values up to 2^32-1. No server-side limit is applied.\u003c/p\u003e\\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e2. Indexing\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ccode\u003eencode_headers\u003c/code\u003e encodes every response header as \u003ccode\u003e:store\u003c/code\u003e, adding it to the dynamic table. Headers whose values differ per response (\u003ccode\u003edate\u003c/code\u003e, \u003ccode\u003econtent-length\u003c/code\u003e, \u003ccode\u003eset-cookie\u003c/code\u003e, \u003ccode\u003ex-request-id\u003c/code\u003e, a reflected \u003ccode\u003elocation\u003c/code\u003e) produce new entries, and with a limit of about 4 GB none are evicted.\u003c/p\u003e\\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e3. Cost\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\\n\u003cp\u003eHPAX\u0027s \u003ccode\u003elookup_by_header\u003c/code\u003e scans the table linearly for each header it encodes, so every response costs more than the one before it. Serving N responses on one connection costs O(N\\u00b2) CPU in the connection process, and the table holds every entry for as long as the connection stays open.\u003c/p\u003e\", \"base64\": false}, {\"type\": \"text/markdown\", \"value\": \"**1. Table size** (`lib/bandit/http2/connection.ex`)\\n\\nOn every SETTINGS frame, `Bandit.HTTP2.Connection` passes the peer\u0027s `SETTINGS_HEADER_TABLE_SIZE` straight to `HPAX.resize/2` for the encoder table, accepting values up to 2^32-1. No server-side limit is applied.\\n\\n**2. Indexing**\\n\\n`encode_headers` encodes every response header as `:store`, adding it to the dynamic table. Headers whose values differ per response (`date`, `content-length`, `set-cookie`, `x-request-id`, a reflected `location`) produce new entries, and with a limit of about 4 GB none are evicted.\\n\\n**3. Cost**\\n\\nHPAX\u0027s `lookup_by_header` scans the table linearly for each header it encodes, so every response costs more than the one before it. Serving N responses on one connection costs O(N\\u00b2) CPU in the connection process, and the table holds every entry for as long as the connection stays open.\", \"base64\": false}]}]}}",
"cveMetadata": "{\"cveId\": \"CVE-2026-110499\", \"state\": \"PUBLISHED\", \"dateUpdated\": \"2026-10-26T15:35:50.929Z\", \"dateReserved\": \"2026-10-22T09:30:02.077Z\", \"assignerOrgId\": \"6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db\", \"datePublished\": \"2026-10-26T13:32:38.613Z\", \"assignerShortName\": \"EEF\"}",
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2"
}
}
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or seen somewhere by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability is confirmed from an analyst perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: This vulnerability was exploited and seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Patched: This vulnerability was successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not exploited: This vulnerability was not exploited or seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expresses doubt about the veracity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: This vulnerability was not successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
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