CVE-2026-107496 (GCVE-0-2026-107496)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-10 18:14 – Updated: 2026-11-10 18:14
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Infinite Loop in CMS_encrypt() With an EC Group Order of 1
Summary
Issue summary: Encrypting a CMS message to an EC certificate whose group order
is 1 may cause CMS_encrypt() or CMS_encrypt_ex() to loop indefinitely.
Impact summary: An attacker able to supply the recipient certificate to an
application performing CMS encryption can cause that application to loop
indefinitely, consuming CPU and resulting in Denial of Service.
CWE: CWE-835: Loop with Unreachable Exit Condition ('Infinite Loop')
Description: CMS_encrypt() and CMS_encrypt_ex() encrypt a message to one or
more recipient certificates and, for an EC recipient, generate an ephemeral
key in the recipient's group. If the certificate declares a group order of 1,
random scalar generation can only produce zero. The key generation routine
then retries without limit while waiting for a nonzero private scalar, so the
call never returns.
The OpenSSL TLS and QUIC implementations do not use this path. An application
is exposed only if it calls CMS_encrypt() or CMS_encrypt_ex() with a recipient
certificate whose EC parameters are attacker-controlled. Certificates with
normal EC group orders do not trigger the loop.
OpenSSL 4.0 and later reject unknown explicit EC groups in default builds.
These versions are affected only when configured with the
enable-ec_explicit_curves option.
The result is a hang that consumes a CPU core until the process is
interrupted, a Denial of Service. The severity is Low because the attacker
must supply the recipient certificate and the application must choose to
encrypt to it; ordinary CMS encryption to trusted recipients is unaffected.
The fix makes EC key generation fail when the group has no valid nonzero
private scalar, instead of retrying indefinitely.
FIPS impact: no
The FIPS modules in 4.1, 4.0, 3.5 and 3.0 are not affected. The FIPS provider
does not support arbitrary explicit EC domain parameters, so an order-1 group
is rejected during key import before the vulnerable key generation path is
reached.
Severity
No CVSS data available.
CWE
- CWE-835 - Loop with Unreachable Exit Condition ('Infinite Loop')
Assigner
openssl
CNA
References
4 references
Impacted products
Date Public
2026-11-10 11:00
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"value": "Yinxi Liu"
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"type": "remediation developer",
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"value": "Issue summary: Encrypting a CMS message to an EC certificate whose group order\u003cbr\u003eis 1 may cause CMS_encrypt() or CMS_encrypt_ex() to loop indefinitely.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eImpact summary: An attacker able to supply the recipient certificate to an\u003cbr\u003eapplication performing CMS encryption can cause that application to loop\u003cbr\u003eindefinitely, consuming CPU and resulting in Denial of Service.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eCWE: CWE-835: Loop with Unreachable Exit Condition (\u0027Infinite Loop\u0027)\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eDescription: CMS_encrypt() and CMS_encrypt_ex() encrypt a message to one or\u003cbr\u003emore recipient certificates and, for an EC recipient, generate an ephemeral\u003cbr\u003ekey in the recipient\u0027s group. If the certificate declares a group order of 1,\u003cbr\u003erandom scalar generation can only produce zero. The key generation routine\u003cbr\u003ethen retries without limit while waiting for a nonzero private scalar, so the\u003cbr\u003ecall never returns.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eThe OpenSSL TLS and QUIC implementations do not use this path. An application\u003cbr\u003eis exposed only if it calls CMS_encrypt() or CMS_encrypt_ex() with a recipient\u003cbr\u003ecertificate whose EC parameters are attacker-controlled. Certificates with\u003cbr\u003enormal EC group orders do not trigger the loop.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eOpenSSL 4.0 and later reject unknown explicit EC groups in default builds.\u003cbr\u003eThese versions are affected only when configured with the\u003cbr\u003eenable-ec_explicit_curves option.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eThe result is a hang that consumes a CPU core until the process is\u003cbr\u003einterrupted, a Denial of Service. The severity is Low because the attacker\u003cbr\u003emust supply the recipient certificate and the application must choose to\u003cbr\u003eencrypt to it; ordinary CMS encryption to trusted recipients is unaffected.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eThe fix makes EC key generation fail when the group has no valid nonzero\u003cbr\u003eprivate scalar, instead of retrying indefinitely.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eFIPS impact: no\u003cbr\u003eThe FIPS modules in 4.1, 4.0, 3.5 and 3.0 are not affected. The FIPS provider\u003cbr\u003edoes not support arbitrary explicit EC domain parameters, so an order-1 group\u003cbr\u003eis rejected during key import before the vulnerable key generation path is\u003cbr\u003ereached."
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"value": "Issue summary: Encrypting a CMS message to an EC certificate whose group order\nis 1 may cause CMS_encrypt() or CMS_encrypt_ex() to loop indefinitely.\n\nImpact summary: An attacker able to supply the recipient certificate to an\napplication performing CMS encryption can cause that application to loop\nindefinitely, consuming CPU and resulting in Denial of Service.\n\nCWE: CWE-835: Loop with Unreachable Exit Condition (\u0027Infinite Loop\u0027)\n\nDescription: CMS_encrypt() and CMS_encrypt_ex() encrypt a message to one or\nmore recipient certificates and, for an EC recipient, generate an ephemeral\nkey in the recipient\u0027s group. If the certificate declares a group order of 1,\nrandom scalar generation can only produce zero. The key generation routine\nthen retries without limit while waiting for a nonzero private scalar, so the\ncall never returns.\n\nThe OpenSSL TLS and QUIC implementations do not use this path. An application\nis exposed only if it calls CMS_encrypt() or CMS_encrypt_ex() with a recipient\ncertificate whose EC parameters are attacker-controlled. Certificates with\nnormal EC group orders do not trigger the loop.\n\nOpenSSL 4.0 and later reject unknown explicit EC groups in default builds.\nThese versions are affected only when configured with the\nenable-ec_explicit_curves option.\n\nThe result is a hang that consumes a CPU core until the process is\ninterrupted, a Denial of Service. The severity is Low because the attacker\nmust supply the recipient certificate and the application must choose to\nencrypt to it; ordinary CMS encryption to trusted recipients is unaffected.\n\nThe fix makes EC key generation fail when the group has no valid nonzero\nprivate scalar, instead of retrying indefinitely.\n\nFIPS impact: no\nThe FIPS modules in 4.1, 4.0, 3.5 and 3.0 are not affected. The FIPS provider\ndoes not support arbitrary explicit EC domain parameters, so an order-1 group\nis rejected during key import before the vulnerable key generation path is\nreached."
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"url": "https://openssl-library.org/news/secadv/20261110.txt"
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"name": "3.5.10 git commit",
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"url": "https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/a0051cfe699bf5a047bc1c4faef65f80f7987366"
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"discovery": "UNKNOWN"
},
"title": "Infinite Loop in CMS_encrypt() With an EC Group Order of 1",
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"datePublished": "2026-11-10T18:14:18.207Z",
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