CVE-2026-107336 (GCVE-0-2026-107336)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5
Published
2026-10-08 17:20
Modified
2026-10-14 19:39
CWE
  • CWE-290 - Authentication bypass by spoofing
  • CWE-441 - Unintended Proxy or Intermediary
  • CWE-863 - Incorrect Authorization
Summary
Malcolm's front nginx reverse proxy defines a "Dashboards → Arkime shortcut" location using a case-insensitive regex matcher but a case-sensitive rewrite. A request whose path segment is not exact-lowercase (for example /IDDASH2ARK/...) enters the location (the matcher fires) but evades the rewrite (no redirect is issued), so nginx falls through to the location's proxy_pass to the Arkime backend. That location is the one proxied location in the shipped config that does not include the per-location authentication file, so the request reaches Arkime unauthenticated. The same location also forwards a client-supplied X-Forwarded-User header un-overwritten, and Arkime is configured to trust X-Forwarded-User as the authenticated username — so an unauthenticated network caller can reach the Arkime backend while supplying a forged, auto-provisioned identity.
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
CISA Malcolm Version: 0   <
Create a notification for this product.
Show details on NVD website


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