CVE-2026-104025 (GCVE-0-2026-104025)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5
Published
2026-10-15 12:00
Modified
2026-10-15 13:11
Severity ?
VLAI Severity ?
EPSS score ?
CWE
Summary
Path Traversal (CWE-22) in the execute_obj function of the archive object viewer (peach.pas) in PeaZip 11.2.0 and earlier on Windows allows an attacker who convinces a victim to preview an entry of a crafted archive via the "Preview with... -> Associated application" action (Shift+Ctrl+O) to execute an arbitrary program already present on the victim's system, with no warning dialog. The function validates only outname (PeaZip's own temporary directory) with checkfiledirname, while the string actually executed is the concatenation outname+tempstring; tempstring is taken verbatim from the archive entry name (StringGridList.Cells[12,...]) and is never validated. checkfiledirname (list_utils.pas) rejects control and reserved characters in the file name but performs no ".." path-containment check, so an entry named ../../../../Windows/System32/calc.exe escapes the extraction directory and is passed to cp_open -> ShellExecuteW; the extracting backend (7-Zip) strips the traversal while the opener does not. In addition, the SECEXTCONST dangerous-extension confirmation prompt is implemented only in the double-click handler (grid_obj_open) and not on this preview route, so an executable inside an archive reaches ShellExecuteW unannounced, and where the prompt does fire it names the entry's display name rather than the resolved path that will run. Arbitrary code execution was demonstrated with a proof of concept against official PeaZip builds, confirmed on two archive formats (.zip and .tar) to show the defect is in PeaZip's own path handling and not in a single format parser.
References
| URL | Tags | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
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Impacted products
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or seen somewhere by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability is confirmed from an analyst perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: This vulnerability was exploited and seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Patched: This vulnerability was successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not exploited: This vulnerability was not exploited or seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expresses doubt about the veracity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: This vulnerability was not successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
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