CVE-2026-104016 (GCVE-0-2026-104016)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5
Published
2026-10-27 23:52
Modified
2026-10-27 23:52
Severity ?
VLAI Severity ?
EPSS score ?
CWE
- CWE-190 - Integer Overflow or Wraparound
Summary
ProtobufParser parses length-prefixed protobuf string and bytes fields by checking (_inputPtr + len) <= _inputEnd and then, on the fast path, calling _finishShortText(len). Both use 32-bit signed integer arithmetic. When an attacker supplies a varint decoding to a length near Integer.MAX_VALUE, _inputPtr + len overflows to a negative value, the bounds check passes, and _finishShortText(len) reaches TextBuffer.expandCurrentSegment(len), which performs Arrays.copyOf with no cap and throws OutOfMemoryError: Requested array size exceeds VM limit.
The JVM refuses arrays larger than Integer.MAX_VALUE - 8 before consulting available heap, so -Xmx tuning does not mitigate the issue. StreamReadConstraints.maxStringLength and maxDocumentLength do not gate this path: a 33-byte payload is far below any document-length cap and the string-length check does not fire before the allocation. This was confirmed empirically against shipping artifacts with maxStringLength, maxDocumentLength and maxNestingDepth all configured.
A February 2026 hardening commit added the equivalent overflow guard to the packed-array-length and message-length paths but left the string-length call sites unguarded. No privileges or user interaction beyond the ability to submit data for parsing are required.
References
| URL | Tags | |
|---|---|---|
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FasterXML | jackson-dataformat-protobuf |
Version: 2.6.0 Version: 2.19.0 Version: 2.22.0 |
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|
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"credits": [
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"type": "reporter",
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{
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"value": "\u003cp\u003eProtobufParser parses length-prefixed protobuf string and bytes fields by checking (_inputPtr + len) \u0026lt;= _inputEnd and then, on the fast path, calling _finishShortText(len). Both use 32-bit signed integer arithmetic. When an attacker supplies a varint decoding to a length near Integer.MAX_VALUE, _inputPtr + len overflows to a negative value, the bounds check passes, and _finishShortText(len) reaches TextBuffer.expandCurrentSegment(len), which performs Arrays.copyOf with no cap and throws OutOfMemoryError: Requested array size exceeds VM limit.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe JVM refuses arrays larger than Integer.MAX_VALUE - 8 before consulting available heap, so -Xmx tuning does not mitigate the issue. StreamReadConstraints.maxStringLength and maxDocumentLength do not gate this path: a 33-byte payload is far below any document-length cap and the string-length check does not fire before the allocation. This was confirmed empirically against shipping artifacts with maxStringLength, maxDocumentLength and maxNestingDepth all configured.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eA February 2026 hardening commit added the equivalent overflow guard to the packed-array-length and message-length paths but left the string-length call sites unguarded. No privileges or user interaction beyond the ability to submit data for parsing are required.\u003c/p\u003e"
}
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"value": "ProtobufParser parses length-prefixed protobuf string and bytes fields by checking (_inputPtr + len) \u003c= _inputEnd and then, on the fast path, calling _finishShortText(len). Both use 32-bit signed integer arithmetic. When an attacker supplies a varint decoding to a length near Integer.MAX_VALUE, _inputPtr + len overflows to a negative value, the bounds check passes, and _finishShortText(len) reaches TextBuffer.expandCurrentSegment(len), which performs Arrays.copyOf with no cap and throws OutOfMemoryError: Requested array size exceeds VM limit.\n\n\n\nThe JVM refuses arrays larger than Integer.MAX_VALUE - 8 before consulting available heap, so -Xmx tuning does not mitigate the issue. StreamReadConstraints.maxStringLength and maxDocumentLength do not gate this path: a 33-byte payload is far below any document-length cap and the string-length check does not fire before the allocation. This was confirmed empirically against shipping artifacts with maxStringLength, maxDocumentLength and maxNestingDepth all configured.\n\n\n\nA February 2026 hardening commit added the equivalent overflow guard to the packed-array-length and message-length paths but left the string-length call sites unguarded. No privileges or user interaction beyond the ability to submit data for parsing are required."
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"baseScore": 7.5,
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"confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"integrityImpact": "NONE",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
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"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-10-27T23:52:20.141Z",
"orgId": "36c7be3b-2937-45df-85ea-ca7133ea542c",
"shortName": "HeroDevs"
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"references": [
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"name": "GHSA-c2rq-mcfv-jw29",
"tags": [
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"url": "https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-dataformats-binary/security/advisories/GHSA-c2rq-mcfv-jw29"
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"source": {
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"discovery": "EXTERNAL"
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"timeline": [
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"lang": "en",
"time": "2026-10-20T22:46:00.000Z",
"value": "GHSA-c2rq-mcfv-jw29 published by the maintainer in FasterXML/jackson-dataformats-binary"
}
],
"title": "jackson-dataformat-protobuf: signed integer overflow in string-length paths allows unbounded array allocation and OutOfMemoryError",
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"cveId": "CVE-2026-104016",
"datePublished": "2026-10-27T23:52:20.141Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-10-01T16:52:07.587Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-10-27T23:52:20.141Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or seen somewhere by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability is confirmed from an analyst perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: This vulnerability was exploited and seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Patched: This vulnerability was successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not exploited: This vulnerability was not exploited or seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expresses doubt about the veracity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: This vulnerability was not successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
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