CVE-2026-102758 (GCVE-0-2026-102758)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5
Published
2026-09-29 17:26
Modified
2026-09-30 20:42
Severity ?
VLAI Severity ?
EPSS score ?
CWE
- CWE-126 - Buffer Over-read
Summary
The `_nx_secure_x509_asn1_tlv_block_parse()` function parses ASN.1 TLV (tag-length-value) blocks out of DER-encoded data. It is the primitive underneath all X.509 certificate parsing in NetX Secure, and therefore runs on certificates supplied by a remote peer during the TLS handshake.
The function reads the one-byte ASN.1 tag from the caller's buffer *before* checking that the buffer holds at least one byte. When a caller passes a remaining length of zero, the guard correctly returns `NX_SECURE_X509_ASN1_LENGTH_TOO_LONG`, but the read has already happened one byte past the end of the buffer.
code:
nx_secure/src/nx_secure_x509_asn1_tlv_block_parse.c
```
UINT _nx_secure_x509_asn1_tlv_block_parse(const UCHAR *buffer, ULONG *buffer_length, USHORT *tlv_type,
USHORT *tlv_tag_class, ULONG *tlv_length,
const UCHAR **tlv_data, ULONG *header_length)
{
UINT current_index;
USHORT current_tag;
ULONG length;
ULONG length_bytes;
current_index = 0;
current_tag = buffer[current_index]; /* <-- read before the bounds check */
if (*buffer_length < 1)
{
return(NX_SECURE_X509_ASN1_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
}
```
The remainder of the function is correctly ordered. The multi-byte length path is guarded by `length_bytes > 4 || length_bytes > *buffer_length` before its read loop, the decoded value is checked against `length > *buffer_length`, and the second single-byte length read follows its own `*buffer_length < 1` guard. The tag read is the only load placed ahead of its check.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Eclipse Foundation | NetX Duo |
Version: 0 < |
{
"containers": {
"adp": [
{
"metrics": [
{
"cvssV3_1": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 7.5,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"integrityImpact": "NONE",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
}
},
{
"other": {
"content": {
"id": "CVE-2026-102758",
"options": [
{
"Exploitation": "none"
},
{
"Automatable": "yes"
},
{
"Technical Impact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-09-30T20:42:14.455455Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
},
"type": "ssvc"
}
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-09-30T20:42:39.497Z",
"orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"shortName": "CISA-ADP"
},
"title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
}
],
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"packageName": "NetX Duo",
"product": "NetX Duo",
"vendor": "Eclipse Foundation",
"versions": [
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.5.1.202602",
"status": "affected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "custom"
},
{
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.5.2.202603"
}
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "finder",
"value": "tinic"
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"supportingMedia": [
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/html",
"value": "\u003cp\u003eThe `_nx_secure_x509_asn1_tlv_block_parse()` function parses ASN.1 TLV (tag-length-value) blocks out of DER-encoded data. It is the primitive underneath all X.509 certificate parsing in NetX Secure, and therefore runs on certificates supplied by a remote peer during the TLS handshake.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe function reads the one-byte ASN.1 tag from the caller\u0027s buffer *before* checking that the buffer holds at least one byte. When a caller passes a remaining length of zero, the guard correctly returns `NX_SECURE_X509_ASN1_LENGTH_TOO_LONG`, but the read has already happened one byte past the end of the buffer.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003ecode:\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003enx_secure/src/nx_secure_x509_asn1_tlv_block_parse.c\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e```\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eUINT _nx_secure_x509_asn1_tlv_block_parse(const UCHAR *buffer, ULONG *buffer_length, USHORT *tlv_type,\u003c/p\u003e\u003ccode\u003e USHORT *tlv_tag_class, ULONG *tlv_length,\u003c/code\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003ccode\u003e const UCHAR **tlv_data, ULONG *header_length)\u003c/code\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cp\u003e{\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eUINT current_index;\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eUSHORT current_tag;\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eULONG length;\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eULONG length_bytes;\u003c/p\u003e\u003ccode\u003e current_index = 0;\u003c/code\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003ccode\u003e current_tag = buffer[current_index]; /* \u0026lt;-- read before the bounds check */\u003c/code\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003ccode\u003e if (*buffer_length \u0026lt; 1)\u003c/code\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003ccode\u003e {\u003c/code\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003ccode\u003e return(NX_SECURE_X509_ASN1_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);\u003c/code\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003ccode\u003e }\u003c/code\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cp\u003e```\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe remainder of the function is correctly ordered. The multi-byte length path is guarded by `length_bytes \u0026gt; 4 || length_bytes \u0026gt; *buffer_length` before its read loop, the decoded value is checked against `length \u0026gt; *buffer_length`, and the second single-byte length read follows its own `*buffer_length \u0026lt; 1` guard. The tag read is the only load placed ahead of its check.\u003c/p\u003e"
}
],
"value": "The `_nx_secure_x509_asn1_tlv_block_parse()` function parses ASN.1 TLV (tag-length-value) blocks out of DER-encoded data. It is the primitive underneath all X.509 certificate parsing in NetX Secure, and therefore runs on certificates supplied by a remote peer during the TLS handshake.\n\n\n\nThe function reads the one-byte ASN.1 tag from the caller\u0027s buffer *before* checking that the buffer holds at least one byte. When a caller passes a remaining length of zero, the guard correctly returns `NX_SECURE_X509_ASN1_LENGTH_TOO_LONG`, but the read has already happened one byte past the end of the buffer.\n\n\n\ncode:\n\n\n\nnx_secure/src/nx_secure_x509_asn1_tlv_block_parse.c\n\n\n\n```\n\n\n\nUINT _nx_secure_x509_asn1_tlv_block_parse(const UCHAR *buffer, ULONG *buffer_length, USHORT *tlv_type,\n\n USHORT *tlv_tag_class, ULONG *tlv_length,\n const UCHAR **tlv_data, ULONG *header_length)\n\n\n{\n\n\n\nUINT current_index;\n\n\n\nUSHORT current_tag;\n\n\n\nULONG length;\n\n\n\nULONG length_bytes;\n\n current_index = 0;\n current_tag = buffer[current_index]; /* \u003c-- read before the bounds check */\n if (*buffer_length \u003c 1)\n {\n return(NX_SECURE_X509_ASN1_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);\n }\n\n\n```\n\n\n\nThe remainder of the function is correctly ordered. The multi-byte length path is guarded by `length_bytes \u003e 4 || length_bytes \u003e *buffer_length` before its read loop, the decoded value is checked against `length \u003e *buffer_length`, and the second single-byte length read follows its own `*buffer_length \u003c 1` guard. The tag read is the only load placed ahead of its check."
}
],
"problemTypes": [
{
"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-126",
"description": "CWE-126 Buffer Over-read",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-09-29T17:26:44.424Z",
"orgId": "e51fbebd-6053-4e49-959f-1b94eeb69a2c",
"shortName": "eclipse"
},
"references": [
{
"url": "https://github.com/eclipse-threadx/netxduo/security/advisories/GHSA-f95g-xc4w-mrcr"
}
],
"source": {
"discovery": "UNKNOWN"
},
"x_generator": {
"engine": "Vulnogram 1.0.5"
}
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "e51fbebd-6053-4e49-959f-1b94eeb69a2c",
"assignerShortName": "eclipse",
"cveId": "CVE-2026-102758",
"datePublished": "2026-09-29T17:26:44.424Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-09-29T16:21:58.057Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-09-30T20:42:39.497Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2",
"vulnerability-lookup:meta": {
"vulnrichment": {
"containers": "{\"adp\": [{\"title\": \"CISA ADP Vulnrichment\", \"metrics\": [{\"cvssV3_1\": {\"scope\": \"UNCHANGED\", \"version\": \"3.1\", \"baseScore\": 7.5, \"attackVector\": \"NETWORK\", \"baseSeverity\": \"HIGH\", \"vectorString\": \"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H\", \"integrityImpact\": \"NONE\", \"userInteraction\": \"NONE\", \"attackComplexity\": \"LOW\", \"availabilityImpact\": \"HIGH\", \"privilegesRequired\": \"NONE\", \"confidentialityImpact\": \"NONE\"}}, {\"other\": {\"type\": \"ssvc\", \"content\": {\"id\": \"CVE-2026-102758\", \"role\": \"CISA Coordinator\", \"options\": [{\"Exploitation\": \"none\"}, {\"Automatable\": \"yes\"}, {\"Technical Impact\": \"partial\"}], \"version\": \"2.0.3\", \"timestamp\": \"2026-09-30T20:42:14.455455Z\"}}}], \"providerMetadata\": {\"orgId\": \"134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0\", \"shortName\": \"CISA-ADP\", \"dateUpdated\": \"2026-09-30T20:42:35.929Z\"}}], \"cna\": {\"source\": {\"discovery\": \"UNKNOWN\"}, \"credits\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"type\": \"finder\", \"value\": \"tinic\"}], \"affected\": [{\"vendor\": \"Eclipse Foundation\", \"product\": \"NetX Duo\", \"versions\": [{\"status\": \"affected\", \"version\": \"0\", \"versionType\": \"custom\", \"lessThanOrEqual\": \"6.5.1.202602\"}, {\"status\": \"unaffected\", \"version\": \"6.5.2.202603\"}], \"packageName\": \"NetX Duo\", \"defaultStatus\": \"unaffected\"}], \"references\": [{\"url\": \"https://github.com/eclipse-threadx/netxduo/security/advisories/GHSA-f95g-xc4w-mrcr\"}], \"x_generator\": {\"engine\": \"Vulnogram 1.0.5\"}, \"descriptions\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"value\": \"The `_nx_secure_x509_asn1_tlv_block_parse()` function parses ASN.1 TLV (tag-length-value) blocks out of DER-encoded data. It is the primitive underneath all X.509 certificate parsing in NetX Secure, and therefore runs on certificates supplied by a remote peer during the TLS handshake.\\n\\n\\n\\nThe function reads the one-byte ASN.1 tag from the caller\u0027s buffer *before* checking that the buffer holds at least one byte. When a caller passes a remaining length of zero, the guard correctly returns `NX_SECURE_X509_ASN1_LENGTH_TOO_LONG`, but the read has already happened one byte past the end of the buffer.\\n\\n\\n\\ncode:\\n\\n\\n\\nnx_secure/src/nx_secure_x509_asn1_tlv_block_parse.c\\n\\n\\n\\n```\\n\\n\\n\\nUINT _nx_secure_x509_asn1_tlv_block_parse(const UCHAR *buffer, ULONG *buffer_length, USHORT *tlv_type,\\n\\n USHORT *tlv_tag_class, ULONG *tlv_length,\\n const UCHAR **tlv_data, ULONG *header_length)\\n\\n\\n{\\n\\n\\n\\nUINT current_index;\\n\\n\\n\\nUSHORT current_tag;\\n\\n\\n\\nULONG length;\\n\\n\\n\\nULONG length_bytes;\\n\\n current_index = 0;\\n current_tag = buffer[current_index]; /* \u003c-- read before the bounds check */\\n if (*buffer_length \u003c 1)\\n {\\n return(NX_SECURE_X509_ASN1_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);\\n }\\n\\n\\n```\\n\\n\\n\\nThe remainder of the function is correctly ordered. The multi-byte length path is guarded by `length_bytes \u003e 4 || length_bytes \u003e *buffer_length` before its read loop, the decoded value is checked against `length \u003e *buffer_length`, and the second single-byte length read follows its own `*buffer_length \u003c 1` guard. The tag read is the only load placed ahead of its check.\", \"supportingMedia\": [{\"type\": \"text/html\", \"value\": \"\u003cp\u003eThe `_nx_secure_x509_asn1_tlv_block_parse()` function parses ASN.1 TLV (tag-length-value) blocks out of DER-encoded data. It is the primitive underneath all X.509 certificate parsing in NetX Secure, and therefore runs on certificates supplied by a remote peer during the TLS handshake.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe function reads the one-byte ASN.1 tag from the caller\u0027s buffer *before* checking that the buffer holds at least one byte. When a caller passes a remaining length of zero, the guard correctly returns `NX_SECURE_X509_ASN1_LENGTH_TOO_LONG`, but the read has already happened one byte past the end of the buffer.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003ecode:\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003enx_secure/src/nx_secure_x509_asn1_tlv_block_parse.c\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e```\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eUINT _nx_secure_x509_asn1_tlv_block_parse(const UCHAR *buffer, ULONG *buffer_length, USHORT *tlv_type,\u003c/p\u003e\u003ccode\u003e USHORT *tlv_tag_class, ULONG *tlv_length,\u003c/code\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003ccode\u003e const UCHAR **tlv_data, ULONG *header_length)\u003c/code\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cp\u003e{\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eUINT current_index;\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eUSHORT current_tag;\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eULONG length;\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eULONG length_bytes;\u003c/p\u003e\u003ccode\u003e current_index = 0;\u003c/code\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003ccode\u003e current_tag = buffer[current_index]; /* \u0026lt;-- read before the bounds check */\u003c/code\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003ccode\u003e if (*buffer_length \u0026lt; 1)\u003c/code\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003ccode\u003e {\u003c/code\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003ccode\u003e return(NX_SECURE_X509_ASN1_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);\u003c/code\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003ccode\u003e }\u003c/code\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cp\u003e```\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe remainder of the function is correctly ordered. The multi-byte length path is guarded by `length_bytes \u0026gt; 4 || length_bytes \u0026gt; *buffer_length` before its read loop, the decoded value is checked against `length \u0026gt; *buffer_length`, and the second single-byte length read follows its own `*buffer_length \u0026lt; 1` guard. The tag read is the only load placed ahead of its check.\u003c/p\u003e\", \"base64\": false}]}], \"problemTypes\": [{\"descriptions\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"type\": \"CWE\", \"cweId\": \"CWE-126\", \"description\": \"CWE-126 Buffer Over-read\"}]}], \"providerMetadata\": {\"orgId\": \"e51fbebd-6053-4e49-959f-1b94eeb69a2c\", \"shortName\": \"eclipse\", \"dateUpdated\": \"2026-09-29T17:26:44.424Z\"}}}",
"cveMetadata": "{\"cveId\": \"CVE-2026-102758\", \"state\": \"PUBLISHED\", \"dateUpdated\": \"2026-09-30T20:42:39.497Z\", \"dateReserved\": \"2026-09-29T16:21:58.057Z\", \"assignerOrgId\": \"e51fbebd-6053-4e49-959f-1b94eeb69a2c\", \"datePublished\": \"2026-09-29T17:26:44.424Z\", \"assignerShortName\": \"eclipse\"}",
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2"
}
}
}
Loading…
Loading…
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or seen somewhere by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability is confirmed from an analyst perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: This vulnerability was exploited and seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Patched: This vulnerability was successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not exploited: This vulnerability was not exploited or seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expresses doubt about the veracity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: This vulnerability was not successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
Loading…
Loading…