CVE-2025-68775 (GCVE-0-2025-68775)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5
Published
2026-01-13 15:28
Modified
2026-10-19 18:05
Severity ?
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/handshake: duplicate handshake cancellations leak socket When a handshake request is cancelled it is removed from the handshake_net->hn_requests list, but it is still present in the handshake_rhashtbl until it is destroyed. If a second cancellation request arrives for the same handshake request, then remove_pending() will return false... and assuming HANDSHAKE_F_REQ_COMPLETED isn't set in req->hr_flags, we'll continue processing through the out_true label, where we put another reference on the sock and a refcount underflow occurs. This can happen for example if a handshake times out - particularly if the SUNRPC client sends the AUTH_TLS probe to the server but doesn't follow it up with the ClientHello due to a problem with tlshd. When the timeout is hit on the server, the server will send a FIN, which triggers a cancellation request via xs_reset_transport(). When the timeout is hit on the client, another cancellation request happens via xs_tls_handshake_sync(). Add a test_and_set_bit(HANDSHAKE_F_REQ_COMPLETED) in the pending cancel path so duplicate cancels can be detected.
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
Linux Linux Version: 3b3009ea8abb713b022d94fba95ec270cf6e7eae
Version: 3b3009ea8abb713b022d94fba95ec270cf6e7eae
Version: 3b3009ea8abb713b022d94fba95ec270cf6e7eae
Version: 3b3009ea8abb713b022d94fba95ec270cf6e7eae
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  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or seen somewhere by the user.
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