CVE-2025-24371 (GCVE-0-2025-24371)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2025-02-03 21:20 – Updated: 2025-02-04 19:16
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Malicious peer can make node stuck in blocksync in github.com/cometbft/cometbft
Summary
CometBFT is a distributed, Byzantine fault-tolerant, deterministic state machine replication engine. In the `blocksync` protocol peers send their `base` and `latest` heights when they connect to a new node (`A`), which is syncing to the tip of a network. `base` acts as a lower ground and informs `A` that the peer only has blocks starting from height `base`. `latest` height informs `A` about the latest block in a network. Normally, nodes would only report increasing heights. If `B` fails to provide the latest block, `B` is removed and the `latest` height (target height) is recalculated based on other nodes `latest` heights. The existing code however doesn't check for the case where `B` first reports `latest` height `X` and immediately after height `Y`, where `X > Y`. `A` will be trying to catch up to 2000 indefinitely. This condition requires the introduction of malicious code in the full node first reporting some non-existing `latest` height, then reporting lower `latest` height and nodes which are syncing using `blocksync` protocol. This issue has been patched in versions 1.0.1 and 0.38.17 and all users are advised to upgrade. Operators may attempt to ban malicious peers from the network as a workaround.
Severity
SSVC
Exploitation: none
Automatable: no
Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2025-02-04 19:15 UTC
CWE
- CWE-703 - Improper Check or Handling of Exceptional Conditions
Assigner
GitHub_M
CNA
References
3 references
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/cometbft/cometbft/security/adv… | x_refsource_CONFIRM |
| https://github.com/cometbft/cometbft/releases/tag… | x_refsource_MISC |
| https://github.com/cometbft/cometbft/releases/tag… | x_refsource_MISC |
Impacted products
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Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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